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Abstract
This thesis makes it possible for future reforms of the 
social security system to be based on the best available 
information. An approach to benefit policy analysis is 
defined and a technique for processing available data 
as required is identified. Progress on evaluating 
policies more faithfully in accord with expected
performance rather than assuming perfect implementation 
is made.
Having reviewed the development of the social security 
system and previous contributions to benefit policy 
analysis the requirements of an information system are 
defined. Available data sources are evaluated. This
analysis highlights the complementary nature of the
qualities of the Family Expenditure Survey and
specialised sources. The use of iterative proportional 
fitting procedures to combine these sources in such a 
way as to exploit their strengths and minimise the 
impact of their weaknesses is advocated. Validation
tests show the approach results in good estimates.
Furthermore the approach is easy to understand and lies 
well in an analytic process geared towards increasing 
involvement of non-technical personnel. The same
approach can be used to analyse the alternative benefit 
regimes for the distributional implications of
hypothesised trends in aggregate variables.
The need to consider operational issues when analysing 
policies is recognised. Two aspects of this problem 
are considered. An analysis of appeals data led to 
rankings of aspects of the benefit entitlement
assessment procedure in terms of difficulty caused and 
persistence with which problems arose. The second 
analysis is a pilot study of inter-regional
differences in population characteristics and aspects 
of benefit implementation to identify ways of
improving the operational system generally. An
important aspect of this analysis is the presentation
of data on computer drawn maps - a further attempt to 
increase participation in the analytic process. 
Further development of this work should enable the 
evaluation of policy alternatives in terms of expected 
performance rather than on the assumption of perfect 
implementation.
Chapter 1
Introduction
The purpose of the work described in this thesis is to 
make it possible for future reforms of the social 
security system to be based on the best information 
available. An approach to benefit policy analysis is 
defined and a technique for processing the available data 
as required is identified. Progress on evaluating 
policies more faithfully in accord with their expected 
operation rather than on the assumption of perfect
implementation is also made. The need for further work in 
this field is called for.
The work has been motivated both by the widespread 
political support for major reform of the social security
system and by a number of calls from various quarters in 
recent years for improved analysis and planning of the
system. The Social Services Committee (1980) called for 
more strategic planning at the Department of Health and 
Social Security (DHSS). Blackstone (1983) has argued for 
the definition of cross-programme social priorities and 
the establishment of a mechanism to review progress 
towards their fulfilment. Habib (1979) has called, at an 
international level, for changes in the way in which 
information systems to examine social security issues are
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constructed and presented, leading to new decision making
processes. Politicians including Patrick Jenkin 
(Conservative Party, 1977) and Frank Field (1980) have 
called for family impact statements which describe the 
net distributional implications of social policies on 
individual families. Similar calls have come from the 
Study Commission on the Family (Craven et al. 1982) and 
the Family Services Unit (1983).
Chapter 2 sets out a brief history of the development of 
financial provision for the unemployed in Britain, 
concluding with a short description of the existing 
provisions. The rationale for presenting this material is 
to increase the awareness of potential analysts of social 
security policies of the historical perspective and the 
problems encountered in the past. The specific area of 
provisions for the unemployed is focussed upon because of 
its more controversial nature than other aspects of the 
system and because it has an important influence on the 
overall quality of the service of the system.
Chapter 3 reviews the previous contributions made by the 
Operational Research Services (ORS) division of the DHSS 
to social security policy analysis and describes briefly 
those models existing in other DHSS divisions and 
elsewhere in Government for the purposes of evaluating 
benefit policies. The potential advantages and political 
difficulties of establishing clear objectives for the
2
system are then discussed and, in the concluding section 
of the chapter, a possible future approach to policy 
analyses is proposed which seeks to circumvent these 
problems.
Chapter 4 provides an overview of the major possible 
policy trends in social security being considered by 
political parties and interested pressure groups. This 
material is intended to serve as background information 
for analysts to place the planning of an information 
system for benefit policy analysis on a firmer
foundation. The chapter also seeks to identify common 
questions raised by the wide range of objectives and
policy proposals being put forward by the various
political groups.
Having defined the boundaries of analyses for which OR 
might be of some assistance in future policy evaluations 
in Chapter 4, Chapter 5 then develops this further and 
specifies the requirements of an information system to 
support the necessary analysis and the implications of 
this for choosing suitable data sources for the
information system. There would appear to be a strong 
case for basing the information system on a wide ranging 
survey of a representative sample of the general
population. The most suitable such survey currently
available is the Family Expenditure Survey (FES). 
Accordingly Chapter 6 describes the FES in detail and
I
■
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discusses its weaknesses in relation to benefit 
evaluation studies.
The complementary nature of the strengths and weaknesses 
of the FES and more specialised data sources is 
highlighted and the advantages of combining these so as 
to exploit the strengths of each whilst minimising the 
impact of their inherent disadvantages are clear. Chapter 
7 introduces a computational procedure which seeks to 
achieve this aim and the final section of the chapter 
sets out the analytic framework into which it is 
envisaged the procedure would fit. The quality of the 
results of this approach is discussed in Chapter 8 where 
FES data is combined with varying amounts of information 
from the Annual Statistical Enquiry (ASE) of 
Supplementary Benefit claimants to reproduce known data.
A widespread level of concern with operational aspects of 
the social security system is mentioned at various points 
in the thesis, and the need to tackle them at the policy 
level is also recognised. Chapters 9 and 10 therefore 
describe work carried out on these aspects of the policy 
analysis problem. Chapter 9 concerns an analysis of the 
operational complexity of various dimensions of the 
benefit entitlement assessment procedure based on data 
relating to the appeals procedure. The analysis ranks 
these dimensions according to the degree of difficulty 
which they have caused and classifies them according to
4
whether they have been persistently problematic or 
whether they have caused problems in the short term but 
not in the longer term as the laws were more closely 
defined.
Chapter 10 then adopts a different approach to analysing 
related problems. This chapter describes work done by way 
of a pilot study on the analysis of inter-regional 
differences in population characteristics and aspects of 
the implementation of the benefit system such as levels 
of take-up. Such an approach might lead not only to a 
reduction in the level of any regional variations in 
policy implementation but also to insights into ways in 
which service implementation might be improved generally. 
The data used in the analysis are presented on shaded 
maps and it is hoped that such an approach advances the 
vital aspect of presenting the results of policy analyses 
in such a way that they can be fully appreciated by their 
recipients and such that they serve as a starting point 
and continuing focus for debate and dialogue between 
analysts and policy makers - and possibly Local Office 
staff also.
Chapter 11 draws together the main conclusions of the 
research.
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Chapter 2
The Development of Financial Provision During 
Unemployment
2.1 Motivation
Britain's social security system has been nearly 400 
years in the making. The foundation stone was laid in 
1597 when much of the legislation which went to make up 
the Elizabethan Poor Law reached the statute books - 
where it was to remain for 340 years.
The original Poor Law, the so-called 'Act of 1601', aimed 
to suppress 'vagrancy and idleness' at a time when 
feudalism was coming to an end and society was changing 
radically.
Following an endless procession of piecemeal changes the 
Department of Health and Social Security (DHSS) is now 
responsible for administering benefits valuing some 33 
billion pounds a year at a cost of some 1400 million 
pounds to administer. These benefits aim to prevent 
people from suffering excessive financial hardship as a 
result of one or more of the numerous eventualities which 
cause a temporary or permanent abatement of earned 
income. They are also being used to play an increasing
6
Part persuading people to adjust to a society which is 
changing every bit as radically now as it was at the time 
of the original Poor Law — by offering grants for 
training and retraining, by paying re-location expenses, 
by encouraging early retirement and so on.
The unprecedented rise in unemployment during recent 
years is straining the system to its limits - this was 
expressed at the end of 1982 in the form of industrial 
action amongst benefit office workers who are finding 
that the present system is becoming increasingly 
unworkable.
For some time now there has been a clear and growing need 
for a comprehensive review of the entire income 
maintenance system and this has received increasing 
political support from all parties. See for example 
Labour Party, 1982; Social Democratic Party, 1982; 
Parker, 1982; Vince, 1983. This was formally recognised 
in April 1984 when the Government announced that the 
system was to be examined by four review teams who would 
be reporting at the end of 1984.
As Watkin explained in his historical review of the 
health and social services;
It has been said that armies are always ready 
to fight the last war never the next, and the 
same could be said of architects of social
7
security systems. The scheme of unemployment insurance devised by Churchill and Beveridge before the First World War was unable to cope 
with the massive unemployment of the 1920s and 1930s. Similarly the chronic inflation of the 
19508 and 1960s created problems with which the post-war system was ill-equipped to deal and 
much hardship was caused, especially to the elderly. The contributory principle solved certain problems in its day, but brought others 
in its train. Actuarial soundness and social justice - at least in the strongly egalitarian sense in which the term has been interpreted in 
recent years - seldom marched together. 
(Watkin, 1975s 73).
It is vital that any such review of the system should 
seek to ensure that the reforms which are suggested 
should, as far as possible, be designed to tackle the 
problems of today and tomorrow rather than yesterday. It 
is also important, however, that the reformers are aware 
of the problems encountered and mistakes made by their 
predecessors. Given the record of previous reformers it 
is not unreasonable to suggest that analysts in general 
and Operational Research workers in particular ought to 
have a contribution to make to the debate on the nature 
of such reforms and so it is important that they too 
should have an awareness of the historical and political 
background to the present system.
Although the number of unemployed people in receipt of 
benefits is around 3 million compared with around 9 
million pensioners, as Donnison explains, they account 
for two-thirds of claims for Supplementary Benefits each 
year (a proportion which is increasing with the level of
’unemployment and a decline in the value of National
Insurance benefits) , and as such.
The quality of our service, the morale of itsstaff and its public reputation all depended 
heavily on our capacity for dealing with the 
unemployed. (Donnison, 1982: 67).
It is for these reasons that this chapter sets out a
brief history of the financial provision for the
unemployed in Britain, concluding with a short
description of the existing provisions.
2.2 Early Schemes of Assistance for the Poor
Although relief of some form has been available for the 
poor since the beginning of the seventeenth century there 
was only one piece of legislation which sought to provide 
any positive assistance - and the benevolence shown by 
this was comparatively short-lived.
That exception was a scheme introduced by the Government 
under Charles I which was financed by making landowners 
pay a 'poor rate' . Whilst it did not relax Tudor 
harshness towards the 'idler and vagrant' it did aim to:
i. regulate prices and supplies of basic foods and raw
materials,
ii. provide employment or, failing this, maintenance.
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for the able-bodied willing to work
iii. offer education and apprenticeship for children, 
and
iv• provide cash allowances, medical help and almshouses
for the old and infirm.
However, following the Civil War and the Restoration of 
the monarchy, a new class emerged - the 'self-made man*. 
These people's new-found wealth meant that they were 
paying an increasing proportion of the poor rate, and 
generally resented it - their attitude was typically that 
the poor were perfectly capable of looking after 
themselves if only they were to show more initiative and 
a greater capacity for hard work. This is essentially the 
same philosophy which is expounded today by those people 
who believe in the prevalence of scroungers and voluntary 
unemployment and which is expressed in social security 
legislation such as the denial of the long term rate of 
Supplementary Benefit to unemployed claimants.
An example of the new attitude towards the ' indigent 
poor' as they were now called was the Law of Settlement 
of 1662. This law meant that if a family so much as 
looked as though they might be a burden on the rates of 
the place in which they were living and working they
could be sent away to their place of settlement - that is 
their own parish.
The combination of the Napoleonic Wars and a succession 
of bad harvests led to severe hardship at the end of the 
eighteenth century. In 1795 the Berkshire magistrates met 
at the Pelican Inn in Speenhamland and decided to modify 
the Poor Law by introducing a system of allowances 
financed from the rates to supplement wages of family men 
on a scale dependent upon the number of children and the 
price of bread. Other authorities quickly followed their 
example. Whilst the system did protect the poor it had 
the unforeseen consequence that farmers saw little 
incentive to pay a living wage when they knew it would be 
made up to susbsistence level by the rates.
This famous example illustrates the problems of any form 
of wage subsidy, and many people fear that if similar 
measures were introduced in the future then they would 
inevitably lead to similar consequences. As important, 
perhaps, is the lesson it offers regarding the need to 
think through the full implications of proposed policies 
in advance. It must be regarded as an essential attribute 
of an analytic system to aid policy making in the future, 
therefore, that information is provided in such a way as 
to enable a full consideration to be given to the 
implications without introducing inertia into the policy 
making process. This implies that a certain amount of
basic information must be readily available to the 
analysts.
The following year William Pitt produced a Bill which 
passed the Committee Stage in the House of Commons but 
which, in many ways, anticipated the Beveridge proposals 
made 150 years later. This Bill proposed that district 
social insurance funds be established to be financed from 
the poor rates, gifts from wealthy patrons and 
subscriptions from the insured themselves. Any local 
resident would be eligible to join - there was even a 
suggestion of making the scheme compulsory. Benefits were 
to be paid in sickness and old age and would be dependent 
upon the amount of subscription paid. Membership was to 
be transferable between schemes in order to assist in the 
creation of a national labour market. It was also argued 
that an additional contribution from public funds would 
serve as a form of investment because it would result in 
savings on payments which would have had to have been 
made eventually to alleviate poverty.
The Depression and unemployment which followed the 
Napoleonic Wars made the Elizabethan Poor Relief system 
increasingly expensive even though it offered only 
minimal protection to the poor. In 1832 a Royal 
Commission was set up under the chairmanship of Edwin 
Chadwick to investigate the reform of the Poor Laws. It 
is generally accepted (Walley, 19721 22-3) that the
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Commission did not undertake an objective investigation 
but rather set out to collect evidence to support the 
view of its members that relief for the able-bodied 
should be abolished. Their 'analysis' was centred on 
southern England which was still agricultural and had 
quite different circumstances to the industrial north.
The subsequent legislation, the Poor Law Amendment Act 
1834, was based on two principles, those of 'less 
eligibility* and the 'workhouse test*. The situation of a 
beneficiary of relief was not to be 'really or apparently 
so eligible as the situation of the independent labourer 
of the lowest class' . Relief was to be provided in 
workhouses which were intended to act as a deterrent - if 
large numbers of unemployed had used them the system 
would almost certainly have collapsed. The underlying 
philosophy was that every able-bodied man was capable of 
looking after himself and his family and if the 
alternative was made sufficiently unpleasant then he 
would.
Although there was initial opposition to the proposals, 
especially in the north where their implementation was 
delayed for several years, the approach gradually became 
the accepted way of dealing with the problem of 
unemployment. Again one can identify similar attitudes 
today with a concern for replacement ratios (see Glossary 
in Appendix 2.1) and the need to maintain incentives to
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wor^ spite of very high levels of unemployment and the 
existence of only very few vacancies.
It has always been considered undesirable to enable 
people to receive more in benefits whilst not working 
than they might expect to earn if they were working. 
Whereas some would argue from that point that benefits 
should therefore be held down to ensure that they are 
below the lowest wage levels others would say that 
benefits should aim to provide an acceptable standard of 
living and it is up to employers to then set wage levels 
sufficiently high to attract the requisite workforce. 
Either way it is essential that the tax and benefit 
systems are properly co-ordinated so as to avoid poverty 
and unemployment traps developing (see Appendix 2.1).
The 1834 Act had two major consequences, both of which 
were ultimately undesirable. For the unskilled and 
irregularly employed worker the alternative to the 
workhouse was to have large families in the hope that 
there would eventually be sufficient children to care for 
them in later life. The skilled workers with regular 
employment established friendly societies, trades unions 
and industrial assurance companies to provide for them - 
but the benefits these paid were meagre and, ironically, 
the creation of these institutions was to prove a great 
obstacle to the development of social security in years 
to come as will be explained in the following section.
2.3 A New Approach
By the end of the nineteenth century conditions were 
favourable for a completely new approach to the treatment 
of the poor. There was peace, increasing prosperity, a 
greater awareness of the conditions of the poor and in 
1884 the Third Parliamentary Reform Bill extended the 
vote to around two-thirds of the adult male population.
In 1883 in Germany, Bismarck introduced state supported 
schemes for earnings-related insurance for sickness, 
disablement and old age. For the newly enfranchised 
British worker the idea of a state run social insurance 
scheme was appealing - he understood the principles of 
insurance and would trust the state (but not employers) 
to organise such a scheme. The Poor Law offered no real 
alternative and so insurance did not have to show itself 
to be better than any apparently free system. Society is 
more complicated now than at the beginning of the century 
and the choices more diffuse. If a major reform is to 
gain popular acceptance - however great the 
dissatisfaction with the present system may be - then the 
proposed replacement must be shown to be worthy of the 
transitional period of turmoil. There will be numerous 
bodies with vested interests who will want to examine the 
consequences of the proposals in depth. If these calls 
are to be answered then the analysis should be performed
at as early a stage as possible. Furthermore, in a 
democracy, the data and assumptions upon which the 
proposals are based ought to be made available to those 
interested groups.
The early emphasis in the moves to establish social 
insurance in Britain was on the creation of a state 
pension scheme, whilst sickness was left to the Friendly 
Societies. The unions wanted a non-means-tested scheme 
financed entirely by the Exchequer, the Conservative 
Government wanted a contributory scheme. Any progress was 
baulked by the fear that politicians had of upsetting the 
Friendly Societies, and that unions had of moving towards 
a contributory scheme (which would have been competing 
for the workers' contributions), and by the Treasury's 
insistence that a universal non-contributory scheme would 
not be viable.
In 1905 a Royal Commission was set up to undertake the 
first major inquiry into the Poor Laws since the 1834 
Act. The motivation for setting up the Commission was 
that Poor Law officials believed that the principles of 
the 1834 Act had been eroded and needed to be 
re-affirmed. Unlike their 1830s counterparts, however, 
the Commissioners sought to be objective in their 
investigations and heard a great deal of evidence and, in 
some cases, travelled Europe to look at systems in 
operation elsewhere. The Commission was split however
and, consequently, had little impact. Although united in 
their support for the introduction of old age pensions 
(which had already taken place the previous year, 1908) 
and the recommendation of state insurance schemes for 
sickness and unemployment, the Commissioners were unable 
to come to complete agreement and the Minority Report was 
far more radical than the Majority Report which did not 
support the former's call for the abolition of the Poor 
Law.
Meanwhile, however, Lloyd George and Churchill had 
examined the German system and had been studying the 
possibilities of a comprehensive system of social 
insurance, including unemployment insurance. Churchill 
had very little to guide him in his attempts to set up an 
unemployment insurance scheme - the Germans had examined 
the possibilities not long before and had rejected the 
idea as impracticable. In 1901 in Ghent a system had been 
established which spread throughout Western Europe and in 
1905 was introduced on a national basis in France. The 
'Ghent System' consisted of municipal subsidies to 
private unemployment insurance schemes specifically to 
increase the value of benefits. The subsidies were paid 
annually and depended upon the amount of benefits paid by 
the fund in the previous year, the funds were mainly 
administered by the trades unions.
In 1909 Churchill, as President of the Board of Trade,
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started to create a national network of labour exchanges. 
These would be used to administer the first national 
scheme of unemployment insurance in the world - this was 
eventually enacted in 1911 despite resistance from the 
labour movement towards contributions and without any 
real public debate.
The scheme was compulsory for workmen earning less than 
160 pounds per annum in any of seven trades known to be 
subject to short-term unemployment - building, 
construction, shipbuilding, mechanical engineering, 
ironfounding, vehicle construction and saw-milling. The 
employee, his employer and the state each contributed 2 
1/2 d a week and an unemployed worker was entitled to 
seven shillings a week for a maximum of fifteen weeks in 
a year. Initially employers were able to reclaim a third 
of their contribution for workers employed 
uninterruptedly for twelve months - an attempt to 
encourage employers to stabilise their employment 
practices which was later dropped. The Government also 
subsidised voluntary schemes by paying them one-sixth of 
the value of benefits but this was stopped in 1920 when 
the scope of the compulsory scheme was extended. A 
limited health insurance scheme was also established but 
this was to be administered by the Friendly Societies.
Although Churchill had little past experience to guide 
him in his attempts to establish a system of unemployment
insurance he had the benefit of being in the unique 
position of creating it from scratch and not having to 
adapt it to accommodate existing provisions. 
Unfortunately, however, Britain's first attempt at social 
insurance lacked both administrative co-ordination and 
popular support and consequently the overall structure 
did not provide a firm, coherent foundation on which to 
build.
In 1917 the administration of the system moved to the 
newly created Ministry of Labour and the scope, 
objectives and benefit structure were changed 
considerably. The original scheme was restricted to 
skilled workers with fairly predictable patterns of 
employment and unemployment; the duration of benefit 
entitlement was limited and dependent upon the 
contributions made; and benefits were set at as high a 
level as possible in relation to wages in the insured 
trades whilst maintaining incentives to work - that is 
benefits were essentially intended to replace earnings 
rather than provide a minimum subsistence.
With the demobilisation of the forces after the First 
World War there was seen to be a need for the scheme to 
cover all employment which was not secure, and with many 
people coming on to the labour market who had not worked 
before the war it became impractical to link benefits to 
contributions. The scheme was extended to cover all
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manual workers except. domestic and agricultural 
employees, and all non-manual workers earning less than a 
certain amount. The idea of benefits as a replacement for 
earnings was abandoned. Benefits were still paid as of 
right without means-test and from 1921 supplements were 
paid for wives and children. The scheme remained under 
the insurance banner to justify the continued collection 
of contributions and also because the local 
administration structure and stigma of the deterrent 
principles of the Poor Law did not offer a real 
alternative.
The suspension of the income maintenance principle was a 
fundamental change in the scheme which has essentially 
not been reversed to this day - except to a very limited 
extent by the Earnings Related Supplement, 1966-82. There 
ceased to be any link between benefits and the 
contributions which were by now a general levy on the 
employees and their employers. The introduction of 
subsistence type benefits with supplements for dependents 
created a serious problem which has never been resolved. 
Since wages are not related to the size of a worker's 
family then benefits which are so related will tend 
either to under compensate the single person or enable 
heads of large families to be able to gain nearly as much 
or even more in benefits than they might expect to earn
in work
The funding of the scheme was put under great strain 
during the Depression but it survived by borrowing 
heavily from the Exchequer. The debt was eventually 
repaid. In order to take account of falls in wages and 
prices the Labour Government of 1930 cut benefits, 
although not by as much as the 1930 Royal Commission on 
Unemployment Insurance had recommended in their First 
Report. In 1931 a crisis measure was taken which has 
survived to this day - the assistance payments to those 
who had exhausted their title to insurance benefits were 
to be means-tested.
In 1934 the Unemployment Insurance Statutory Committee 
was established and this was to give Parliament the 
machinery to control the scheme in the future. In the 
same year relief of all able-bodied persons was taken 
away from the county authority bodies and a national 
Unemployment Assistance Board, directly answerable to the 
Ministry of Labour, was created. The Poor Law was finally 
abolished in 1940.
2.4 A Unified System of Social Insurance - ‘From the 
Cradle to the Grave1
In June 1941 the National Government appointed the 
Inter-Departmental Committee on Social Insurance and 
Allied Services under the chairmanship of Sir William 
Beveridge, who had played a major part in the designing
of Churchill's Part II of the 1911 National Insurance
Act. The Committee's Terms of Reference were:
To undertake with special reference to the inter-relation of the schemes, a survey of the existing national schemes of social insurance 
and allied services, including workmen's 
compensation, and to make recommendations. (Beveridge, 1942: 5).
The Report which resulted was produced in November 1942. 
It was given an enormous amount of publicity and its 
recommendations received a great deal of popular support. 
Although regarded as a radical document at the time, 
Beveridge's proposals for a unified social security 
system were based on the experience accrued as the 
various facets evolved. In Beveridge's words:
The scheme proposed here is in some ways a 
revolution, but in more important ways it is a natural development from the past. It is a British revolution. (Beveridge, 1942: 17).
Back in the 1920s as an official at the Board of Trade, 
Beveridge had come to the conclusion that unemployment 
insurance could never take the place of economic policies 
designed to promote full employment. So one of the three 
assumptions he made, without which he said no 
satisfactory scheme of social security could be devised, 
and in particular with which his scheme was not intended 
to cope, was that mass unemployment could and would be 
avoided.
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The structure of the report itself was characterised by 
the author’s use of lists which make the identification 
of his priorities and objectives and their links with 
specific policy measures very clear - an example 
subsequent policy formulators have generally chosen not 
to follow. At the heart of the system he proposed for 
social security was a social insurance scheme based on 
the following six principles.
i. Flat rate of subsistence benefit - Beveridge 
acknowledged that this was out of step with the 
rest of the world but argued that it followed from 
his recognition of the place and importance of 
voluntary insurance in social security.
ii. Flat rate of contribution - all insured persons 
would pay the same contributions for the same 
security.
iii. Unification of administrative responsibility - in 
the interests of efficiency local offices would 
administer all claims and benefits would be paid 
from a central Social Insurance Fund.
iv. Adequacy of benefit - the proposed benefit was 
intended to be 'sufficient without further 
resources to provide the minimum income needed for 
subsistence in all normal cases'.
v. Comprehensiveness — the scheme was to be
comprehensive in both the people and contingencies 
covered.
vi« Classification — the scheme was designed for all 
citizens irrespective of means, the term 
classification referred to the different 
circumstances of groups of citizens such as 
children, employees and retired people.
The underlying philosophy of the report was that poverty 
and want could be anticipated and avoided by a 
comprehensive system of social insurance, health services 
and children's allowances, with those payments being made 
as of right without tests of means or character.
The National Government was united in its support for 
Beveridge and in March 1943 Churchill broadcast to the 
nation:
You must rank me and my colleagues as strong partisans of national compulsory insurance for 
all classes, for all purposes from the cradle 
to the grave. (Walley, 1972: 80).
Priority was given to family allowances and the Family 
Allowance Act was eventually passed in 1945. These tax 
allowances were not allowed for the first child and were 
five shillings a week for each of the others.
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Beveridge's ambition for a comprehensive social insurance 
was largely realised in 1946 with the passing of the 
National Insurance Act. The scheme was characterised by 
flat rate benefits and contributions, was comprehensive 
in its coverage and consisted of seven benefits - 
Unemployment Benefit, Sickness Benefit, Maternity 
Allowance, Widow's Benefit, Guardian's Allowance, 
Retirement Pensions and Death Grants. Initially all the 
main benefits were to be taxable, with the contributions 
tax deductible, but in the 1949 Budget unemployment and 
sickness benefits were made non-taxable.
Unemployment Benefit was to be payable for up to thirty 
weeks in one spell, but for the first five years after 
the war provisions were made for this to be extended 
indefinitely, at the discretion of the Minister and at 
the cost of the Exchequer. After title to insurance 
benefits was exhausted recipients had to resort to 
means-tested National Assistance.
The National Assistance Act of 1948 was intended to mark 
the death of the Poor Law and the birth of a new era, but 
the old image was not easily changed. The Assistance 
Board was replaced by the National Assistance Board which 
was to 'assist persons in Great Britain who are without 
resources to meet their requirements or whose 
resources... must be supplemented in order to meet their
requirements'. Beveridge had intended social insurance to 
make any need for assistance non-existent but the 
benefits were not sufficiently generous for this and the 
National Assistance Board was to play a much larger part 
in the system than was envisaged in 1948.
The 1948 Act forbade the payment of assistance to 
supplement the wages of full-time workers, and there was 
a rule called 'wages-stop' to prevent granting assistance 
in excess of the wages the beneficiary would earn in 
full-time employment. This meant that some families had 
total incomes below the official subsistence level and 
wages stop inevitably came in for consistent criticism 
from representatives of low income families. Eligibility 
for National Assistance was determined by the resources 
of the applicant and his wife and dependents - resources 
of other members of the family and certain capital assets 
were disregarded.
In 1966 a Ministry of Social Security was created to 
unify administration and to make 'claiming Supplementary 
Benefits' a less degrading process than the still 
stigmatised one of 'applying for assistance'. By the 
following year the number of claimants of the new 
Supplementary Pensions was more than a third higher than 
the previous number of applicants from retirement 
pensioners for assistance. Although Atkinson estimates 
(Atkinson, 1969s 76) that around one-half to two-thirds
of this increase is attributable to an increase in the 
size of the eligible population rather than the 
replacement of National Assistance with Supplementary 
Benefit. The Supplementary Benefit Commission, which was 
also set up as part of the Social Security Act 1966, had 
a wide range of discretionary powers within which it was 
to run the scheme. The Commission was abolished by the 
Social Security Act 1980 and their discretionary powers 
were replaced by legally binding regulations. Legal 
decisions are now referred to the Social Security 
Commissioners, formerly called the National Insurance 
Commissioners. This move from discretionary powers to 
legal regulations further eroded the distinction between 
means-tested assistance and National Insurance benefits, 
entitlement for which has always been determined by past 
contributions.
The Beveridge Report, and the legislation which it gave 
rise to, stands alone in the history of social security 
in Britain as a unique attempt to make the system 
coherent and comprehensive. During the inflationary 1950s 
and 1960s, however, National Insurance benefits failed to 
provide adequate protection and an ever-increasing 
proportion of applicants were pushed on to means-tested 
assistance. Now, in the 1980s, there is mass unemployment 
again in Britain, a condition Beveridge specifically 
stated his scheme was not designed to counter. Even 
though Beveridge's scheme has become increasingly less
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applicable over the last 30 years, it remains the basis 
for the social security system today. Changes over those 
30 years have been of a piecemeal, marginal character, 
attempting to adapt the system to cope with the immediate 
demands placed upon it. There has been a conspicuous lack 
of long-term strategic planning.
This form of development of an income maintenance system, 
of grand reform followed by a stream of marginal changes, 
is not peculiar to Britain. Heidenheimer et al. in a 
comparative study of the systems in Britain, the United 
States, Germany and Sweden (Heidenheimer et al. 1975), 
identify the following three factors which lead to 
considerable inertia in the systems:
i. When a scheme of income maintenance is initially set 
up policy makers have plenty of scope but, once 
created, the scheme soon becomes entrenched in the 
social heritage of the country and the people grow 
fixed in their expectations with regard to types 
and levels of benefit, contributions, etc.
ii. Finding general rules to administer the system 
better within the confines of these established 
expectations becomes very difficult and so there is 
a great incentive to leave the system as it is.
iii. Comprehensive reform requires comprehensive support
since everyone will be affected, a situation which 
exists only exceptionally, as at the time of the 
Beveridge Report. Pressure for particular changes 
is more readily brought to bear.
These elements were certainly highly relevant in the 
development of the British system as has been observed 
during the course of this chapter. Furthermore these are 
evidently very real obstacles which will have to be 
overcome if the system is to be radically altered in the 
future. It is essential that the design of an analytic 
system takes these factors into account for although 
these are fundamentally political matters they are 
central to the policy making process. If the analytic 
system can assist that process to overcome these barriers 
to change then it will make a valuable contribution to 
it, if it fails in this objective then the impact of the 
analysis will be severely restricted.
The system which has emerged from the developmental 
process outlined above is undeniably complicated. The 
next section describes very briefly the structure of the 
existing system.
2.5 Social Security in Britain Today
The system which has evolved over the years is extremely 
complicated. There are a wide range of benefits but these
can be divided into three main groups.
Firstly there is the National Insurance scheme. Virtually 
all employees and their employers are now compulsory 
contributors to the scheme and the benefits it now 
provides are Unemployment, Sickness, Invalidity, 
Maternity and Widow's Benefits, Retirement Pensions, 
Child's Special Allowances and Death Grants. To qualify 
for these benefits the claimant must satisfy certain 
contribution conditions and many fail to do so.
To be eligible for Unemployment Benefit (UB), for 
example, the claimant must be involuntarily unemployed 
through no fault of his or her own and be available for, 
and capable of work. Furthermore the claimant must have 
paid 'Class I contributions' on earnings at least 25 
times the 'lower earnings limit' and paid, or been 
credited with (during sickness or unemployment), Class I
contributions of at least 50 times the weekly lower
earnings limit in the 'relevant tax year' . If
contributions between 25 and 50 times the lower earnings 
limit have been paid or credited then UB will be paid at 
a reduced rate. UB can be claimed for up to 312 days in 
any one period of interruption of employment (PIE). PIEs 
separated by less than 8 weeks employment 'link' to form 
a single PIE. For definitions of the terms used here see 
Appendix 2.1.
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Secondly there are a number of non-contributory benefits 
which, like contributory benefits, are not subject to a 
means-test but, unlike contributory benefits, do not 
include contribution conditions in their eligibility 
rules. Non-contributory benefits are Child Benefit, 
Non-Contributory Invalidity Pension, Guardian's 
Allowance, Invalid Care Allowance and Mobility Allowance.
However, whilst the National Insurance scheme and 
non-contributory benefits, combined with the industrial 
injuries and war pensions schemes, cover a wide range of 
contingencies which give rise to financial hardship, in 
December 1981 there were 6,121,000 people receiving 
assistance from the means-tested Supplementary Benefits 
scheme. Beveridge had intended National Assistance, the 
forerunner of Supplementary Benefit, to act as a safety 
net for those people who could not claim National 
Insurance benefits, today it is the bedrock of the 
system. The reliance upon Supplementary Benefit amongst
the ranks of the unemployed is particularly acute at
*present as the numbers exhausting their title to UB 
continue to rise. In February 1982 just over 40% of 
registered unemployed claimants were entitled to UB and 
23% of those were receiving Supplementary Benefit also.
Since then the number of people unemployed for over a
year has continued to rise and the Earnings Related
Supplement to UB has been abolished, these factors
combined with the lass than inflation uprating of UB in
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1981 and the re-introduction of the taxation of UB in 
1982 are forcing an increasing proportion of the 
increasing number of the registered unemployed on to 
means-tested Supplementary Benefit.
Supplementary Benefit is for people not in full-time 
work, there are also benefits available for low-paid 
workers. There are rent and rates rebates (Housing 
Benefit) administered by the Local Authorities and Family 
Income Supplement (FIS). FIS is paid to families with 
children whose breadwinner is in full-time work (30 hours 
a week or 24 hours for a single parent) and amounts to 
half the difference between the claimant's normal gross 
income and a prescribed amount subject to a maximum 
payment. For many commentators the introduction of FIS in 
1970 was a return of the Speenhamland system of nearly 
200 years ago. The take-up rate for FIS is thought to be 
exceptionally low, official statistics estimate that 
around half those families who would be eligible for FIS 
actually receive it - in the DHSS Cohort Study of 
Unemployed Men it was found that only 17% of those 
eligible to receive FIS took up their title (Roll, 1983: 
14) .
The existence of this variety of different benefits gives 
rise to problems at several levels. Firstly it can be
bewildering for claimants who, on the basis of limited 
information, may need to perform difficult calculations
32
to determine which authority they should claim from in 
order to receive the maximum benefit. A National Consumer 
Council study of means-tested benefits identified 45 
different means-tested schemes in 1976 (National Consumer 
Council, 1976: 20).
Secondly, the pressure on the staff of the local benefit 
offices is probably greater than ever before. At a time 
when levels of unemployment are so persistently high the 
Government on the one hand is committed to reducing DHSS 
staff numbers and on the other its benefit policies are 
forcing an increasing proportion of claimants on to 
means-tested benefits - a measure of the effect of this 
is that in 1979/80 the administration costs for UB and 
Supplementary Benefit to the unemployed were put at 10.5% 
and 18% respectively.
Thirdly the tasks of monitoring the effectiveness of 
policies and assessing the likely impact of changes are
made immensely difficult by the complexity of the system. 
The DHSS's ability to perform these tasks came under 
attack from the Social Services Committee in 1980, their 
feelings were summarised in the following comment:
We are struck by the apparent lack of strategic 
policy-making at the DHSS« the failure to 
examine the overall impact of changes in 
expenditure levels and changes in the social 
environment across the various services and 
programmes for which the Department is 
responsible... the Committee wishes to record
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its disappointment - and dismay - at the 
continuing failure of the DHSS to adopt a 
coherent policy strategy across the
administrative boundaries of individual 
services and programmes. (Social Services 
Committee, 1980: para. 15).
The Committee's overall impression of the Department's 
policy making was that decisions tended to be taken in 
isolation without an overall framework or any long-term 
objectives and without a proper knowledge of the likely 
implications of its policies. Their report made three 
recommendations with important implications for the 
administration of social security.
i. Future Public Expenditure White Papers should state
more explicitly the links between policy changes 
and the aims which they are intended to further - 
rather in the manner of the Beveridge Report
perhaps.
ii. The Department should 'intensify its efforts to
reduce the costs of administering the social
security system, and that, in particular, it should 
seek to devise an income support system for the 
unemployed which is both more coherent and less 
expensive to administer.'
iii. The Department should 'seek to develop a coherent
strategy concerning the overall impact of 
government policy decisions - whether on taxes,
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benefits, subsidies or charges - on the relative 
living standards of different groups of 
beneficiaries and earners.'
To be fair, however, this comment ought to be placed in 
an international perspective. Whilst many of the problems 
of the British system are a direct consequence of the 
manner in which it has evolved, Habib found similar 
problems the world over - in concluding an international 
conference on the interaction of tax and social security 
syterns he had the following to say:
Policy making is characterised by a piecemeal approach in most, if not all, countries. We 
only seem able to co-ordinate the total cost of the various programmes, but when we approach 
the issues of distribution, equity, adequacy and incentives we are consistently surprised 
when someone occasionally adds up the combined effects of various programmes. There are 
numerous reasons for this state of affairs. There are jurisdictional barriers related to 
the distribution of administrative and political responsibilities for various 
programmes. There are difficulties inherent in the complexities of the issues of the 
decision-making processes when faced with 
complex decisions, which are exacerbated with 
the trend towards specialisation which makes it increasingly rare to find people who can take an integrated overview. The high degree of specialisation also compounds the problem of communication among experts in different areas.
These obstacles to more co-ordinated policies will not be easily overcome. We must change our research methods, how we gather and present descriptive programme data, and our conceptual basis for approaching social security issues. These qualitative changes in information 
systems must be fed into new decision-making 
processes (Habib, 1979: 129).
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This historical review has shown that there has
traditionally been a notable absence of long term 
strategic planning in social security policy making and 
this continues to be the case. The example set by 
Beveridge of clearly defining priorities and objectives 
and their links with specific policy measures has not 
been generally adopted. Policy making needs to be
preceded by objective analysis based on the best possible 
information concerning existing and expected future 
circumstances - this applies to any field of course, but 
is made especially important by the controversial nature 
of the issues involved. The alternatives are policies 
based on perhaps unwarranted preconceptions as in the 
Poor Law Amendment Act 1834; policies designed to tackle 
the problems of yesterday rather than today and tomorrow 
as was the case with the first attempts at unemployment 
insurance by Churchill; policy stagnation as exemplified 
by the Poor Law remaining on the statute books until 
1940; or incremental, piecemeal changes leading to the 
confused and complicated system which has developed since 
Beveridge reported.
This thesis is offered as a contribution to the debate on 
how the analysis of benefit policies might be improved.
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Chapter 3
Operational Research and Social Security Policy Making
3.1 Introduction
In Chapter 2 the historical development of financial 
provision for the unemployed was reviewed. It was argued 
that there is a need for more strategic planning in 
social security policy making with coherent, objective 
analysis based on the best available information, and 
with the objectives and priorities of the system stated 
explicitly wherever possible and linked to specific 
policy measures. The objective of this thesis was defined 
as the identification of ways in which analysts, 
particularly OR workers, might achieve these aims.
Accordingly the next three sections of this chapter 
review the previous contributions made by the Operational 
Research Services (ORS) division of the DHSS to social 
security policy analysis. In Section 3.5 benefit 
evaluation models existing elsewhere in the DHSS and 
Government are briefly reviewed.
In Section 3.6 the potential advantages of establishing 
clear objectives for the social security system are 
discussed, as is the difficulty of finding such
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objectives which are both general enough to obtain 
support from a wide political spectrum yet detailed 
enough to be of real value to policy planners. In the 
final section of this chapter a possible approach to 
future policy analysis which seeks to circumvent this 
problem is described.
3.2 The Early Days of Operational Research in Social
Security
The ORS division of the DHSS first became involved in the 
social security side of the Department's operations in 
1972. The following version of their early involvement 
draws largely on Holdaway and Partridge (1981).
In 1970 a programme of integration had been implemented
to combine 1200 Pension Offices and 500 Assistance
Offices into 650 Integrated Local Offices. The Local 
Offices (LOs) were in a far from satisfactory state. 
Staff morale was at a particularly low ebb with conflict 
between the two sets of staff from the previously
separate Ministries, calls by politicians to stem the 
rise in staff numbers and a consequently high turnover of 
staff. This was set against a background of a system of 
benefits which had become increasingly complex and with a 
virtually ever-increasing number of claimants. The
consequence was falling standards of service and an 
increasing sense of frustration with the system on the
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part of both customers and staff.
The first job given to ORS in the social security field 
was to study the organisation of the LOs - not to seek 
out the root cause of the problems but to find a way to 
enable the LOs to cope with them more tolerably. 
Following a somewhat rushed preliminary review ORS 
responded with a report to the Director of Regional 
Offices suggesting Operational Research (OR) could be of 
use in examining problems such as the location and size 
of LOs and the causes of high error rates and proposing 
that the programme of integration be reconsidered. In his 
reply the Director essentially said, 'Thank you very 
much, but there's nothing I can do,' and added that he 
and his colleagues were convinced that OR could be of use 
to the policy divisions.
ORS had no further direct contact with social security 
for more than a year - although in the meantime members 
attempted to learn more about social security so that, 
given another opportunity, they might be better placed to 
make a contribution. The opportunity materialised in the 
shape of the New Model Office (NMO) study of the 
organisation and management of LOs. Their limited 
experience of social security had indicated to ORS that 
this was not the way forward and so it was agreed that in 
parallel with the NMO study they should also consider the 
interaction between policy and operations.
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The first step was to establish measures of performance 
for the administrative system. Four were selected - total 
benefit paid, total administration costs, the proportion 
of people who receive the benefit to which they are 
entitled, and the number of people who receive benefit to 
which they are not entitled.
ORS then proposed to develop a model to both estimate the 
changes in the measures as a result of alternative 
administrative systems operating with the existing range 
of benefits and rules, and also to consider the 
consequences for the existing system of changing the 
benefits and rules. This approach was not supported, 
however, and ORS had to settle for considering issues 
such as centralisation/de-centralisation of the 
administrative system and optimal office sizes for the 
Regional Directorate. This was done by first breaking 
down the assessment procedure into three operations (the 
collection, processing and distribution of information), 
and then, by synthesising the various benefits in terms 
of these elementary operations, the impact on the 
measures of performance of centralising and 
de-centralising LOs was estimated.
This early stage of the analysis was received with some 
encouragement from the Directorate and so the next stage 
was to quantify the functional relationships which show
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how the operations in the LOs link together. However, 
when they looked more closely at the LOs, it transpired 
that there was considerably more variation between them, 
with much more 'managing* being done in order to cope 
with changing circumstances, than had been anticipated. 
Nevertheless some patterns did emerge - in particular, 
benefit complexity emerged as the prime cause of errors 
of assessment which, once complexity was defined as the 
number of different distinguishable operations through 
which a claim must pass, enabled the prediction of the 
effect on error rates of changes in benefit rules.
Furthermore this part of the study led ORS to draw three 
conclusionst
i . LO staff would 'somehow cope with whatever changes 
the administrators and politicians could throw at 
them'.
ii. 'The way in which they cope would materially affect 
how the policy would be implemented*.
iii. 'That the useful area for OR was in helping to 
evaluate proposed policy changes'.
The lessons to be learned from Chapter 1 would surely 
bear out this third conclusion - any improvements in the 
administrative system, whilst welcome, will merely be
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scratching the surface of the operational problems 
without radical reforms to the substance of the policy. 
The other conclusions, however, are a little disturbing 
for they seem to be recognising and condoning the 
existence of considerable local variation in the 
implementation of policies. Given that the social 
security system is national and the DHSS goes to very 
great lengths to define eligibility rules in specific 
detail to endeavour to ensure that all claimants are, in 
some sense, treated equitably, this is surely not an 
acceptable position. However, the fact that the complex 
nature of the present system does lead to such local 
variations is surely further vindication for the need for 
reform and the need for analytic effort to be directed at 
policy issues rather than adapting the operational system 
to cope as best it can with the present benefit 
structure.
3.3 Benefit Evaluation Models in ORS
The formulation of the above views by ORS coincided with 
the setting up of the Supplementary Benefit Review team 
in 1976 under Partridge, who had been ORS's primary 
contact at the Regional Directorate. This gave ORS the 
ideal opportunity to involve themselves in policy 
evaluation. Partridge, however, wanted them to use their 
Operations Model and experience gained from the NMO work 
to consider the effect of proposed changes on LOs.
Nevertheless, although this was to occupy the bulk of 
available effort, ORS still found time to consider how an 
overall evaluation model could best be developed. The 
result was the Benefit Model.
The Benefit Model used unidimensional distributions of 
population characteristics to generate cohorts of 
claimants. These cohorts were then made to decay 
according to input exponential decay rates, thus by 
running the model for several time steps a steady-state 
population could be created. Alternative sets of benefit 
rules could then be applied to this artificial claimant 
population. Output included 1 better-off/worse-off‘ tables 
and sensitivity analyses (particularly important, as 
noted by Sanctuary (1980), when the model relies on some 
basic assumptions).
The motivation for the Supplementary Benefit Review was 
to identify ways of simplifying the system, albeit very 
much within the existing framework. Thus ORS proposed a 
much simplified 'Short Term Scheme' - whereby claimants 
would receive benefit based on far fewer criteria for the 
first few weeks of their claim and then, if the claim 
continued, would be assessed for entitlement under the 
main scheme. This proposal was supported by the regional 
agencies and, with reservations, by the policy divisions. 
The Benefit Model thus had a part to play and so 
generalised development of the model was dropped in
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favour of work specifically directed at the Short Term 
Scheme. The model was used to evaluate the Short Term 
Scheme which appeared in Social Assistance (DHSS.1978) 
but which was not adopted.
Another proposal to come out of the review was to reduce 
the number of Child Scale Rates - that is the allowances 
paid for children under Supplementary Benefit and which 
are age-related. At the time of the review there were 
five rates.
This highlighted the need to be able to study the 
implications of changes not for individual children but 
for families. This in turn highlighted the problem so 
frequently encountered in studying the distributional 
implications of benefit changes - there was no reliable 
data on the family structure of low income families. Thus 
ORS was commissioned to develop a model of family 
structure. The resulting project consisted of three 
parts.
The first stage of the project was to develop measures of 
the effect of the changes on different family types 
including comparisons with 'equivalent income scales' 
(McClements, 1978). The second stage was to extract data 
from the Supplementary Benefit Annual Statistical Enquiry 
(a sample of 100,000 claimants taken annually on a single 
day) to construct an estimated claimant population. The
third stage was to develop the Family Structure Model 
(FSM).
The development of the FSM represented the first real 
attempt by ORS to address some of the major problems of 
data which the evaluation of social security benefit 
policies presents. The administrative statistics only 
cover existing claimants and are thus of limited value 
when considering possible new policies, especially if 
this involves a new population characteristic which will 
not even be covered for existing claimants. Although 
there are a number of general surveys which contain data 
relevant to the evaluation of benefit policy none of 
these contains all the data required, moreover there ie 
usually a delay of around 18 months between surveys being 
conducted and the data becoming available for analysis. 
Even if the DHSS was to conduct its own survey, 
specifically for the purposes of evaluating benefit 
policies, apart from the high cost involved and the 
extended time-lag, this would still not be perfect 
because changes in policy aims could mean changes in the 
nature of the information required, and the structure of 
the claimant population is sure to change over time.
It should also be noted that to enumerate all possible 
claimant types for any but the most narrow of benefits 
would be infeasible. The number of characteristics one 
needs to know to determine a claimant's benefit
entitlement and their corresponding possible values 
mu^-tiply up to give a number of claimant types many 
orders of magnitude of the population of the country. 
Moreover these cannot be greatly reduced by a priori 
knowledge because such knowledge does not always exist 
and, even if it does, what may be an insignificant 
claimant group for one application may not be 
insignificant for another.
The FSM used the technique of simulation to extract data 
from the Census on numbers of family starts and 
inter-sibling age gaps to generate distributions of 
family size which could be compared with actual data. 
These data related to the entire population of the 
country, however, and DHSS interest was, as always, in 
those subsets eligible or nearly eligible to various 
benefits. So these family structures were converted to 
those of the sub-populations by combining them with 
published distributions such as couples by ages of 
members and sick males by age.
These were put together assuming that they were 
all independent of one another but with the facility to vary the weighting factors to allow correlation between pairs of variables. In this 
way we were able to accommodate almost any changes in assumptions which were requested and to predict future distributions (Holdaway and Partridge, 1981i 465).
It should be noted, however, that the model makes some 
very basic assumptions of independence - in particular it
assumes characteristics such as income and rent are 
independent of each other, and that family size and 
inter-sibling age gaps are independent of the age of the 
mother. Finally any set of benefit rules could then be 
applied to the population so generated to assess benefit 
entitlement. The model produced estimates of total cost, 
better-off/worse-off distributions and numbers attracted 
on to Supplementary Benefit as a result of a rule change.
The model was validated at a somewhat late stage in the 
Supplementary Benefit Review and apparently (Sanctuary, 
1980: 9) its impact was restricted to only one option 
which did not appear in Social Assistance (DHSS, 1978). 
Partridge was satisfied, however, and sponsored its 
extension to cover all National Insurance benefits 
because of the way in which they interact with 
Supplementary Benefit - even though he had no direct 
responsibility for National Insurance benefits. 'He also 
tried to persuade his NI colleagues that they needed the 
models' (Holdaway and Partridge, 1981: 465). This led to 
the development of the Dependency Model.
The Dependency Model was a population generator. It 
passed cohorts of males and cohorts of females from age 
zero through states of dependency (marriage, widowhood, 
one child, etc.) according to input transition rates. By 
generating a series of such cohorts with the transition 
rates held constant the model would produce a
steady-state population - although it would also have 
been possible to generate non-steady populations. The 
model was not developed beyond a pilot version but the 
intention was to use distributions of health, employment, 
housing, etc., by sex, age, and dependency to model the 
population by those characteristics relevant to 
determining benefit entitlement. The Dependency Model has 
much in common with the early modules of the Population 
Mode1.
The Population Model (PM) is the latest of the general 
purpose benefit evaluation models developed by ORS. 
Development of the PM began in 1978 and it was used for 
four applications in 1980-81. It would be fair to 
describe the PM as having been in 'cold storage* since 
the latter part of 1981. Apart from the knowledge and 
expertise accumulated over the years spent developing the 
earlier models the PM consumed a considerable amount of 
effort directly. It is not unreasonable to expect, 
therefore, that many of the problems encountered in 
developing the earlier models would have been overcome by 
the time work started on the PM, it is also important 
that the experience gained in developing and applying the 
PM should not be wasted. The next section looks at the PM 
and its applications in more detail.
3.4 The Population Model
The PM, then, was the culmination of the efforts of ORS 
to contribute to social security policy making to date. 
The original intention was for the PM to model the 
population of Britain, assigning each member the 
characteristics relevant to determining benefit 
entitlement. It was to be capable of modelling radical 
policy changes and sequences of policy changes whose 
effects may not be additive, it was to be comprehensive 
in its coverage of benefits and it was to be flexible in 
its consideration of demographic changes.
Once again, however, the intention to retain generality 
was sacrificed. An opportunity arose to use the PM for 
the National Insurance Short Term Benefit Review so it 
was decided to restrict the population modelled to the 
unemployed and sick. Tables of family characteristics 
were available for these groups and so by restricting 
coverage to them the need to adopt sophisticated 
modelling of family building would be avoided. At this 
stage it was envisaged that the PM would eventually be 
extended to cover other groups of interest such as one 
parent families and pensioners. In fact the model has 
only been validated for families with unemployed or sick 
male heads.
The model is sub-divided into modules which fall into two
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groups. The first group of modules generates an 
artificial population and the second applies benefit 
rules to that population to determine its benefit 
entitlement. The population is first passed through a 
module which allocates to each member a sex and an age 
group using stratified sampling which takes into account 
the correlation between the proportion of people of a 
certain age and their sex. The population is then passed 
through a number of other modules which allocate to each 
member a variety of characteristics by random sampling 
or, in a few cases, deterministically. A flow diagram of 
the modules of the PM is given in Figure 3.1. A complete 
list of the variables, their inter-relationships and the 
data sources of the PM is given at Appendix 3.1. To 
include all the correlations which exist between 
characteristics would have made the model unmanageably 
complicated, even if the necessary data were to exist 
which they do not. This inability to embrace all the 
interdependencies was one of the major drawbacks of the 
PM and this became increasingly apparent when compared 
with information from the DHSS economists' Cohort Study 
of Unemployed Men — see Section 3.5.
The PM is structured so that the modules can be replaced, 
altered or missed out, so the model is able to focus 
attention on a particular sub-population of interest and 
generate a larger sample of such claimants (a sample sise
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Figure 3.1 Modules of the Population Model
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of 5000 is usual). This offers a degree of flexibility 
which no purpose-built survey could offer.
The model is conceptually simple and contains little 
actual modelling except in the ’Period of Interruption of 
Employment* (PIE) module which attempts to describe the 
occurrence and duration of spells of employment, sickness 
and unemployment. This module presented considerable 
problems. In retrospect it may be that it would have been 
more appropriate to adopt a hypothesising approach 
combined with sensitivity analysis - incorporating a more 
sophisticated PIE model as and when it became available. 
There is no explicit projective modelling of the 
population but the model is designed to consider 
hypothesised changes.
The PM does not attempt to model such factors as 
administration costs or behavioural factors either. In 
particular take-up is assumed to be 100% in the model and 
the results are subsequently adjusted by hand. It is 
doubtful whether available estimates of average take-up 
are really applicable to consideration of marginal 
changes. There is evidence to suggest that take-up 
increases as the amount of benefit to which the claimant 
expects to be entitled increases and also as the length 
of the claimant's PIE increases (Supplementary Benefits 
Commission, 1978).
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The PM covers comprehensively the main benefits and 
income sources to households whose head is male and 
unemployed or sick and can assess the cumulative effect 
of complicated interacting changes. Existing benefits 
covered include contributory benefits. Family Income 
Supplement, school meals and welfare milk and the model 
performs a calculation to determine whether claimants 
would be better-off on Supplementary Benefit or on rent 
and rates rebates. It can consider both radical changes 
and complicated questions concerning, for example, 
•linking rules* (see Appendix 2.1) or the relevant tax 
year. There have been a few simplifications made to the 
benefit rules.
Validation of the PM has been for particular benefits and 
claimant types rather than for the model as a whole. When 
a result is quoted the associated sampling error
expressed as a standard deviation is also quoted, the 
target accuracy is plus or minus 10% since greater 
accuracy would have been expensive to achieve and quite 
often spurious. Validation for hypothetical rules is, of 
course, more difficult and consists of plausibility and 
qualitative checks.
The major applications for which the PM has been used
are i
i. Work commissioned in March 1980 by one of the
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National Insurance policy divisions to forecast the 
consequences of alternative packages of benefit 
cuts then under discussion — decisions concerning 
which were announced in the Budget statement on 26 
March 1980.
ii. A more carefully considered reworking of the same 
calculations as in (i) after the decisions were 
taken.
iii. Estimates of the total cost of the main proposals 
for the Statutory Sick Pay scheme and one of its 
main variants.
iv. Estimates of the impact of the taxation of
Unemployment Benefit on individual families carried 
out in 1981 after the decisions had been taken but 
before they were implemented.
There are two comments which can be made about this list 
of applications without looking any deeper. The first is 
that after the investment of such a great deal of effort 
and expertise the PM was never commissioned at a
sufficiently early stage of the policy making process to 
influence the policy decisions. So that, even if
administrators would be prepared to take into account the 
results of the sorts of analysis which the PM could 
provide when formulating policy, they have not had the
opportunity. Thus the PM has largely been used as a tool 
for monitoring the outturn rather than forecasting the 
consequences of decisions. This belated intervention is 
particularly problematic for a model such as the PM which 
is specifically designed to provide early quantitative 
information rather than highly accurate costings. 
Furthermore, despite suggestions by ORS to a potential 
customer that the PM had a part to play in providing a 
baseline against which to monitor, the task of monitoring 
is apparently agreed to be the preserve of the DHSS's 
statisticians — this was reflected in their taking on the 
bulk of the work following a meeting in June 1980 to 
decide how the work on research into cuts in benefits 
being considered should be divided between the various 
support groups in the DHSS.
It could be that the reason for this lack of early 
indication to ORS about likely live issues is in part 
attributable to the fact that the groups of economists 
and statisticians in the Department are longer 
established, with better contacts and more clearly 
defined roles than ORS. It is also almost certainly 
attributable to the nature of decision making in 
Government - especially the subset of decisions which are 
disclosed on Budget Day. However, if OR is to contribute 
to policy decisions in the future, OR workers surely need 
to be more aware of likely medium-term policy 
developments in order that they can tailor any extended
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model-building activity accordingly. To this end the 
major possible policy trends of the next few years are 
reviewed in the following chapter. It would seem, 
however, that more important than this background 
awareness is that, in future, policy makers and analysts 
from all disciplines need to be closely involved in the 
analytic work from the earliest possible stage. This 
would enable the users of the results to gain confidence 
in the analyses, to build a commitment to them and for 
their expertise to be incorporated in the analytic work.
The second point to emerge from the above list is the 
commissioning of the PM for estimating the total costs of 
a package. In its work on the abolition of Earnings 
Related Supplement (ERS) to short-term National Insurance 
benefits, ORS displeased the Finance division of DHSS by 
estimating the total cost of a package using the PM. 
Whilst this is no sin in itself it should be noted that 
the PM is really intended to estimate distributional 
effects of policy changes and its crude assumptions 
regarding economic and demographic factors make it less 
accurate for estimating overall costings. It is, 
therefore, perhaps unwise to use it for these purposes 
without great care. In the case of the ERS work the PM 
estimates differed quite dramatically from those of the 
Finance division, the economists and the statisticians 
and it transpired that the reason for this divergence was 
that ORS were not aware that the wives of unemployed men
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are significantly less likely to be in employment than 
the wives of the male working population as a whole. 
Whilst this experience led to a subsequent improvement in 
the PM it is unfortunate that it could not have been 
achieved at an earlier stage.
The point here is not that ORS benefit models need to be 
able to provide more accurate costings of policy 
proposals - that is not their function. Rather that the 
capabilities and limitations of the models need to be 
specifically set down. This would not only save them from 
being used illegitimately but would also enable potential 
customers to appreciate more readily when the models 
might be of positive assistance. As for the specific 
oversight regarding the interdependence of a husband's 
employment status and the probability of his wife being 
in work is concerned, if the assumptions contained in the 
models were specifically set down also, then, if evidence 
exists to suggest that such assumptions are invalid, 
other analysts are more likely to be able to offer advice 
sooner rather than later. This is, of course, further 
evidence to support the need for closer co-operation 
between different groups of analysts and users from as 
early a stage as possible.
It has been noted above that new information is now 
becoming available, particularly from the Cohort Study of 
Unemployed Men. and this needs to be incorporated into
evaluative models as soon as possible. It is unfortunate 
that reading through the papers of previous exercises 
gives the impression that this has been used to discredit 
rather than assist the work of ORS in the past. There are 
indications that this situation was improving during the 
above applications of the PM. It is perhaps regrettable, 
therefore, that ORS have not involved themselves in 
issues of benefit policy since the end of 1981 for fear 
of duplicating work done by other groups.
The importance of this has been well defined by Rein:
To introduce competing analyses which arise 
from different knowledge orientations in the same arena of decision also diminishes and 
moderates the contribution of social science 
knowledge to policy-making. Certainly no one sector of the social science community has a monopoly on useful knowledge but even so a more competitive use of social science, over a wide 
range of orientations, with overlap across arenas and processes, is likely to produce 
substantial argument and increase confusion as the issues become more complex. Besides, disagreement among the experts will also give 
greater prominence to the political policy makers' responsibility for choices, at the same time reducing the claim of the social scientist 
to be a policy adviser... Even so, I believe that, given the present state of social science knowledge, it is probably better to recognise how conflicting and uncertain its interpretations are than to assign a very high value to a particular orientation, which is 
narrowly distributed in the policy-making process and has not the benefit of competition from alternative views (Rein, 1976: 33).
There is 
arguments
also a need for a party to co-ordinate the 
and reconcile and explain differences so that
P°^^t:*-ca  ^ choice is well-founded and open to clear 
criticism. Moreover there would appear to be a need for 
some party to act as an intermediary between quantitative 
analytical work and the administrators responsible for 
passing on the results to Ministers. The following 
comment was made by an Undersecretary in such a position 
in a memo to senior personnel in ORS and the economists 
in 1980 in relation to the above work.
As one to whom even simple, single basic, figures "come hard", I shall be delighted if 
those who better understand numbers can put their heads together and thus give me
sufficient understanding to help Ministers to understand whatever sifted figure work we give 
them for various purposes. I therefore welcome (the economists') initiative in relationship to the ORS studies, and hope that (the statisticians) will be able to join in when much more important things allow this.
It is suggested that it is to this end, of co-ordinating
research effort and ensuring that it is fully utilised in
the decision-making process, which ORS should be
directing any future effort in the field of policy
analysis in the social security field.
The next quetion concerns the type of policy issues which 
the PM was designed to be able to consider. It has
already been noted that it was intended to be able to 
handle radical changes, the combination of several 
interacting changes and complicated alterations such as 
the way in which PIEs link together. There are several 
points here.
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Firstly, was it designed with any particular radical 
change in mind and, if so, how wide a range of radical 
changes was it to be able to consider?
Secondly it would appear that the principal customer for 
the applications of the PM saw its main values as being 
its abilities to consider the cumulative effect of a 
package of changes and complicated adjustments to details 
of benefit rules. Firstly, are such factors really 
sufficiently important to justify the maintenance of a 
large, general model, would it not be more appropriate 
and the results more trustworthy if small, 
problem-specific models were built for such purposes? 
Secondly, if the PM can be shown to be wrong on issues 
for which there do exist evidence, such as the working 
wives case above, does this justify accepting its results 
just because no other evidence exists, supportive or 
otherwise?
It can be argued that any estimate, however poor, is 
better than none but with a smaller, more specific model 
it would at least be easier to identify its limitations 
and assumptions. Although the customer in the above 
applications was impressed with the PM's ability in this 
regard a senior statistician preferred, not unreasonably, 
the more direct evidence offered by the Cohort Study - in 
a minute to the Cohort Study team in 1980 he asked them 
to use the study to investigate the linking problem
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because 'it is only the Cohort Study which can shed light 
on the interval between linking spells of unemployment' .
The point here is that large, general models are often 
better suited to studying radical policy changes and 
detailed changes to existing policies are perhaps better 
studied using more specific models. To try to develop a 
model capable of considering both levels of policy change 
simultaneously, which is what the PM sought to do, 
especially in such a complicated problem area as social 
security, is surely over-ambitious and liable to result 
in a model which can fulfil neither aim satisfactorily.
Any policy analysis must be based initially on a broad 
database, taking account of the complete range of 
significant factors. Once the areas which require 
detailed analysis have been identified then specific, 
in-depth research studies can be commissioned. There is, 
then, a need for an established information base to carry 
out the initial analysis promptly, efficiently and 
effectively and to highlight those areas in need of 
fuller study. If such a facility is not readily available 
then the danger is that the parameters of the debate will 
be defined without reference to the facts and, once 
defined, will be that much harder to change.
The multiple source nature of the data not only gives 
rise to problems of interdependencies but also means that
in order to keep the data as consistent as possible it 
needs to be updated en bloc. This would be a considerable 
effort, probably of the order of 1 to 2 man-months. 
Consequently it has never been done and so the model was 
stfll using 1977 data when it was placed in abeyance in 
autumn 1982. Although the income and expenditure 
variables are updated for the application no allowance is 
made for demographic change - which in the case of the 
unemployed was considerable between 1977 and 1982. One of 
the main disadvantages of using survey-based data is the 
time-lag between the survey being conducted and the data 
becoming available, but this is normally around eighteen 
months to two years. There is no easy answer to the data 
problem but using out of date data and combining 
distributions under the assumption that they are 
independent when they are not is surely not the best 
possible compromise. This issue will be the subject of 
subsequent chapters.
Finally the argument in favour of major modelling 
exercises which holds that one of their values is in 
sustaining thinking in a consistent fashion, leading to 
an enhanced understanding of the system does not appear 
to apply in the case of the PM. The key feature of the PM 
would appear to be its highly flexible structuring, 
which, although commendable, does not in itself 
contribute to the quality of decision making in the DHSS.
Although the above may appear to be rather negative and 
comprehensive in its criticism of the PM it must be 
recognised that the problems which it is addressing are 
highly complicated and the complete solution has not been 
formulated elsewhere either. The following section 
briefly reviews other Government models aimed at tackling 
similar issues.
3.5 Other Government Models for Benefit Evaluation
Within the DHSS the two other service divisions, SR (the 
statisticians) and EAO (the economists), who advise the 
policy divisions each have some form of modelling 
capability of their own.
SR3's Tax/Benefit Model uses what is known as the 
hypothetical families approach, that is it simply 
calculates tax liability and benefit entitlement and 
hence 'total income support' (TIS - see Glossary in 
Appendix 2.1) for certain stylised families. It makes no 
attempt to estimate the numbers of such families which 
exist. Furthermore it assumes expenses, in particular 
rent, rates and work expenses, do not vary with income 
and it is unable to consider mortgage repayments in place 
of rent. For families whose head is unemployed TIS is 
calculated separately for those out of work for 6 months 
and 12 months to attempt to illustrate the effect of 
exhaustion of title to UB. Not only is the assumption of
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expenses being independent of income unrealistic it is 
also unhelpful because when policies are being considered 
attention may well not focus on those groups who are 
faced with average circumstances, but rather on those who 
are faced with exceptionally high housing costs, 
travelling expenses, etc. The Tax/Benefit Model is really 
no more than a powerful ready-reckoner which can be 
useful for early quantification of ideas but it must also 
be remembered that it can be very misleading. Since it 
makes no attempt to estimate the numbers of people in 
each of the various circumstances it cannot be used to 
estimate the total cost of policy proposals.
SR3 also use the Family Expenditure Survey (FES) to 
estimate benefit entitlement for the participating 
families and hence to calculate official estimates of 
'take-up' (Appendix 2.1) of various benefits. This 
involves programmes for each benefit which are also used 
for ad hoc analyses of proposed changes to benefit rules.
The economists use a model based on the FES to estimate 
changes in net weekly incomes of families and households. 
It covers income tax (modelling all bands, rates and 
personal allowances and mortgage interest relief), 
National Insurance Contributions, Child Benefit, Family 
Income supplement, Housing Benefit, free school meals and 
free welfare milk. Incomes are projected forward to 
current levels from those in the survey, which are about
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18 months out of date on average. The model can produce 
-^akles of gainers and losers in terms of absolute values 
and as proportions of annual income, by households or tax 
units, and by a range of other characteristics such as 
income and family composition. Output from other models 
can also be input. The model was to be extended so that 
it would be capable of evaluating changes in out of work 
benefits.
The value of the FES for evaluating benefit changes is 
discussed in detail in Chapter 5 below. Broadly, however, 
there are several disadvantages of using the FES for 
analysing out of work benefits - disadvantages which 
apply to any general purpose survey in fact. The first is 
that the data are, on average, 18 months out of date by 
the time they become available. The second is that there 
is a suspicion of under-reporting of benefit income in 
the survey, although in a recent paper Atkinson and 
Micklewright (1982a) found 'reasonably close* agreement 
between FES estimates and the administrative and Blue 
Book statistics. The third drawback is that the FES 
covers a total of approximately 7000 households each year 
and although a number of families with out of work heads 
can be identified (and this number is of course 
increasing along with the numbers of unemployed in the 
country as a whole) if interest focusses on a 
sub-population of this group then the cample sices can 
become very small or even non-existent. This problem can
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be overcome to a limited extent by taking data from the 
surveys of several years but this is not entirely 
satisfactory due to demographic change - which can be 
expected to have been considerable as a result of the 
sudden rise in unemployment. The main advantage of using 
survey data is that they relate to actual families and so 
it is possible to estimate, for example, the numbers of 
people in groups of interest without making assumptions, 
which may be unjustified, about the correlation of 
certain characteristics.
Another important source of information within the 
Department is the Cohort Study of Unemployed Men. This 
was a study set up by the Department to look at the 
labour market experience, living standards, financial 
incentives and so on of people experiencing a spell of 
unemployment. The study took a national sample of 2300 
men (72% of the original sample) registering as 
unemployed in 1978, it thus focusses on the flow as 
opposed to the stock of unemployed. Data were extracted 
both from benefit records and from interviews with the 
men and their wives carried out approximately one, four 
and twelve months after registration - some 1800 were 
interviewed in the second round and 1500 in the third, 
some of whom had not been interviewed in the second 
round. The value of this study to evaluation modelling is 
that it provides a source of data on the characteristics 
of the unemployed against which hypotheses may be tested
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before they are included in a formal model — the value in 
pinpointing the cause of the PM's error with regard to 
the probability of the wives of unemployed men being in 
work has already been noted above.
To the best of our knowledge apart from the models within 
the DHSS outlined above the only models which exist 
within Government which attempt to perform similar tasks 
are those of the Government Actuary's Department (GAD).
GAD's role is to estimate social security and National 
Insurance expenditure and revenue for four to five years 
ahead - principally for the Treasury and DHSS Finance 
division. They have separate models for unemployment and 
sickness which utilise benefit statistics modified 
according to demographic and economic assumptions and 
forecasts. Whilst these models can produce quite good 
estimates of how the existing system will perform in the 
future they can only consider minor changes to the system 
(anything more radical necessitating ad hoc studies) and 
do not offer any real insight into the distributional 
impact of such alternative policies.
3.6 The Objectives of the Social Security System
In the historical review of the development of financial 
provision for the unemployed in Chapter 2 it was noted 
that legislation has traditionally been of a piecemeal
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nature with occasional grand reforms and has generally 
been made in reaction to problems of the past rather than 
any anticipation of possible difficulties in the future. 
The purpose of this thesis is to consider how analysts 
might serve to remedy this situation and some areas where 
there appears to exist room for improvement in the 
analytic contribution have already been identified in 
this chapter. It could be argued, however, that a 
prerequisite for remedying this situation is to determine 
long term objectives for the income maintenance system to 
which all major political parties could agree. The case 
for defining the objectives of social services programmes 
has been forcefully advocated by Algie:
To define and explore objectives is to open ourselves to alternative possible futures, thus 
extending treachorously narrow conceptions of what is possible. By clarifying objectives, 
decision-makers may support their bids for scarce resources and gain general sanction within which specific activities may be undertaken at their discretion. Stated objectives establish the expectations of sponsors and clientele, and provide a rationale for daily decisions. Lacking objectives, an agency has no basis for evaluating effectiveness of action. If relevant objectives 
can be agreed, some hope for improvement is established, some degree of optimism necessary 
for any committed action, and some limits are 
set to fatalism, pessimism or resignation. 
Where objectives are ignored, activities become meaningless... Only by projecting a future and attempting to realise it, can effective action 
be generated (Algie, 1975« 11).
The next question to be asked then is whether such 
objectives can be established for the income maintenance
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system which are both general enough to receive support 
from a wide political spectrum and sufficiently detailed 
to be of real value to policy planners.
Wedderburn (1964) has identified the following four 
'theories of the Welfare State'.
i. The 'anti—collectivists'
The anti-collectivists see the Welfare State as a
transitory service which becomes increasingly superfluous 
as industrial output rises. Wedderburn quotes Peacock 
(1961) as saying, 'The true object of the Welfare
State... is to teach people how to do without it.' This 
is very much the policy of thrift, self-help and 
independence expounded by the present Government. Two 
fundamental elements of the existing legislation embody 
this view - namely the contributory principle,
representing the virtue of thrift, and the concept of a 
minimum income, stressing a desire to ensure that
incentives for individual self-improvement are not 
jeopardised.
ii. The 'functionalists'
In common with the Marxian view of the Welfare State the 
functionalists see it as being necessary to the survival 
of a capitalist society. However, whereas the Marxist
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considers all social reforms as palliative measures
designed to avert working-class rebellion, the
'functionalist' attributes the existence of the Welfare 
State to the recognition by more enlightened legislators 
that the alternative would be incompatible with their 
overall view of society.
iii. The 'citizenship view'
A leading exponent of this school is Professor T. Marsall 
who argued in 1949 that the social services do not help 
to create an economically more equal society but do play 
an essential part in the creation of equality of status. 
This ideology he saw expressed in the post-Beveridge 
provisions of universal benefits and especially in the 
provision of health services solely on the basis of need. 
However by 1961 Marshall was saying that this stage had 
already passed as the Second World War faded into the 
past and that the consensus on which the Welfare State 
was built no longer existed. Developments in the 1980s 
would seem to confirm this view.
iv. The 'integrationists'
The integrationist school argues that by making the 
distribution of the national income more favourable to 
the mass of the population, wage-earners acquire a stake 
in society which includes pensions, health services and
69
so on. The main thrust of the democratic process then 
becomes to preserve and perhaps marginally improve that 
stake but the quest for a higher ideal is essentially 
abandoned.
In their book presenting the results of a major research 
project on deprivation sponsored by the DHSS and the 
Social Science Research Council, Brown and Madge 
summarise the position thus:
For some people, the only real objective of 
social policy is the total removal of inequality. For others, more modest goals would be to relieve the worst poverty, to tidy up the most glaring squalor, and provide care for the 
neglected and abused. For yet others the goal would be merely to maintain law and order and a minimal social tidiness. There is certainly no agreement on redistribution and no mandate to re-order society (Brown and Madge, 1982: 276).
To relate the problem to current political perceptions of 
the Welfare State it would seem impossible to square 
Thatcher's calls for a return to the 'Victorian values' 
of thrift and self-help with the recent declarations by 
both the Labour and Liberal parties that they believe the 
income maintenance system, in conjunction with the 
taxation system, should effect a substantial 
redistribution of income (see for example Labour Party, 
1982 and Vince, 1983).
To summarise, any system and its purpose will be 
perceived in an individualistic light. In many cases
70
these differences will be reconcilable, at least to such 
an extent as to enable long term objectives to be 
established for the system about which a consensus can be 
achieved. The social security system does not fall into 
this category.
3.7 Benefit Evaluation Studies - the Way Forward
If the definition of workable long-term objectives for 
the income maintenance system is accepted as being 
infeasible for the purposes of establishing long-term 
policy plans then the next question that needs to be 
raised is whether the analytic and evaluative parts of 
the policy making process can be designed in such a way 
as to compensate for the lack of objectives to some 
extent.
Rein has argued in relation to public policy in general 
that i
Future policy is... a redefinition of either 
social objectives or the constraints which inhibit the implementation of objectives already held. Because this is so, it follows that it must be difficult to discover what an organization is trying to accomplish, and whether its present arrangements facilitate or 
inhibit the achievement of these evolving goals. We should not simply accept the goals as given; it is necessary to scrutinize both the 
input and the goals (Rein, 1976« 21).
It could certainly be argued that the ultimata aim of the
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analyst should be to set out all the relevant 
consequences of all the available options and, although 
assumptions may be stated in order to define the 
boundaries of the analysis, by defining objectives the 
analyst may impose unnecessary restrictions and fail to 
consider acceptable alternatives.
The role of evaluation studies in the policy making 
process is described by Brown and Madge as followst
Evaluation is often undertaken because 
politicians or officials want to know if something works. But the value of studies on the effectiveness and efficiency of particular 
services or initiatives is more often that they begin to describe what actually happens. 
Without such detailed studies it is often quite 
difficult to know what the policies are in practice as opposed to what they are stated to be. So evaluation often begins with valuable description. Before it can proceed to 
measurement it has to establish criteria for 
assessment. Here it quite frequently founders because criteria for measuring effectiveness are not generally agreed upont they differ according to the perspective adopted... But the 
attempt to establish criteria helps to elucidate the aims of social policies and 
clarify thinking about goals. It is often only when we have striven to establish criteria for 
effectiveness that the ambiguity of policy objectives becomes clear (Brown and Madge, 
19821 277).
This view of policy analysis is close to that which would 
appear appropriate for the purposes of comparing benefit 
policy alternatives and their distributional implications 
for existing and potential claimants.
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Although it will not materially affect the information 
required by the analyst there is the question of the most 
effective tactics to be adopted by the analyst. The 
approach proposed by Brown and Madge is essentially of 
using the data to clarify ambiguities and stimulate 
analysis of criteria and objectives. A more desirable 
approach, which would build the policy maker's commitment 
to the analysis from an earlier stage in the policy 
making process, and perhaps a politically more realistic 
one, is for the analysts to liaise with the policy makers 
as early in the policy making process as possible and to 
gear the research effort towards the perceived needs of 
the policy makers. This approach is suggested with the 
idea that a database of the basic data is maintained in 
such a way that these analyses will not involve extended 
periods of primary analysis - rather extraction and 
analysis of data from the database in such a manner as to 
comply as well as possible with the needs of the policy 
makers. This is not to suggest that the information 
should be presented such as to support only the views of 
the policy makers, of course.
If OR is to make a contribution to policy analysis in the 
future then it is suggested that the following aims need 
to be met.
i. To find ways of increasing the involvement of 
potential users of the analyses in the analytic
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process from as early a stage as possible with a 
view to building their commitment to the analyses 
and incorporating their expertise in the work and 
ensuring early analytic involvement in policy 
evaluation studies.
ii. To assemble the means to describe the operation of
the existing system as well as possible.
iii. To evaluate potential, alternative policies by
describing their likely distributional implications 
in relation to the present and expected future
populations as best as existing knowledge will 
permit.
iv. To heighten the awareness amongst analysts of the
kinds of policy which might be required to be 
analysed in the future - this end would be much
advanced by the achievement of (i) of course - in
order that sustained efforts on major benefit
modelling projects will be well directed.
To these ends the following chapter outlines possible 
policy trends in social security during the next few
years. The following chapter then attempts to define in 
more detail the issues which need to be examined during 
the course of benefit evaluation studies with a view to 
identifying important attributes of an information system
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Chapter 4
Possible Trends In Social Security Policy
4.1 Introduction
This chapter provides an overview of the major possible 
policy trends in social security being canvassed by 
various political parties and pressure groups. This has 
two main purposes. The first is to provide background 
material for analysts to place the planning of an 
information system for benefit policy analysis on a 
firmer foundation and define the range of problems with 
which it might expect to be presented. The second purpose 
is that the previous chapter identified a wide range of 
philososphies underlying people's perceptions of the 
objectives of the social security system and this chapter 
goes on to identify a similarly diverse range of policy 
proposals stemming from these philososphies - this 
chapter, therefore, seeks to identify common questions 
raised by the various policies.
If common questions can be identified then it would be 
sensible to concentrate any extended research activity on 
these areas. Moreover, if similar questions are being 
asked about policies currently being considered, it may
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justify a fuller analysis than might otherwise be the 
case. It is always necessary to balance the costs of 
research against the expected value of its results and so 
an awareness of the likelihood of similar questions 
recurring is important since it will affect that value.
In common with the historical review of the system in 
Chapter 2 consideration will be restricted to policies 
which are broadly concerned with the able-bodied under 
retirement age — this would include the unemployed, those 
in work, the sick and children. Policies primarily aimed 
at disabled or retired people will not be discussed. This 
is not because these latter groups are thought to be less 
important in any way but they do raise different 
questions and much current debate is focussed on problems 
associated with high unemployment where the same degree 
of political consensus regarding objectives does not 
always prevail. In the longer term it would be desirable 
to include these other population groups in the same 
analytic framework and any approach to the problem which 
would facilitate this end should consequently be given 
added weight.
The pressures on the existing system have already been 
noted. The approaches of the main political parties to 
tackling these would seem to encompass all the main 
options for the future and can be summarised as follows. 
The Labour Party's approach would be to concentrate on
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taking people off means-tested benefits by increasing the 
value and scope of non—contributory and insurance—based 
benefits with a new, improved earnings related 
supplement. The Alliance parties' approach would involve 
a move towards better co-ordinating the taxation and 
benefits systems with the introduction of some form of 
tax credits scheme. The Conservative Government is 
primarily concerned with reducing the 'burden' of the 
Welfare State on the economy and looking for ways of 
saving both on benefit payments and administration costs; 
it announced in April 1984 that it was to set up a major 
review of the social security system and these issues are 
likely to be high on the agenda.
Accordingly this chapter consists of four further 
sections. The next three look in turn at the questions 
raised by policies of simplifying the Supplementary 
Benefits scheme within its existing framework, relating 
benefits to earnings and negative income tax. The final 
section attempts to bring together the implications of 
this review of policies for the design of the analytic 
system.
4.2 Simplification of the Supplementary Benefits Scheme 
within the Existing Framework
In September 1976 a team of DHSS officials was set up by 
the Secretary of State for Social Services to conduct a
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comprehensive review of the Supplementary Benefits 
scheme. The resulting report (DHSS.1978) indicates that 
this was carried out very thoroughly; the team heard a 
great deal of evidence and sought advice from independent 
researchers, from the Supplementary Benefits Commission 
and from the analytic groups within DHSS.
Due to constraints on public expenditure the team decided 
not to consider wider reforms but to concentrate on how 
best to deploy existing resources within the 
Supplementary Benefit framework, whilst taking account of 
the implications of the changes for other Government 
programmes. The team also tried to bear in mind the 
changes in demography and social behaviour which had 
important implications for the system.
The team concluded the underlying need was to simplify 
the system. Although many of the changes advocated in the 
report have been implemented the fundamental problem of 
over complexity still remains and the review of social 
security set up by the Thatcher Government in 1984 is 
likely to address similar issues.
Accordingly this section draws on the 1976 review to 
identify the issues likely to be examined in the present 
review or any similar study and the considerations which 
were felt to be important when the options were being 
evaluated and compared.
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The basic aim of the Supplementary Benefits scheme is to 
provide a minimum standard of living for everyone in the 
country. To define minimum standard of living is 
extremely difficult and the harder the scheme strives to 
achieve equity, so that every claimant has the same 
standard of living, the more complicated the rules 
become. Consequently, in a study such as this, where the 
principal objective is to simplify the administration of
the scheme, there is always a trade-■ off between
simplification and equity. The standard indices for
simplification and equity used in the study were
estimates of numbers of staff saved and ' better-off/
worse-off' tables respectively, and in some cases 
'attraction rates', that is the number of people newly 
entitled to benefit. In considering the simplification of 
the system the way in which provisions interact and 
overlap was also taken into account.
Apart from the trade-off between simplicity and equity 
the other factors which were important in all the 
possible changes were the implications for total costs 
and the possible consequences for financial incentives to 
work for unemployed claimants. Also it was decided when 
studying the adequacy of the rates that need was greatest 
amongst families with children and so this was borne in 
mind when evaluating the other possible changes and it 
was regarded as a priority to devote any additional 
expenditure to this group.
The inter-relationships of the changes, that is their 
implications for each other, were generally borne in mind 
but this can become very difficult and the ability to 
assess the net effect of a package of changes would be an 
essential feature of an information system to aid the 
evaluation of benefit policy analyses. Although each 
change was analysed in depth and its effects on total 
costs and staffing requirements were estimated it is the 
combined effect of the package of changes on total income 
support and marginal tax rates of claimants which really 
matters. Without an indication of the overall cost and 
distributional effects of a set of packages there is a 
danger that an attempt such as this to take a 
comprehensive view of the system in order to make it more 
consistent will only serve to replace one set of 
anomalies and complexities with another.
Superficially a model which is intended to be capable of 
studying the implications of detailed changes to existing 
benefits - basically the manner of change addressed in 
the 1976 Supplementary Benefit Review - requires largely 
the same qualities as a model capable of assessing the 
full implications of the annual uprating of benefits to 
allow for inflation. An 'uprating model' requires 
descriptions of the characteristics of the existing 
claimant population and the current rules for determining 
eligibility to all the existing benefits available to
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that population in order to be able to describe and 
explain the current distribution of benefits and estimate 
such a description of the future claimant population. It 
should be noted that the population will change to a 
limited extent as a result of the uprating because the 
eligible population for means-tested benefits is 
dependent upon the needs allowances and there is also 
evidence that take-up increases with the level of benefit 
entitlement (Supplementary Benefits Commission, 1978). If 
the model is also to be able to analyse detailed changes 
to existing benefit rules, however, it will generally 
have to tackle two further problems.
Firstly the characteristics which determine claimants' 
benefit title may be changed. This may require 
information concerning a characteristic not previously 
tested or information presented in a different form to 
which it has previously been arranged in the 
administrative records. Examples of the latter case would 
be the alteration of the children's scale rates in the 
Supplementary Benefit Review and the altering of the 
linking rules in the review of National Insurance 
Short-Term Benefits discussed in Section 3.4.
Secondly the introduction of new rules may or may not 
alter the eligible or claimant populations, whether it 
will may not be possible to determine prior to analysis.
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These become important points when considering 
alternative sources of data on which to base a benefit 
evaluation model. Administrative records provide a great 
deal of information on the existing claimant population 
and would be a valuable source of data on which to base 
any analysis of policies which do not introduce new rules 
and do not increase the eligible population in any way. 
If information is required on people other than existing 
claimants, however, or if new information concerning 
existing claimants or possibly just similar information 
on existing claimants as already exists but arranged in a 
different form is required, then either the data of 
administrative records must be supplemented by additional 
data or demographic modelling, or an alternative data 
source must be used.
Any application of a benefit evaluation model would need 
to assess the forecast implications of the proposed 
policies against the expected consequences of a policy of 
no change. The ability to analyse fully the implications 
of the annual uprating would also give the model a 
valuable ongoing applicability.
The worth of a model to examine the functioning of the 
present system in detail should not be devalued by the 
inadequacies of that system, therefore, but, on the other 
hand, it should aim to do rather more than this given the 
widespread dissatisfaction with the state of that system.
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The following two sections consider two possible
directions reform of the present system might take.
4.3 Expansion of Non-Means-Tested Benefits
The decision by the Government to abolish Earnings 
Related Supplements to Short-term National Insurance 
benefits in 1982 further decreased the value of insurance 
benefits and forced a greater proportion of the greater 
number of benefit claimants on to means-tested
Supplementary Benefit, and hence further increased the 
pressure on the Supplementary Benefits scheme. It was, 
incidentally, against the international trend towards the 
earnings-relation of benefits.
Moreover the TUC have called for the introduction of a 
new earnings related supplement, the Labour Party pledged 
to introduce an 'improved earnings related supplement* 
during the first months of unemployment in their last 
election manifesto (Labour Party, 1983« 18), and in 1982 
a senior DHSS administrator expressed the opinion that 
this was a policy alternative which could well be 
considered in the next few years.
As far as the implications for choosing a data source are 
concerned the determination of a claimant's title to any 
form of earnings related benefit would clearly be based
84
on an earnings test with the possibility of additions for 
dependents. The Labour Party has suggested that any 
future earnings related benefit introduced by them should 
be calculated on the basis of earnings in as recent a 
period as possible to the claim and that a Period of 
Interruption of Employment in one year should not reduce 
title in the following year - one possibility mooted is 
thus to base the test on earnings in the best two of the 
previous three years revalued up to the October preceding 
the benefit year (Labour Party, 1981s 32-33). If an 
information system is to be capable of analysing the 
proposals for a scheme such as this, therefore, it would 
ideally contain details of the earnings of the relevant 
populations during the past four years. Additionally this 
may need to be linked to information on dependents 
although there is no indication of such an approach in 
Labour's discussion on the matter to date - such an 
analysis may be desirable even if supplements for 
dependents were not considered, of course.
Apart from earnings related benefit schemes the main need 
for research under a future Labour Government will almost 
certainly concern Child Benefits. The Labour Party has 
expressed its intentions to extend the scope of 
non-contributory benefits by improving the existing ones 
for disabled people, one parent families and children and 
introducing new, non-contributory benefits to cover other 
contingencies frequently associated with low incomes
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(Labour Party, 1982s 94). Whilst they have not attached 
priorities to all their measures the improvement of Child 
Benefit is designated to be of high priority (Labour 
Party, 1982: 84) and, given the widespread support for 
Child Benefits, it is sure to be an issue requiring early 
attention.
The improvement of Child Benefit is seen as a three stage 
process (Labour Party, 1981: 18-19). The first priority 
would be to raise the level of the benefits so that they 
exceed that of the child dependency additions to National 
Insurance benefits. They would then be indexed to a new 
prices-or-earnings formula proposed for all benefits - 
essentially uprating benefits according to the greater of 
wages-inflation and price-inflation. Finally the Child 
Benefit scheme would be improved and three possibilities 
have been proposed.
i. Age-relation of Child Benefit - this is not thought
to be a strong proposal since, although older
children are more expensive to maintain, the caring
for younger children is associated with a greater
loss of earnings and these conflicting aspects
would lead to complicating the system for unclear
reasons.
ii. Relating Child Benefits to family size - large
families are more commonly associated with poverty
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than small ones; however paying higher rates of 
benefit to larger families could be seen as an 
undesirable subsidy to large families and would 
also give rise to problems encountered with the old 
family allowance scheme whereby the benefits due to 
separated families could depend on the distribution 
of the children.
iii. Family responsibility allowances - the final
proposal is the payment of an allowance to every 
person with responsibility for children under five 
years of age or disabled relatives, such an
allowance would be payable regardless of whether 
the recipient worked but would be subject to tax.
The important feature of an information system to analyse 
proposals such as these would be detailed information on 
family structure and the financial position of different 
family types. The population base for studies such as 
this would need to be much broader than studies
concerning benefit uprating or minor rule changes and 
would essentially have to cover the general population.
The possibility of a Conservative Government considering 
the introduction of a means-test for Child Benefit, 
either in the 1984 review or subsequently, cannot be 
wholly discounted. This would be highly sensitive 
politically but the issues raised would be mainly
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concerned with target efficiency, and the trade-off 
between equity and simplicity which will be taken up in 
subsequent chapters.
4.4 Negative Income Tax
A great variety of schemes of 'negative income tax' and 
tax credits' have been proposed as universal, 
income-based systems of support (see for example Green, 
1967; Dilnot et al. 1984; Cmnd 5116, 1972; Cooper, 1983). 
They can all be characterised by three simple parameters, 
any two of which determine the third. These three 
parameters are a tax rate, some form of minimum income 
guarantee, and a 'break-even' income.
If M is the minimum income guarantee, that is the level 
of credit paid to an individual with no earned income, 
which may vary according to family size and composition, 
housing expenses, or whatever; t is the tax rate per 
pound of earned income, that is the rate at which the 
credit is withdrawn as earnings increase; and N is the 
'neutral* or 'break-even* income where pre- and post-tax 
incomes are the same and above which positive taxes 
become payable as in conventional systems of income tax; 
then clearly Nt»M. See Figure 4.1 for an example.
Theoretically there is no need for t to be constant and 
been proposed with both progressive andschemes have
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regressive tax schedules (Green, 1967). However if t is 
constant across the greater part of the income range then 
the scheme becomes very much simpler to administer.
In 1972 the Conservative Government developed a scheme of 
tax credits of comparatively modest proportions to the 
extent of administrative feasibility (Cmnd 5116, 1972). 
The Tax Credit scheme was proposed primarily as a tax 
reform, making the income tax system cheaper for the 
Government to administer, saving between 10,000 and 
15,000 Civil Service posts and obviating the need for the 
PAYE system. At the same time, however, it was claimed 
that it would provide an improved level of support for 
the poor both in and out of work, without means-testing, 
that it would be easier to understand, and that it would 
reduce marginal tax rates and hence increase incentives 
to work.
The principal motivation for the 1972 proposals was 
administrative simplicity, but other factors were also 
recognised as being significant. An important part of any 
such scheme is the effect on marginal tax rates and 
financial incentives to work - since it aims to bring 
together or replace several existing measures which can 
combine to produce exceptionally high marginal rates, it 
offers the opportunity to smooth away such anomalies. In 
considering the likely consequences for the labour supply 
it is necessary to look at both the minimum credit level.
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which will effect individuals' total incomes, and the 
marginal tax rates which will effect both total income 
and the marginal price of leisure relative to work.
The interaction with and implications for other schemes 
is clearly of prime importance in a reform of this kind. 
Considerations such as the appropriate accounting period 
and the unit of assessment become central. At present the 
tax system has an annual accounting period whereas social 
security payments are based on a variety of time periods. 
For the purposes of benefits it is generally regarded as 
more suitable to treat the unit of assessment as the 
'household' or 'family', rather than the individual which 
may be considered more appropriate for tax purposes. If 
the tax and social security systems are to be brought 
more closely together in some unified system it would be 
necessary for these definitions to be made consistent.
Another important consideration with any negative income 
tax scheme is the expected consequences for wage rates. 
It was noted in Chapter 2 that mistrust of wage subsidies 
dates back to the Speenhamland system of 1795, and 
whatever the expected effect on wages maybe, even if it 
is neutral, estimates need to be made explicit.
Behavioural aspects other than the work-leisure option 
and household formation which need to be considered are 
fertility, which could be effected by the child credit
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level, and savings which could, for example, be Increased 
if such a scheme were to encourage early retirement. A 
major advantage of tax credit schemes is that since there 
would be no need to apply for the credits there would be 
no problem of non-take-up.
Finally, any scheme of negative income tax will 
redistribute income to some extent but the degree of this 
redistribution is of course dependent upon the tax 
schedules and credit levels. A scheme such as the one 
proposed in 1972, with only limited levels of credit and 
a single tax rate for most of the population, is 
inevitably restricted in this regard. Whether or not this 
amounts to success or failure on the part of the scheme 
depends, of course, on the philosophy underlying the 
proposals.
More recently the Alliance parties (Social Democratic 
Party, 1982; Vince, 1983) have proposed systems of tax 
credits and the Institute for Fiscal Studies (Dilnot fit 
al. 1984) have gone a stage further and devised a scheme 
of tax and benefit credits. The details of these schemes 
are not important for present purposes, the issues they 
raise are essentially the same as any wide reaching 
reform of the income transfer system. Clearly an 
information system capable of evaluating a combined 
tax-benefit scheme of any description would have to be 
based on the general population as it would affect people
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at all Income levels.
4.5 Conclusion
This chapter has presented the main policy changes which 
require analysis in the next few years. The purpose 
of this was partly to provide background information for 
potential analysts but mainly to seek to identify areas 
of common concern to provide a sound analytic framework 
in spite of the wide diversity of system objectives 
described in Chapter 3. This wide diversity of objectives 
has been seen to translate into an equally wide range of 
possible policy initiatives. It has been possible, 
however, to draw out the basic structure which would be 
required of an information system to aid benefit
evaluation.
The primary decision which is necessary in determining 
the nature of such an analytic system is whether it is to 
aim solely to describe and monitor the operation of the 
present system or whether it is to seek to compare this 
with alternative proposals. Given the widespread
dissatisfaction with the present system, the former 
approach would seem quite unsupportable.
Given this conclusion, then, it would seem essential that 
the analytic system is based on information relating to 
the general population. Any reform of the system will
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require the consideration of a wider population than 
existing claimants and many proposals will directly 
effect a large proportion of the population — especially 
examples such as tax credit schemes and Child Benefit.
Having said this it must also be recognised that the 
description of the existing system and its expected 
operation in the future will always be the starting point 
for evaluation studies. Any alternative must first show 
itself to be better than the existing system. Moreover an 
analytic system which is able to provide a detailed 
assessment of the implications of the annual uprating of 
benefit rates will have an important, ongoing 
applicability. However because the present system is far 
from satisfactory this is not enough. If, therefore, the 
analytic system has to sacrifice some detail in its 
description of the present system in order to achieve a 
wider perspective and applicability, then so be it. The 
inadequacies of the existing system should not be allowed 
to frustrate attempts to analyse alternative systems to 
the best ability of available data, technology and 
expertise.
The bare essentials of the analytic system, then, are the 
ability to assess the net effects of a package of changes 
to the existing system in terms of the distributional 
consequences. This will involve estimations of total 
income support, marginal tax rates, better-off/worse-off
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tables, and attraction rates together with administrative 
implications and overall costings related to present and 
expected future populations. Apart from the information 
required to determine claimants' benefit title this will 
require information on previous earnings - this would be 
necessary to calculate replacement ratios but the ability 
to consider income-based systems of assessment would 
appear essential and so ideally earnings data would 
relate to the previous three or four years. This will 
need to be linked with information on family and 
household composition, housing expenses, work expenses 
where applicable, and so on. It will also be necessary to 
incorporate expectations of behavioural responses to 
policy such as household formation, fertility, savings, 
retirement, wage rates, etc.
Other issues which the analytic system should be able to 
address would be the consequences of policy changes for 
take-up of benefits and overall measures of distribution 
and redistribution of incomes. These latter are catered 
for to a limited extent by better-off/worse-off tables 
but an analytic system based on the general population 
would be able to produce similar tables covering the 
entire population - whether these should be reduced to a 
single index is debatable but this will be considered in 
Chapter 5. Wider reforms will also necessitate 
consideration of issues such as the appropriate unit of 
assessment and accounting period and a better
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understanding of the trade—off between equity and
simplicity would be a valuable input to analyses.
Given these observations the next chapter goes on to 
study these issues in detail to specify the requirements 
of the analytic system more fully.
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Chapter 5
Requirements of an Information System to Evaluate Social 
Security Benefit Policy Alternatives
5.1 Introduction
In Chapter 3 it was concluded that the definition of 
workable long-term objectives for the income maintenance 
system is an infeasible goal. Chapter 4 then went on to 
consider the alternatives which are likely to receive 
significant political support over the next few years 
with a view to establishing a framework for future 
analytic work which would remain valid irrespective of 
the political composition of the government. The main 
issues would appear to concern the unit of assessment, 
the accounting period, distributional consequences, 
benefit efficiency and economic, demographic and 
behavioural changes and the sensitivity of the policies 
to these.
This chapter studies each of these issues in detail in 
order to first identify the desired nature of the output 
from an information system to aid benefit policy analyses 
and then to draw these requirements together to specify 
some essential and desirable attributes of a database for
the information system.
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The chapter consists of three further sections. The 
following section addresses each of the above issues in 
turn together with the question of the presentation of 
the results of policy analyses. Section 3 then draws out 
the implications for the choice of a suitable database. 
The final section summarises the conclusions of the 
chapter.
5.2 The Output of an Information System for Evaluating 
Benefit Policy Alternatives
5.2.1. Unit of Assessment
Fundamental to any analysis involving the distribution of 
income is the definition of the income unit on which the 
analysis is based. As explained in Low incomess
Because families with disparate incomes can comprise a multi-family household, there is 
less dispersion of incomes about the average when a household definition of income unit is used than when a family definition is used. The composition of the lowest quintile is affected, and the income relative to the median that is 
associated with the lowest quintile is higher in the case of households than in the case of families. (Supplementary Benefits Commission, 
19771 64).
It would appear self-evident, however, that any 
comparison of alternative benefit policies should be 
based on consideration of the benefit unit as defined for
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the purposes of each alternative. This could result in 
the need to compare the effects of policies which use 
different definitions and in this case it may be 
necessary to evaluate the impact of each alternative on 
one or more common definitions for the purposes of 
removing the influence of the definition of the unit of 
assessment on other attributes of the policy 
alternatives.
The most common unit used both in determining benefit 
entitlement and analysing income distribution in general 
is some description of the 'nuclear family', that is a 
single person or married couple together with any 
dependent children. For the purposes of Supplementary 
Benefit, for example, persons of 19 or over are 
considered to be separate families if living with their 
parents, as are 16 to 18 year-olds no longer in full-time 
education, and elderly relatives.
However this is by no means the only unit of assessment 
used in the social security system as explained by 
McClements (1978, 28). In the National Insurance system 
the individual earner is the basic unit for contribution 
purposes and contribution records determine benefit 
entitlement, so that a married couple can be one or two 
benefit units depending on their individual contribution 
records. If there is only one insured spouse then the 
other spouse and dependent children are counted as being
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in the same benefit unit, although a woman on Short-Term 
benefits cannot normally claim for her husband and 
children. A widow remarrying or cohabiting who is 
dependent on her husband *s insurance retains her title to 
National Insurance Retirement Pension but loses her right 
to Widows' Benefits. For Widowed Mother’s Allowances any 
child below the age of 19 can be classified as a 
dependent even if it has an independent income.
Given this confusion; the facts that at least a fifth of 
households contain more than one benefit unit and there 
are, on average, 1.5 tax units per household (McClements, 
1978: 57); and the extent of joint consumption and 
intra-household income redistribution causing expenditure 
data only to be available on a household basis; 
McClements prefers to base his analysis on the ‘household 
unit* - that is a single person or group of people 
sharing the same tenure and with common cooking and 
eating arrangements.
The Supplementary Benefits Commission suggested (1977: 
para 29) that the breakaway from the household means-test 
which became complete with the passing of the National 
Assistance Act in 1948 was permanent. It notes two 
objections to the household definition - that it made 
unemployed members of the household dependent on the 
earning members and that it acted as an incentive to 
split households. It thus concluded«
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While we would not suggest that low income 
should be defined solely in terms of the nuclear supplementary benefit family unit, we 
believe that this definition is particularly relevant to any consideration of policy options for improving the financial situation of those 
in the low income category (Supplementary 
Benefits Commission, 1977» para 30).
However, following reports of the policies considered by 
the 'Family Policy Group* within the present Government 
the possibility of a return to a broader, family-based 
definition of the benefit unit of assessment being 
considered should not be discounted.
Conversely the viewpoint of the women's movement and 
socialists would emphasise the significance of 
intra-household distribution of income and 
responsibilities. So that although they would see the 
distribution of income between families as of fundamental 
importance they would also emphasise the need to consider 
the distribution of income at the level of the 
individual. In policy terms this may or may not manifest 
itself in a shift towards greater independence in the 
structure of the benefit system, but either way there is 
sure to be a need to analyse policies at the level of the 
individual.
It would seem, therefore, that it should be a 
prerequisite of any data source adopted for benefit 
comparison analyses that it should be capable of
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producing information on a 'Supplementary Benefit nuclear 
family' basis. However, given the existing diversity of 
definitions, and the possibility that future studies may 
need to consider still other alternatives, it would be 
highly desirable if the data could be based on the 
individual but in such a way that the individuals can be 
regrouped into their respective families, households, tax 
units etc. Such an approach would serve to strengthen the 
essential quality of durability in the database - and 
allow the information system to develop into a lasting 
aid to policy making. Whether such an approach is 
feasible depends upon the data being collected on a 
household basis with sufficient information to 
disaggregate the household into the smaller units of 
analysis as required.
It is worth noting that an approach such as this would be 
compatible with the 'whole person' approach which is 
being considered in the Operational Strategy documents 
relating to the computerisation of the DHSS Local 
Offices. In particular it was suggested«
1.1 All relevant data about the person concerned held by the Department should be 
readily accessible at the point of enquiry or 
claim.
1.2 The records of spouses (and other people 
with adult dependents) should be suitably cross-indexed, care being taken to avoid criticism of interfering or obtaining 
unnecessary information.
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1*3 Child Benefit records should be cross-indexed to the records for both spouses or other appropriate adults (DHSS, 1980: 14).
5.2.2. Accounting Period
The next aspect of the presentation of the results to be 
considered is the length of the time period over which 
the monitoring is to take place.
Income and expenditure are subject to greater variation 
in the short-term than over longer periods and so in 
order to obtain a more faithful representation of a 
unit's 'average behaviour' it would be preferable to base 
the analysis on longer rather than shorter periods. 
However 'average behaviour' is not necessarily what 
evaluation studies are concerned about. For example, 
there is conflicting opinion as to whether benefits 
should be higher in the long-term or the short-term. Some 
people would argue that benefits should be higher in the 
short-term to allow beneficiaries a period of adjustment 
to their altered circumstances - this view was expressed 
in the Earnings Related Supplement scheme, 1966-82. 
Others would argue, however, that benefits should 
increase in the longer-term as capital stocks begin to 
need replacement - this is the purpose of the higher 
scale rates of Supplementary Benefits available to all 
long-term claimants except the unemployed. Informed 
debate of issues such as these would not be advanced by
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averaging experiences over longer periods.
The great majority of social security provisions are 
based on the payment of weekly benefits and discussion of 
them is normally conducted at this level. It would appear 
to be essential, therefore, that any analysis of benefit 
policies should consider weekly income, and possibly 
consumption or expenditure.
If reliable information on people's actual experience 
over longer periods existed so that fluctuations could be 
identified and changes in behaviour in the light of 
changing financial circumstances observed then this would 
surely be of considerable interest. Such information 
would be of value in improving understanding of the 
existing conditions which in turn could improve 
predictions of the likely consequences of future policy 
changes. Unfortunately data collected over longer periods 
is traditionally less reliable. For example, in 1976 the 
Office of Population Censuses and Surveys (OPCS) 
conducted an experiment to investigate the feasibility of 
recording annual income in the Family Expenditure Survey 
and it was concluded that if the consultation of records 
by respondents was important to ensure accuracy then it 
would not be feasible - it was not possible to draw firm 
conclusions about the accuracy of estimates not supported 
by records (Kemsley at al. 1980« 71—72).
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It is suggested, therefore, that any information system 
used to evaluate social security policies should be able 
to describe units' experiences on a weekly basis as 
accurately as possible. Information concerning their 
experiences over longer periods, such as that from the 
longitudinal analysis of the Cohort Study of Unemployed 
Men is extremely useful for improving understanding and 
this should be used to augment basic data wherever 
possible within the main evaluation system.
5.2.3. Distributional Consequences
The estimation of the differential effects which a policy 
change is expected to have on various subsets of the 
population is the fundamental product of any analysis of 
benefit policy alternatives - any other research is 
essentially aimed at improving these estimates either 
directly by, say, attempting to better understand the 
composition of the existing population, or perhaps more 
indirectly by seeking to develop the theory of labour 
supply effects of benefit policies, for example.
The basic requirement for comparing the implications of 
alternative policies for different sub-populations is 
some measure of their incomes under the various schemes. 
Capital resources play an important part in determining 
material standards of living and some commentators, 
perhaps most notably of late the Institute for Fiscal
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Studies in work carried out for the Social Democratic 
Party (Morris, 1982), have suggested that consumption is 
a more indicative measure of living standards than 
income. However, with the exception of the amount of a 
claimant's savings in assessing title to means-tested 
benefits, all social security measures since Beveridge 
reported have sought to provide some sort of minimum 
income irrespective of a person's stock of capital. 
Whilst it is as well to be aware of the possibility that 
some future Government may wish to relate its income 
maintenance system more closely to consumption rather 
than income - and again it is important to bear in mind 
the underlying philosophy of the Conservative 
Government's 'Family Policy Group* - it is suggested that 
some measure of income will remain the primary gauge of 
people's material standard of living for the foreseeable 
future. Moreover, even if a Government did wish to shift 
the emphasis towards consumption, much of the debate 
would inevitably continue to focus on incomes and so even 
in these circumstances income measures would retain their 
importance. Clearly, though, a data source which also has 
information on expenditure would have added value.
For the purposes of comparing very similar benefit 
policies, particularly when considering a change in 
benefit rates without altering eligibility rules, for 
example, it may be adequate to compare benefit income 
before and after the change. Even in such simple cases
great care must be taken, however. Atkinson and 
Micklewright have shown (1980 ) for example that 
predictions of National Insurance benefit receipt 
calculated on the basis adopted in Lower Incomes (Royal 
Commission on the Distribution of Income and Wealth, 
1978s Table 4.3), when compared with benefit actually 
received by unemployed respondents to the Family 
Expenditure Surveys 1972-77, resulted in only 19% of 
recipients with unemployment durations of less than a 
year receiving within 5% of the predicted amount of 
benefit, and only 34% of recipients for all durations. 
There were a number of factors which explained this 
divergence - disqualification from title to benefit at 
the beginning of a PIE, linking spells reducing length of 
title, errors in calculation of Earnings Related 
Supplement caused by assumption of uninterrupted 
earnings, wives' earnings exceeding the maximum permitted 
level so that the claimant is not eligible for benefit on 
her behalf.
It is therefore suggested that any model designed to 
compare benefit policy alternatives should, as a minimum, 
seek to describe the unit's 'Total Income Support' (TIS). 
TIS was defined in Social Assistance (DHSS, 1978t 115) 
as s
i. for those in work -
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gross earnings less income tax, National Insurance 
contributions, rent, rates and work expenses, plus Child 
Benefit, Family Income Supplement, rent rebates, rate 
rebates, free school meals and free welfare milk; and,
ii. for those out of work -
National Insurance benefit less rent and rates, plus 
Earnings Related Supplement, Supplementary Benefit 
(including rent and rates). Child Benefit, any Family 
Income Supplement still payable, rent rebates, rate 
rebates, free school meals and free welfare milk (tax 
rebates were ignored).
The actual definition will vary according to the benefits 
available to claimants at the time. Also care needs to be 
taken with the allowance made for all these elements - 
for example, Atkinson and Micklewright have demonstrated 
(1982b) the difficulty of including a realistic allowance 
for work expenses and the need to offset this against the 
costs of job-seeking, which will also be subject to 
considerable variation between individuals.
It is suggested, therefore, that the fundamental output 
required from benefit evaluation analyses is a breakdown 
of the numbers of units - defined initially in terms of 
the 'benefit unit of assessment* for the particular 
policy, but also, for the purposes of policy comparison,
to, say, individuals, families, households, or 
perhaps the Supplementary Benefit claimant unit - into a 
number of TIS ranges.
Determining the appropriate width of these TIS bands may 
be important when deciding whether or not a given data 
source is capable of supplying results of sufficient 
accuracy since the narrower the bands have to be then the 
more reliable the data upon which they are based must be 
if the results are not to be presented as spuriously 
accurate. Clearly the appropriate width of the bands will 
vary from one exercise to the next, and it is reasonable 
to suppose that the more radical the change which is 
being considered the wider the bands could be expected to 
be - as the possible policy changes become more radical 
the consequences will probably become more difficult to 
predict, hence making less closely defined predictions 
more appropriate, and the absolute size of the consequent 
changes in people's benefit receipts are likely to be 
larger.
In addition to the distribution of TIS by 'type of 
benefit unit', the analysis also needs to be able to 
describe its distribution by a number of other personal 
and household characteristics - some of these will have 
been required in order to assess the unit's benefit 
entitlement. The characteristics referred to here are 
housing type (owner occupier, council tenant, private
108
rented accommodation, furnished or unfurnished), region 
(standard regions and type of region), ages of 
individuals, employment histories, length of current PIE, 
National Insurance contribution records, previous 
occupation, education, health and possibly others. The 
reason for obtaining this output is that it should serve 
to identify any groups whose incomes are particularly 
affected, and hence to improve understanding of the 
distributional consequences of the changes being 
considered. It may also provide information on groups in 
whom there is particular interest, a matter which will be 
taken up below.
Having established TIS by the various characteristics 
there are several sorts of analyses which can be carried 
out to improve understanding of the consequences of the 
alternatives. The first is to construct 
'better-off/worse-off tables - that is tables which 
divide individuals, benefit units, or whatever, by change 
in income, normally compared to a no change position or 
possibly by comparing policy alternatives in pairs.
The second study which should be carried out on the TIS 
tables is a consideration of the implications for 
horizontal equity. That is, implicit in any benefit 
scheme's rules, there is an idea that claimants with 
different family circumstances should be at a similar 
standard of living. This applies particularly to the
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Supplementary Benefit scheme which seeks to provide a 
minimum standard of living, but also to other benefits as 
well. McClements (1978) has developed indices for 
comparing different households based on an analysis of 
the expenditure data in the 1971 and 1972 Family 
Expenditure Surveys, which attempt to define incomes 
which households, categorised in terms of the 
individual's sex and age, require in order to attain 
similar standards of living. The horizontal equity 
implicit in a given set of tables of TIS resulting from a 
policy evaluation could either be studied by dividing TIS 
by the appropriate indices and comparing results or 
alternatively by comparing the equivalence scales implied 
by the results themselves. This can be done in one of two 
ways, either by dividing the TIS for each group by that 
for a base group and deriving a given policy* s implied 
equivalence scales and comparing the scales for different 
policies, or alternatively by taking the same population 
groups under the alternative policies and dividing their 
TIS by one of their number, say the no change option, so 
that if the equitability of the scheme were to remain 
unchanged the process would yield indices which, for any 
of the policy alternatives, were the same across all 
population groups.
A further study which could be undertaken once the TIS 
tables have been derived is an analysis of the extent to 
which the alternatives redistribute income. Whilst any
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income transfer scheme redistributes income by 
definition, it has not been clear in the past that 
redistribution with a view to reducing inequality of 
income has been an explicit objective. Both Labour and 
Liberal Parties have declared recently that they do wish 
this to be an explicit aim of the system in future. It 
would appear, therefore, that future analyses of benefit 
policy options should seek to quantify this quality. Such 
an analysis would begin with the distributions of the 
population of the country by pre- and post-transfer 
income - post-transfer income would be TIS, pre-transfer 
income could be simply gross earnings plus unearned 
income. Summary tables of pre- and post-transfer 
household income are published annually in Economic
Trends - these include four definitions of income,
'original income* plus cash benefits equals 'gross
income', gross income minus direct taxes equals
'disposable income', and disposable income minus indirect 
taxes plus other benefits equals 'final income', capital 
gains are excluded from these incomes and all direct 
taxes on capital are thus omitted also (the information 
to include these items is not available in the Family 
Expenditure Survey data upon which these tables are 
based). The Central Statistical Office produce tables of 
income distributions before and after transfers which are 
published in the Blue Book - these are based on the 
information contained in the Inland Revenue's Survey of 
Personal Incomes supplemented by Family Expenditure
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Survey data, they are presented on a tax unit basis which 
is extended to cover units not liable for tax who are not 
included in the Survey of Personal Incomes. The Royal 
Commission on the Distribution of Income and Wealth 
considered these tables to be the 'most valuable income 
statistics available* in spite of their retaining many of 
the defects of the Survey of Personal Incomes (Royal 
Commission on the Distribution of Income and Wealth, 
1975s 44).
The task of expressing the distributions of income in 
terms of a single index has been the subject of 
considerable research and continues to be a matter of 
academic debate (see Atkinson, 1970, for example). It is 
possible, however, to describe the various income 
distributions which are anticipated for the various 
policy alternatives by using several different summary 
statistics. This approach is adopted by Piachaud (1982) 
in which he first describes the distributions in terms of 
proportions of families in various income ranges and 
percentiles, he then quotes the Gini coefficient and the 
Atkinson measure of equality with three values of the 
parameter alpha (see Appendix 5.1 for an explanation of 
these indices).
A further benefit attribute which could be estimated once 
the TIS tables have been derived is total benefit cost. 
Although ORS may essentially be concerned with estimating
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the impact of policy decisions at a distributional level 
rather than overall costs, any model capable of producing 
reasonable distributional estimates should also be able 
to produce costings as well. Even if total cost estimates 
are only made to be used as a test statistic in 
validation runs they must still have a role to play.
5.2.4. Benefit Efficiency
It should be noted that in some circles the concept known 
as target efficiency would be called effectiveness. 
However, as target efficiency is a recognised term in 
social security, it will be retained here.
Roter (1975) discusses the need to tackle the problem of 
overall benefit efficiency, defined as the extent to 
which the actual implementation of a programme meets 'the 
original targets conceptualized by policy-makers'. For 
this purpose two elements of benefit efficiency are 
identified. Target efficiency - 'the degree of 
discrepancy between eligibility requirements as formally 
specified in programme regulations and the original 
targets or objectives which prompted the setting up of a 
programme' - and operational efficiency, the outcomes of 
actual programme implementation compared with the said 
eligibility requirements. Roter explains the trade-off 
between these two aspects of overall benefit efficiency -
namely that increased target efficiency generally 
requires more complex operational rules and regulations 
leading to an increase in errors and a decrease in 
operational efficency and ultimately a breakdown in 
implementation with ad hoc rules being substituted at the 
local level and a greater mismatch between policy as 
analysed and policy as implemented. In essence an attempt 
to improve the equity of the benefit has a trade-off in 
operational efficiency which may have inequitable 
consequences.
For determining target efficiency Roter suggests a data 
set needs to be based either on a population census or a 
representative sample of the general population, and for 
operational efficiency 'a broad data base in which both 
eligible persons and non-recipients are included with a 
known probability so that both groups can be identified'.
It may help to understand the populations which need to 
be identified by considering the following diagram 
adapted from Roter.
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Figure 5.1 The Various Populations of Analysis in Benefit
Evaluation Studies
Recipient
Population EligiblePopulation
f
b
d
Target
Population
Clearly for a perfectly efficient benefit these three 
populations would coincide so that one policy objective would be to maximise (a) as a proportion of the union of 
the above population sets. The other subsets in the diagram can be explained as follows.
b - manifestation of non-take-up and operational errorsc - 'two wrongs make a right', rules do not define asoriginally intended but are incorrectly applied 
giving desired outcome 
d - rules fail to embrace targete - rules fail to exclude non-targetf - rules fail to exclude non-target but benefits fail to reach their eligible population either through 
operational error or non-take-up g - administrative error and fraudulent claims.
Poter suggests a measure of overall efficiency as
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(a) + (c)
(a) + (b) + (c) + (d)
that is the ratio of the target population who receive 
benefits to the total target population, and a measure of 
inefficiency would be
(b) + (d)_______ ,
(a) + (b) + (c) + (d)
that is the proportion of those who do not receive a 
benefit which was intended for them.
If these were considered to be acceptable definitions of 
efficiency (a point taken up later in this sub-section), 
assuming that benefit receipt can be regarded as a 
success irrespective of whether it is a by-product of 
misapplication of the rules and not considering the 
actual level of benefit received, then this requires the 
identification of two populations for any given benefit - 
namely the recipients and the target.
For an existing benefit the identification of the
recipient population is fundamental to any comparison 
with alternatives. To identify the target population of a 
benefit requires an explicit definition of the objectives 
of that benefit and this may well be difficult to 
establish - the longer the scheme has been in existence 
the harder it is likely to be. To estimate the recipient 
population of a proposed benefit requires an 
understanding, and thence a formal model, of the way
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take-up and administrative errors vary between benefits. 
If such a model could be developed then the basic output 
from a policy evaluation exercise, which would normally 
be estimated on the basis of an approximation of the 
eligible population, could be used to transform the 
expected distribution of benefits amongst the eligible 
population into that for the recipient population.
Roter lists the factors which are generally acknowledged 
as leading to increased take-up as being the promotion of 
a more appealing service through advertising, the 
reduction of policing methods which can cause 
embarrassment to potential claimants and stigmatisation 
of the service, and the reduction of the cost of the 
service to potential claimants in terms of expense and 
effort relative to its value.
The Supplementary Benefits Commission (1978) found strong 
evidence that the proportion of sick and unemployed 
receiving their title to Supplementary Benefit rose as 
the length of their PIE extended. Moreover about 
two-thirds of those with an unclaimed title to benefit 
were living in households which had combined incomes 
above the Supplementary Benefit level.
Holdaway and Partridge (1981) report that a Delphi study 
involving eight bocal Office managers revealed benefit 
complexity as the dominating cause of errors - benefit
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complexity being defined as ' the number of different 
distinguishable operations through which a claim must 
pass'. Other factors frequently proposed as having an 
influence on error rates are the number of claimants 
relative to the number of staff, the quality of Local 
Office staff and the amount of training which they 
receive and the level of staff turnover.
If it was felt unacceptable to assume the receipt of 
benefit to be a success irrespective of whether the 
amount of benefit received was correct then subsets (a) 
and (c) could have the additional condition imposed upon 
them of ' received within x% of the correct amount of 
benefit'. Those people excluded as a result would be 
added into subsets (b) and (d) respectively.
There is, then, a need for quantitative research into the 
interaction between benefit complexity and operational 
efficiency. This would have two main objectives. Firstly 
to establish a better understanding of how proposed 
policies will work in practice rather than theory. If it 
is the case that schemes with simpler rules are more 
faithfully implemented than schemes with more complex 
rules then a direct comparison of results of evaluation 
studies based on eligible populations rather than 
potential recipient populations will be deficient. 
Secondly the research may be able to identify more 
efficient policies for reaching the same target
population.
If this model could then be extended in both directions 
it may also be possible to relate increased benefit 
complexity to attempts to improve equity in the 
eligibility rules, and to relate operational efficiency 
to administrative costs. This would then enable analyses 
of benefit policy alternatives to include a consideration 
of their implications for the cost of administering them. 
This has not been feasible in the past and yet whilst 
National Insurance benefits cost around 4% of their value 
in benefit payments to administer the corresponding 
figure for Supplementary Benefits is around 17%. Nobody 
would argue that to decrease the cost of administering 
the benefit system is undesirable - whether such savings 
should be used to enable an improvement in the quality of 
service or to save on running costs may be a different 
matter.
This is an area where the OR modelling approach could be 
particularly valuable and could be a first important step 
towards relating operational problems and policy making 
more closely. To this end this subject will be addressed 
again in Chapter 9.
The suitability of Roter's definition of benefit 
efficiency could be questioned by policy makers. 
Depending on political priorities concern might, for
119
instance, focus on the sub-populations e, f, and g. The 
important point to recognise for the moment, however, is 
that all these various sub-populations ought to be 
considered in benefit evaluation studies. If such groups 
are to be enumerated then clearly the data base for the 
information system needs to cover the general population 
or else not even existing benefits can be properly 
evaluated.
5.2.5. Economic, Demographic and Behavioural Changes and 
Sensitivity Analyses
It could be argued that the social security system is 
designed to ameliorate immediate social problems and so, 
providing it achieves this goal, any further problems 
which the measures themselves may create or which arise 
in the future for whatever reason can be dealt with by 
further measures - quite possibly by a different 
Government. Given this view of the system it could then 
be argued that all that is necessary to design social 
security policies is a knowledge of the social problems 
which the measures need to tackle - in other words a 
description of the existing population by the size of 
groups with various characteristics. Whilst this may seem 
an extraordinarily naive approach to policy making it 
would not appear to be in altogether stark contrast with 
the pattern described in the development of the system in 
Chapter 2. It is suggested that if this pattern is to be
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improved upon in the future, then policies need to be 
made on a basis not only of knowledge of the existing 
population but also of how that population might develop 
in the future. Some of these developments may be expected 
to occur whatever social security provisions obtain, 
others will be dependent on those provisions.
This section is concerned with the nature of the output 
which is needed from benefit evaluation exercises. It has 
been noted that the basic product of such an exercise is 
a breakdown of the existing and prospective claimant 
populations by a number of characteristics in order that 
their benefit entitlement can be assessed and the impact 
of possible changes estimated. Unless the model which 
provides these estimates can embody the theoretical 
understanding of the supply of labour and other 
behavioural consequences of the policies then its value 
is severely limited. For example, at the most basic 
level, registered unemployment more than doubled between 
mid 1980 and mid 1982 from less than 1.5 millions to over 
3 millions; at the next level of detail the number of 
people registered for more than a year rose from around 
20% of the total unemployed (around 350,000 to 400,000) 
in 1980 and the first half of 1981 to 35% (around 1.1 to
1.2 millions) by the end of 1982. Any policy evaluation 
which concerned these population groups in, say, the late 
1970s but did not anticipate these trends would 
inevitably have been far from faithful in its
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assessments.
There are two points being made here. The first is that a 
benefit evaluation exercise which makes no attempt to 
understand changes in the structure of the population 
will always be seriously inadequate. This does not 
necessarily mean that any model designed to evaluate 
benefit policy alternatives should also seek to model 
explicitly the behavioural consequences and likely 
demographic trends. There is a considerable tradition of 
research on all aspects of the interaction of social 
security benefits with the supply of labour and this 
needs to be incorporated into the policy analysis 
exercise at some stage. Preferably the data upon which 
the analysis is based would have the capacity to enhance 
the understanding of the behavioural and demographic 
aspects in its own right. If this were to be achieved the 
source data would have to include a time element — any 
attempt to understand the labour market, for example, 
requires information relating to different conditions in 
that market. If existing theory is to be applied to 
interpret the basic output, however, this time element 
would not be a necessity and 'snapshot' data describing 
conditions at a single point in time may suffice. It is 
essential, therefore, that the evaluation of the policies 
incorporates analysis of their sensitivity to tenable 
theories and changes which are predicted by experts.
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The second point is that some changes which occur in the 
environment will not be a progression from the past and 
hence may not be predicted by any of the existing 
theories, based as they are on historic data - the 
unprecedented rise in unemployment in the period 1980-82 
might be one example. For this reason the evaluation 
exercise should also explicitly test the sensitivity of 
the policy alternatives to discontinuous changes in 
various exogenous variables such as unemployment levels 
and price and wage inflation rates. A policy option which 
is able to show itself to be robust enough to cope with 
such dramatic changes would have considerably added 
appeal over less robust alternatives.
5.2.6. Presentation of Results
Evaluation studies of the kind being discussed here will 
inevitably generate a vast amount of basic data. These 
basic data need to be condensed and summarised by the 
analysts in such a way as to ensure that administrators 
and Ministers are made fully aware of all the salient 
facts and implications of the options open to them 
without being overburdened by the sheer volume of 
material and without exposing themselves to possible 
charges of editing the results in a non-objective 
fashion. Greater involvement on the part of these users 
in the analytic process would go a considerable way to 
overcoming this latter problem apart from the other
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important advantages of such an approach) to policy 
analysis which have already been mentioned in Chapter 3 
above and will be discussed further below particularly in 
Chapter lO.
If further research could identify the correspondence 
between various consequences such as the trades-off 
between the complexity of rules and equity considerations 
in one direction and administration costs and error rates 
in the other direction then it could be possible to model 
such relationships explicitly. If this was to prove 
possible it would enable a greater understanding of how 
the system works and also make the results of evaluation 
studies more easily understood.
In the meantime, however, it should be possible to 
identify certain population groups of particular 
interest, the results concerning whom will be of especial 
importance. These groups can be placed into five 
categories.
i. Qroups who attract concern at all times - this will 
consist particularly of the poorest families.
ii. Groups who attract concern at the particular time of
the study. These may or may not be the groups at 
whom the policy is specifically directed. At
present this class may include the long-term
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unemployed, unemployed school leavers, and single 
parent families. As with those in (i) these groups 
can be identified prior to the analysis.
iii• Groups with 'large' numbers of people in similar 
circumstances. 'Large* will be relative to the
total number affected by the particular change in 
question. These groups can be identified once the 
population profile is known in sufficient detail to 
apply the given policy's eligibility rules.
iv. Groups whose TIS would be most affected by the
change under study. These groups may not be
identifiable until the analysis has been performed. 
If several alternatives are being considered then 
the groups in this class may vary between the 
alternatives, and all these groups will need to be 
enumerated.
v. Groups, if any, who are affected by particular 
aspects of the policy changes. Concern may focus on 
one or more specific aspects of a policy 
alternative, in which case it may be necessary to 
know how many are affected and by how much. It 
should be possible to identify this information 
from the distributions of TIS against relevant 
claimant characteristics.
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Tables describing the changes in TIS for the above 
categories under the various policy options could be 
regarded as the minimum amount of information required to 
facilitate sensible analysis.
5•3 Attributes of a Database for the Information System
The previous section has described the factors which 
determine the desired nature of the output of an 
information system to assist in the comparison of benefit 
policy options. In this section the implications of this 
analysis for the definition of a desirable data base for 
the information system are considered.
The first aspect which was discussed was the appropriate 
unit of assessment on which to base policy comparisons. 
Each policy option will initially be analysed using the 
definition of the unit of assessment adopted in that 
policy. For the purposes of comparing the options the 
results will then need to be translated into one or more 
common bases, perhaps the Supplementary Benefit nuclear 
family and possibly individuals also. It was further 
suggested that ideally the database should be arranged on 
an individual basis but in such a way that the 
individuals can be grouped into other units such as the 
nuclear family, tax units, National Insurance benefit 
units or households. This would mean that the data would 
ideally be collected on a household basis, the widest of
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these groupings, in such a way that they can be separated 
into the smaller units, or alternatively on an individual 
basis cross-indexed so that individuals can be grouped 
accordingly to form the appropriate units. As a minimum 
requirement of any data source it must be able to provide 
consistent data relating to a common unit of assessment 
such as the Supplementary Benefit nuclear family for the 
purposes of policy comparison.
The second aspect was the time period on which the 
analysis should be based. It was noted that although it 
could well be argued that a longer period would be more 
appropriate debate is normally focussed on current weekly 
income support and would probably continue to be so even 
if the Government decided that it wished to change the 
emphasis. Given that it is easier to aggregate, possibly 
fluctuating, weekly incomes than to break down, say, 
annual incomes it is suggested that the information 
system should be based on data able to provide results 
which describe units* weekly incomes. If information from 
longitudinal analyses such as the Cohort Study of 
Unemployed Men is able to provide units* experiences 
through time, and this can be incorporated at the 
aggregation stage then this would be a valuable addition 
to the basic analysis.
Ideally it should then be possible to describe the TIS of 
individuals, families, and so on sub-divided by a wide
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range of personal and household characteristics along all 
dimensions at the same time. These characteristics would 
include family composition, housing type, standard 
region, age and sex of individuals, duration of current 
PIE, employment histories, National Insurance
contribution records, previous occupation, education and 
health.
If a data source possessed the following four
characteristics then it would be a very considerable aid 
to assessing the immediate implications of a policy 
change.
i. The data source should preferably relate to actual 
units, that is families, individuals, or whatever 
current interest is focussed on, and be
comprehensive in its coverage of the
characteristics relevant to the application - if 
the analytic system is to be durable this would 
require a coverage of sufficient characteristics to 
make it of use in a wide range of applications.
il. The data should relate to samples of sufficient size 
to minimise doubts about the validity of results 
relating to sub-populations - this will be
application-dependent since the results will need 
to be more accurate for minor policy changes than 
for more radical proposals.
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iii. The data should at least cover the population 
®ii9i*>le to claim the existing range of benefits 
being considered plus any who narrowly miss 
eligibility - if overall distributional 
consequences or target and overall efficiency are 
to be assessed within the analysis the data would 
have to cover a representative sample of the 
general population.
iv. The data should be as up to date as possible.
As has been noted several times above, however, policies 
are essentially made for future populations and if 
evaluations are to be made with this in mind then the 
analysis also needs to embrace views of how the existing 
population may develop in the future, and this suggests a 
need to incorporate an understanding of the population 
beyond a knowledge of its present composition. It was 
noted above that this understanding could be imposed on 
the results from theories developed elsewhere, in which 
case a single point in time description of the present 
population would suffice. Alternatively if the data 
source contains a time element then that understanding 
could come at least partially from within the analysis.
This chapter has addressed each of the main issues which 
are likely to be considered when evaluating future social 
security policies. It has identified the requirements of 
the output of an information system to support the 
analysis of these alternative policies and hence 
essential and desirable qualities of a suitable database 
for the information system. This analysis is summarised 
in Table 5.1.
The essential quality of a database for evaluating social 
security benefit policies is that it must contain 
sufficient data to assess the TIS of each assessment unit 
under each benefit regime. The analysis of this chapter 
suggests a number of additional attributes which would be 
desirable in such a database, these are summarised in 
Table 5.2.
The analysis of this chapter would appear to amount to a 
very strong case for basing the information system on a 
survey of a representative sample of households from the 
general population covering the widest possible range of 
variables including income, housing, family structure, 
expenditure, employment histories, education and so on. 
The case for using such a general household survey is 
further strengthened by the experience of the Population 
Model which adopted the main alternative approach of
5.4 Conclusion
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Table 5.1 Links between desired output of benefit 
evaluation studies and the implications for selecting a suitable database for the information system to support
s u c h  a n a l y s e s
Desired Output 
I Unit of assessment
Desired Input
Individuals, families, 
households, tax units, etc.
Individual basis able to be regrouped into their 
respective families, households, tax units, etc.
II Accounting Period
Weekly plus longer term Weekly income data plus
understanding --- ► results from longitudinalanalyses
III Distributional Consequences
Distribution of TIS by 
type of benefit unit and by various personal 
and household charac'cs. Better-off/worse-off 
tables. Measures of horizontal equity, income redistribution
TIS of each unit by type of benefit unit and by 
various other personal 
and household carac'cs under each benefit regime 
preferably covering general population
IV Benefit Efficiency
Size of target/non- target, eligible/non- eligible, recipient/non-
recipient populations and interactions between them V
Data to assess eligibility of each unit in general population
V Economic, Demographic and Behavioural 
Changes and Sensitivity Analyses'
Sensitivity analyses, especially changes in 
distributional 
consequences over time
Behavioural and economic theories and hypotheses 
based on understanding of population structure and 
past changes
130a
Table 5.2 Desired Attributes of a Database fear a Benefit Evaluation Information System
Attribute Desired Quality
Ooverage Representative sample of general population of the country.
Accuracy Data as reliable and accurate as possible. Sample sizes of sub-populations large enough to be representative.
Currency As up to date as possible - probably monthly or quarterly data an population structure.
Units Individual basis able to be regrouped into 
their respective families, households, tax units, etc.
Definitions Consistent enough with current benefit rules to evaluate existing system but not so closely tied to idioeyncracies of the present system as to be Inappropriate to evaluate more rationally structured 
alternatives.
Correlations As much information on interrelationships of population characteristics as possible.
Continuity Either continuous or regular point in time collections of data with the minlmun level of change in definitions in order to facilitate the identification of trends in 
demographic structure.
Availability General availability to all interested parties.
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bringing together data from a wide range of sources and 
which fell down largely because of the great difficulties 
inherent in performing this task in a correct and 
consistent manner.
The best available general survey for benefit evaluation 
studies is the Family Expenditure Survey (FES). The major 
weaknesses of the FES have already been mentioned in 
Section 3.5. In particular the time-lag between data 
collection and the availability of results« small samples 
and doubts about some of the income data make the FES a 
far from perfect data source. However, given the failure 
of the alternative approach to make any real impact on 
policy analysis, it surely warrants further 
consideration. The following chapter therefore describes 
the FES in detail and discusses its weaknesses in 
relation to benefit evaluation studies. Chapter 7 then 
offers an approach to the analysis of FES data which 
endeavours to overcome the weaknesses to some extent 
whilst exploiting the inherent advantages of the FES.
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Chapter 6
The Family Expenditure Survey as a Data Source for 
Benefit Policy Evaluation Analyses
6.1 Introduction
The Family Expenditure Survey (FES) is a continuous 
survey of domestic households in Great Britain, with a 
separate survey of Northern Ireland being conducted using 
the same questionnaires and coding. The FES has been in 
continuous operation since January 1957 (except for 
temporary suspensions due principally to General 
Elections) and since 1967 the initial annual sample has 
consisted of some 10,750 addresses. The FES is conducted 
by the Social Survey Division of the Office of Population 
Censuses and Surveys on behalf of the Department of 
Employment. All members of a co-operating household over 
16 years of age are interviewed and then complete a diary 
for 14 days.
A principal motivation for carrying out the FES was 
originally to determine household expenditure patterns in 
order to calculate weightings for the Index of Retail 
Prices - a use to which it has been put annually since 
1962. However it has also proved to be a valuable source 
of household income data. The Central Statistical Office
(CSO) have used the FES to study the effects of taxes and 
benefits on households and to determine the distribution 
of payments of indirect tax, and it is used in 
conjunction with the Inland Revenue's Survey of Personal 
Incomes and the New Earnings Survey to derive tables of 
UK income distribution published in the Blue Book. The 
Treasury uses FES data to estimate the impact of Budget 
proposals on different family types. The Department of 
Environment use FES data to calculate take-up rates for 
benefits administered by Local Authorities. Within DHSS 
the economists (EAO) have a FES-based model covering 
primarily in-work benefits to study the impact of 
packages such as the Budget, and the statisticians (SR) 
use the FES to estimate take-up of benefits and for ad 
hoc studies. McClements based his work on equivalence 
scales (1978) on FES data. Outside Government the FES has 
been used in several major projects concerned with income 
distribution and the income transfer system - in 
particular it is the basis of the Unemployment Project at 
the London School of Economics supported by the Treasury 
and ESRC, a recent study by Piachaud (1982), and the 
analyses of the Institute for Fiscal studies.
The tapes are made available to researchers through the 
ESRC Data Archive at the University of Essex. The tapes 
for the survey in year n become available around March of 
year n+2. Given that analysts then have to process the 
data into the necessary form for their purposes the data
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can be expected to relate on average to circumstances 
obtaining two years previously. Clearly this means that 
the data will have to be projected forward on some basis, 
be it theoretical or hypothetical, in order to describe 
even current circumstances.
The sample design of the FES as at 1979 and described in 
Kemsley et al (1980) is set out in Appendix 6.1. This 
chapter discusses the suitability of the FES for benefit 
policy evaluation studies. The following section 
considers the ability of the FES to meet the requirements 
of an information system which were identified in the 
previous chapter, conclusions are summarised in Section 
6.3.
6.2 Comparison of the FES Against Desired Attributes of a 
Database for Benefit Policy Evaluation
6.2.1 Content
Clearly the precise nature of the information required in 
order to determine a unit's title to benefit under a 
given set of eligibility rules will be dependent upon 
those rules. Moreover experience suggests that there is 
almost no limit to the range of characteristics which may 
be considered to be relevant when testing for eligibility 
for a benefit.
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However the range of variables included in the FES is as 
great as could be expected without jeopardising the level 
of response to an unacceptable degree and as such must be 
regarded as the widest ranging single source of household 
income and expenditure data which is likely to be 
available in the foreseeable future. This range of 
information is achieved at the expense of detail in many 
respects and inevitably a unit's title will not always be 
established as accurately as would be possible given more 
specific data.
6.2.2 Coverage
The FES is a survey of a sample of the general population 
as required. The proportion of households selected for 
the FES sample by the rigorous procedures described in 
Appendix 6.1 who agree to co-operate is around 69-71% of 
the effective sample. This would not be a problem if the 
remaining sample is as representative of the general 
population as the original sample.
Determining differential non-response directly from the 
results of a survey is not easy because only limited 
information concerning non-respondents is available. 
However follow-up studies have been carried out to 
identify the households in the 1971 and 1981 FES samples 
in the Censuses of the same years. The results of the 
1971 study are reported in Kemsley (1975).
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This analysis 
distributions
consisted of constructing two sets of 
one for co-operating households and one
for non-co-operating households. Each pair of 
distributions classified the FES sample by one of 17 
variables relating to a characteristic of the household 
or one of its members. Three of these characteristics 
were identified as being associated with differential 
response. Households whose head is self-employed are 
considerably less likely to co-operate than households 
whose heads are employees; the presence of children in 
the household appears to increase the response rate 
considerably, although the number of children would not 
appear to be significant; and, most striking of all, 
there was a consistent decline in response rates with 
increasing age - a regression of response rates on age 
gave the following results:
Age of 'head of household' Age of 'housewife'
Regression coefficient - 
rate per 5 years per cent -2.22 -2.08
Estimated response at 45 
years per cent 72.22 71.21
Correlation coefficient 
between response rate and 
age
0.9180 0.9160
Although this linear regression gives a fairly good fit, 
actual response rates ars slightly above the line for 
both younger and older age groups and a curvsd lins may
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be better still.
When this comparison was used to study the importance of 
differential response for estimates of income 
redistribution (Harris, 1977) the results were 
encouraging. The FES sample was reweighted for each 
variable in turn and in no case did this change the total 
income of the sample by more than 5% and in most cases 
the change was around or less than 1%. Thus even where 
there is evidence to suggest that differential response 
exists it would not appear to seriously invalidate the 
FES as an indicator of income redistribution.
In conclusion, therefore, the FES would appear to provide 
as representative a sample of the general population as 
can be expected of a survey for the purposes of 
evaluating benefit policies.
6.2.3 Accuracy
Apart from the concern as to whether the respondents to 
the FES provide a representative sample of the population 
of Great Britain as a whole there are further doubts 
about the reliability of some of the information 
contained in the survey which are potentially important 
when determining its value for benefit evaluation 
purposes. These fall into two main groups.
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The first group concerns the size of sub-populations of 
interest and the second the reliability of the responses
to some of the questions in the FES especially those
relating to income.
The representativeness of the FES sample of unemployed 
men aged 16—64 for the 1972 — 1975 surveys has been
analysed in depth by Atkinson and Micklewright (1980 ). 
Whilst they found that the FES was able to pick up 
details such as the increasing proportion of under 20 
year-olds amongst the unemployed which occurred during 
the period such trends are based on samples of 12
unemployed under 20s in the 1973 FES up to 27 in the 1975 
survey. So whilst the FES is as representative a sample 
of the unemployed as can be expected of such a general 
purpose survey the sample size needs to be borne in mind 
at all times and the use of supplementary data to improve 
the representativeness of the sample would be most
useful. The omission of residents of hospitals, hostels, 
hotels and other institutions could also be expected to 
bias results in benefit evaluation studies and
supplementary data for these groups would be needed for 
certain applications at least.
The Central statistical Office annually compares 
grossed-up FES expenditure data with the National
Accounts figures in the .fillifi-- Book derived from
alternative sources, more recently they have carried out
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a similar analysis of FES income data. The major 
discrepancies for 1976 were, on the expenditure side, 
alcohol (grossed-up FES 58% of Blue Book Consumers' 
Expenditure), catering (134%), tobacco (79%) and durable 
goods (79%), and, on the income side, self-employment 
income (67%), investment income (33%), and private 
occupational pensions (49%) (Kernslev et al. 1980: 51).
These discrepancies would appear to devalue the results 
of the FES to a considerable degree. There are, however, 
a number of explanations for them which would appear 
largely unavoidable and which do not seriously weaken the 
validity of the results for the purposes of evaluating 
social security policy options. Apart from errors caused 
by differential non-response discussed above they can 
largely be explained by difficulties of comparing the 
Blue Book estimates with FES data, defects in the survey 
design of the FES (particularly the need to use 
retrospective questions on income and expenditure) and 
errors caused by recording bias which are commonly 
associated with surveys such as the FES.
Atkinson and Micklewright (1982a) have reconsidered the 
evidence of the Blue Book, comparisons by exploiting some 
of the results on differential non-response rates of the 
1971 Census comparison (Kemsley, 1975). In thsir analysis 
the FES sample is first adjusted for the differential
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non-response by region as identified in the Census 
comparison, assuming that these are valid for all years. 
The effect of adjusting for differential response by age 
is then also examined. In this analysis the assumption is 
made that within the region or age category all other 
characteristics are independent of respondent/ 
non-respondent status.
Their analysis of social security benefits showed that 
whilst comparisons would suggest that FES estimates of 
benefit receipts are reliable some individual years did 
display divergences. For example in the Supplementary 
Benefits Commission study of the take-up of Supplementary 
Benefit (Supplementary Benefits Commision, 1978), when 
FES estimates of Unemployment Benefit receipt were
compared with official estimates based on the Annual 
Statistical Enquiry of Supplementary Benefit records for 
1975, it appeared that Unemployment Benefit was 
marginally over-represented in the FES but in Atkinson 
and Micklewright*s analysis of the FES 1972-75 this was 
an exception and the other years displayed far greater 
divergence. They also suggest more refined adjustments 
for the under-representation of groups such as the
unonployed and sick in the sample and recommend further 
study of the misidentification of Supplementary Benefit 
as National Insurance benefits.
Overall their analysis showed that there exists real
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forscope  exploiting knowledge of differential 
non-response which should be advanced when the results of 
the 1981 Census follow-up study become available.
In summary there are justifiable concerns relating to the 
accuracy and reliability of some of the FES data which 
can have important implications when using the surveys to 
evaluate social security policies. For this reason it is 
important that supplementary information is incorporated 
into the analysis to improve the representativeness of 
the sample and correct the most obvious inaccuracies.
6.2.4 Currency
The tapes from the FES in year n are made available to
analysts around March of year n+2. By the time the tapes
have been prepared for the analyst's purposes and 
incorporated into the information system this means that 
the data refer to circumstances some 18 to 30 months
previously# and of course will be a year older before
more up to date information becomes available from the 
FES. This is a serious weakness, the value of such out of 
date information can be very limited. For example before 
the 1980 FES could have been incorporated into any social 
security evaluations, say June 1982, registered 
unemployment in Great Britain had risen from an average 
of around 1.3 millions for 1979 to 3 millions and was 
continuing to rise steadily.
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Having to base social security policies on such 
information as can be contained in a general purpose 
survey such as the FES is by no means ideal, doing so 
when that survey is describing an entirely different 
population to the present and expected future can be 
utterly misleading. It would be essential, therefore, to 
incorporate into the analysis theoretical understanding 
and supplementary information from other sources to 
project forward the FES data to current circumstances and 
to hypothesise about future possibilities. The structure 
of the unemployed population in particular changed 
dramatically in that 1979-82 period - for example, 
between July 1979 and July 1982 male unemployment in 
Great Britain increased by a factor of 2.32 but within 
that overall increase whilst the number of men aged 45-59 
unemployed for more than a year increased approximately 
in line with this total by a factor of 2.41 and remained 
at a similar proportion of all unemployed males (9.1% in 
July 1979, 9.4% in July 1982), the number of men aged 
18-44 and unemployed for more than a year increased more 
than four-fold from being 12.8% of the total male 
unemployed in July 1979 to 22.4% in July 1982 (author e 
calculations from data published in Employment Gazette).
It would be essential, therefore, to incorporate in the 
information system any changes in the structure of major 
population groups which occur between data collection and
analysis and about which supplementary information 
exists.
6.2.5 Units
It was suggested in the previous chapter that the ideal 
configuration of an information system for benefit 
evaluation and comparison would be to have the data based 
on actual individuals, arranged in such a way as to allow 
them to be regrouped into a number of different units of 
assessment depending on the application - in particular 
the Supplementary Benefit nuclear family. National 
Insurance benefit units, tax units and households.
The FES is a household survey and contains no information 
on intra-household sharing of income or expenditure apart 
from payments to children under 16.
There are two processes necessary in order to transform 
data based on households into the form suggested. Firstly 
the various possible groupings of the individuals within 
the household into Supplementary Benefit family units, 
tax units and so on, must be identified as well as 
possible and this information appended to each 
individual's record. Secondly the income and expenditure 
data of interest must be allocated to the individuals
concerned
The ESRC Data Archive will supply subsets of the FES data 
arranged so that each case either represents a household 
or an individual. In a recent study of income maintenance 
schemes using 1977 FES data Piachaud (1982) wished to 
base his analysis on the inner family — a single person 
or couple plus dependent children. The data thus had to 
be transformed into a nuclear family based format. In 
this study it was found that the coding scheme did 
provide sufficient information to identify most families 
within multi-family households (about one-third of all 
households in the sample). There were some instances 
where data did prove to be insufficient and in these 
cases ' the data restructuring fell back on an 
imputational procedure' (Piachaud, 1982: 134) - for 
example students away at university could theoretically 
belong to any family within the home household so the 
procedure adopted was to assign them to ' the family to 
which the student most probably belonged... (in no case 
was there any doubt)' (Piachaud, 1982: 134).
This is most encouraging for two reasons. Firstly the 
inner family is identified in Chapter 5 as being possibly 
the most important unit of analysis. Secondly it is 
potentially the most difficult to define. If imputational 
procedures can be used to identify the nuclear family 
then, given the data included in the FES concerning 
benefit receipts and income tax it should be feasible to 
achieve similar results for any other unit of assessment
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which one might care to define.
As for determining eligibility for means-tested benefits, 
it is necessary to be able to allocate certain
expenditure items between members of the household. 
Atkinson and Micklewright (1981) base their calculations 
of housing costs on the assumptions that all those coded 
as not being heads of households are non—householders and 
that non-dependents contribute to housing costs either 
the fixed rate if they are Supplementary Benefit
recipients themselves or a share of the total according 
to the formula:
( T - C - S ) / T
where
T =* Total number of persons in household treating 
children under 16 as half,
C = Number of persons in claimant's family unit, and 
S = Number of other Supplementary Benefit claimants in 
household.
Whilst such assumptions are not wholly in accord with 
official practice they are a definite improvement on the 
standard assumptions (see Royal Commission on the 
Distribution of Income and Wealth, 1978: Table 4.3) that 
the claimant is a householder and that there are no 
non-dependent members of the household, and it would 
appear from their results to be a reasonable proxy.
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It would seem, therefore, that although the FES is a 
household survey and it does not contain any information 
on intra-household transactions, that apart from a few 
exceptional cases in which it will be necessary to make 
certain assumptions and approximations, the arrangement 
of the data into the desirable format described in 
Chapter 5 is largely a realisable objective.
This is a valuable attribute of the FES data since it 
means that the FES is a source of a vast quantity of 
information concerning the characteristics not only of 
actual households but also of actual individuals, 
families, tax units and so on.
6.2.6 Definitions
Variables in the FES are not defined for any one specific 
purpose and consequently do not always concur with the 
definitions appropriate for assessing benefit 
entitlement. However the diversity of the precise 
definitions of characteristics within the social security 
system is such that no defintions will achieve widespread 
agreement. It is more important therefore that 
definitions should be consistent and that changes should 
only be made where necessary to reflect changes in 
society at large. The definitions in the FES achieve 
this.
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An interesting example of the difficulties involved in 
determining most suitable definitions for variables is 
provided by duration of unemployment. The relevant 
question in the FES (question 2B) asks, 'How many weeks 
have you been away from work?* so that a current period 
of unemployment would link with any consecutive period of 
sickness. The Department of Employment's figures record 
the length of time a person has been registered as 
unemployed so that consecutive periods of sickness and 
unemployment are each recorded anew. Which of these 
definitions is the more appropriate will depend upon the 
application. At present, however, the FES definition 
would appear to be more suitable for many applications 
since PIEs, whether through unemployment or incapacity, 
link for the purposes of determining waiting days and 
exhaustion of title to National Insurance benefits.
For this reason it is suggested that the definitions of a 
general purpose survey such as the FES which have to be 
suitable for a wide range of uses are more appropriate 
for a general benefit evaluation system than definitions 
tied more closely to the peculiarities of the present 
social security system which are not even internally 
consistent anyway.
6.2.7 Correlations
Probably the main strength of the FES is the wide range
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of information collected on individuals and households 
which means that the correlations between different 
characteristics are embodied in the data on the FES tapes.
6.2.8 Continuity
The FES is a continuous survey and as such is a useful 
source of information for identifying trends and
developments in society.
6.2.9 Availability
Summary tables from the FES are published annually and 
are thus readily available to anyone. In addition subsets 
of the FES tapes, including whichever variables are 
required, can be obtained from the ESRC Data Archive at 
the University of Essex.
6.3 Conclusion
The FES is not an ideal source of data on which to base 
an information system to analyse social security benefit 
policies. However such a perfect data source does not 
exist.
Its advantages are considerable in that it provides a 
large amount of pertinent information concerning as 
representative a sample of the general population as can
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be expected. It also has major limitations, however. In 
particular the problems of small sample sizes, 
differential non-response, the unreliability of certain 
variables and the time-lag between data being collected 
and becoming available all restrict its applicability. 
These weaknesses all suggest the need to supplement the 
basic FES data with more reliable, aggregate data. The 
following chapter sets down an analytic framework which 
makes this possible in a simple, consistent fashion 
whilst allowing for the retention of the important 
information on interdependencies of population 
characteristics embodied in the survey.
With the disadvantages overcome to some extent the FES 
provides the basis for a readily available information 
system upon which to base the initial evaluation of 
social security policy alternatives on the best possible 
information and understanding. If, after such preliminary 
analysis, more detailed studies of specific aspects are 
then considered to be worthwhile then such a decision 
will be well-founded and the areas in need of further 
investigation better identified.
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Chapter 7
An Approach to Combining Data Sources which Maximises 
their Strengths and Minimises their Weaknesses
7.1 Introduction
The main requirements of an information system to 
evaluate social security benefit policy alternatives were 
identified in Chapter 5, and the implications for 
selecting suitable data sources were drawn from these. In 
Chapter 6 the suitability of the main general purpose 
survey, the Family Expenditure Survey (FES), to perform 
such a role was considered. In Section 3.4 the Population 
Model (PM) was described and the advantages and 
disadvantages of the alternative approach of drawing on a 
wide variety of specialised data sources were discussed.
The strengths and weaknesses of these two alternatives 
are summarised in the following section. The 
complementary nature of these qualities is highlighted 
and suggests the desirability of attempting to combine 
them in such a way as to take advantage of their 
strengths whilst overcoming their weaknesses. In Section 
7.3 a computational device is introduced which enables 
this to be achieved. The following section then sets out 
the analytic framework into which it is envisaged this 
technique would fit. The final section summarises the
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main conclusions of the chapter.
^•2 The Complementary Nature of General Purpose Surveys 
and Specialised Data Sources
The best general purpose survey of households available 
to form the basis of an information system to evaluate 
social security policy alternatives is the FES. Whilst it 
possesses many of the qualities identified as requisite 
for such purposes in Chapter 5 it was also found lacking 
in important regards in Chapter 6. The principal 
alternative to the FES is to base the information system 
on the best available data relating to each aspect of the 
population's characteristics and behaviour by extracting 
information from various specialised data sources. This 
was the approach preferred for the PM. The difficulties 
encountered in building the PM are described in Section 
3.5. The important qualities of these two approaches can 
be summarised as follows.
i. specialised data sources
Specialised data sources include administrative 
statistics based on claimants' records, specialised 
surveys and research projects.
Administrative statistics refer only to existing 
recipients with a limited amount of information
ineligibleconcerning  claimants. The collection and 
arrangement of these data reflect the eligibility 
conditions of the present system. These data are as 
reliable and accurate as possible. Such data are 
generally published monthly or quarterly and are 
consequently as up to date as any available. These data 
are in the form of aggregate numbers of people in various 
categories.
Specialised surveys and research projects can provide a 
valuable depth of understanding and insights into 
behavioural aspects. Many such data sources will be 
'one-off' projects or at best run for a few years and 
will not provide a continuous stream of data on the 
population.
There is only limited information available concerning 
the nature of the relationships between the various 
aggregated categories within individuals, families and 
households.
ii. General purpose survey data - particularly the FES
These are surveys of a representative sample of the 
general population of the country. Results of such 
surveys are available, on average, some 18 months after 
the date they were collected. The surveys are a source of 
large amounts of information on actual households and
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their individual members, though much of this will 
inevitably be less pertinent than that from more 
specialised sources. Such surveys are usually either 
annual or continuous and thus provide a means of 
monitoring changes over time. There are weaknesses in the 
reliability and accuracy of the data due to differential 
response rates causing the sample to be less than 
perfectly representative and errors in the participants' 
records and responses. There are differences between 
definitions used in the surveys and those used in the 
existing benefit entitlement conditions which make it 
difficult to assess survey respondents' precise title to 
benefits. These data are equally available to 
non-Governmental researchers and analyses based on these 
would thus be more open to informed criticism and debate 
than analyses which can lay claim to be based on 
privileged information.
Sources such as the National Accounts and Census provide 
valuable cross-checks for the validation of survey data 
and hence the opportunity to compensate for the major 
deficiencies as was demonstrated in Chapter 6. It was 
also noted in Chapter 6 that the Office of Population 
Censuses and Surveys is conducting a matching exercise to 
compare the data from the 1981 FES with the same 
households in the 1981 Census and this will be of 
considerable value in improving the representativeness of 
the FES analyses.
The complementary nature of the strengths and weaknesses 
of these two main sources of population data is manifest, 
as can be seen from Table 7.1. This suggests the strong 
desirability of combining data from both forms in such a 
way as to exploit the strengths whilst overcoming the 
weaknesses.
In particular the FES is a rich source of data relating 
to the behaviour of a representative sample of actual 
households in the general population but suffers from 
being out of date and contains inaccuracies due mainly to 
errors and small sample sizes. It is less well suited to 
the analysis of the existing system due to differences in 
definitions but is much more flexible in its ability to 
adapt to the investigation of alternative systems with 
its broader information base and general population 
coverage. Administrative data tend to be as up to date 
and accurate as any available statistics and cover all 
the relevant features of existing claimants. Such sources 
are less well suited to the consideration of alternative 
systems and their implications for the wider population. 
They are commonly in the form of aggregate numbers of 
people in various categories with no way of relating 
these categories to each other • Additionally there are 
specialised surveys and research projects which provide 
added insights into behavioural aspects which is 
important when considering changes in population
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structure and likely future developments.
These various sources provide between them all the 
information required to develop a powerful, yet 
conceptually simple, system to evaluate and compare 
benefit policy alternatives in terms of their 
distributional implications for present and future 
populations. The problem is to harness this information 
in the correct manner. Section 7.3 introduces a technique 
which facilitates this and which should, it is suggested, 
form the basis for a future benefit policy analysis 
system.
7.3 Iterative Proportional Fitting
The computational task is to combine the richness of the 
FES data on the interaction of characteristics within 
individuals, families and households, the accuracy and 
currency of administrative statistics, the depth of 
understanding acquired from research projects and 
specialised data sources and hypotheses about likely 
future developments, all with the minimum of additional
assumptions.
This problem reduces to a similar one addressed in a 
variety of other fields where suitable solutions have 
been developed. The technique is variously known as 
iterative proportional fitting, the RAS method and
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biproportional matrix adjustment in its use for updating 
input—output tables (Stone, 1963) and it is equivalent to 
the Furness method used in traffic models (Evans, 1970). 
So called 'entropy maximisation' procedures have been 
used for urban and regional modelling (Wilson, 1970) and 
are due to ideas from social physics (Jaynes, 1957). 
These techniques have been brought together more recently 
at the International Institute for Applied Systems 
Analysis to infer migration patterns of population 
categories from aggregate data (Willekens et al. 1981; 
Willekens, 1982).
First consider a population described by two 
characteristics, sex and age, say. The FES describes the 
population by these characteristics at time To, say, in 
the form of a matrix M0 = (mi9j )m x n_ that is Mi°j is the 
element in the ith column of the jth row of the matrix M° 
which consists of m columns and n rows. Administrative 
sources, for the present, or hypothesis-based projections 
for the future, provide unidimensional distributions, Mi 
and Nj say, for some later time TA. The problem is to make 
maximum use of this information in deriving an estimate 
of the sex-age matrix M 1“(mij)m x n at tirae ^ *
in the absence of any additional evidence the estimate 
for M1 which uses the maximum amount of this information 
with the minimum additional assumption will be of the 
form m ^ - k y  . where is some non-negative
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the required
is said to be
If additional information does exist this will generally 
take the form of changes in the correlations from T0 to Tj 
Information such as this can be incorporated in either of 
two ways. If strong evidence exists that mj = p, say, 
then this can be fixed in the estimated M 1 . If the
evidence concerning ml . is less strong then m.° . can be
•l 2 j 2 1 2 J 2
adjusted to reflect this additional knowledge.
Finally, it may be necessary to categorise the population 
by some variable for which there is no information, or 
even 'expert opinion' concerning the nature of M° . in 
this case there is no alternative but to assume that the 
distribution of the characteristic is independent of all 
other characteristics. Although this could be calculated 
directly it can be shown that by setting for a11
in M° then the solution obtained will be the same.
Clearly any solution to this two dimensional problem can 
be generalised to multi-dimensional problems since the 
row and column entries of M 1, whether estimated or not, 
become the unidimensional distributions constraining the 
row and column sums of further two dimensional
distributions. So, for example, we may start with
constant to be determined, and £ =
j mij = mi- = Mi 9ive
unidimensional distributions. M1 
•biproportional' to M°.
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The technique of iterative proportional fitting addresses 
the problem of determining the matrix M*=(m.j*j ^  x nwhose 
row and column totals are given and for which there 
exists an initial estimate for the elements of the 
matrix. That is, given row sums Mi for i=l,....,m, and 
column sums Nj for j=l,....,n and given Jhe 
problem is to determine ^ x nsuch that ^
(i-1,.... m) and < W * .... **>) whilst taking
account of the information contained in the estimate M 
for M* . Note the rows and columns of M do not necessarily 
sum to the required values Mi, Nj.
The intuitively least biased solution to this problem 
would be to select elements m*j such that the rows of M* 
are proportional to the rows of M and the columns of M* 
are proportional to the columns of M. This solution can 
be obtained iteratively from the following procedure.
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Procedure A
mij0)= mij
(0)wl (1)(Em
j
)(Em i ) — <kij
_ (2kI ^  (o ) k+ 1 k ij mij Mi Nj
(O( Emij )(Zm. .i 1J - (  Em
Ì2k)
ij
(k
1 , 2 , . . )  
0 , 1 , 2 , . . . )
where k numbers the iterations.
The uniqueness, existence and convergence of a solution 
to Procedure A is given in Appendix 7.1.
Now it will be shown below that Procedure A has the same 
solution as the non-linear programming formulation 
(adapted from Macgill, 1977i 688):
Min W as
m
E
i-1
n
X
J-lmij 10K
mij
mi.1
n
s . t . E
J-lmij
- = M, i 1, ---- , m
m
Ei-1mij “ m .*j = NJ
J 1, ---- . n
where mij Iob mij
- 0 if mij ” °* and m *ij - 0 if mjj - 0.
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For if the Lagrangian associated with this latter 
formulation is
L = £ £ m * log — + £ 
i j “ij i
with extremal conditions
a.(E m* - 1 i 1J V  * ] "i*J - V
£ m*.ij
I mij
“ij
M1#
V
exp(- 1 - o ± -
where a^, Bj are the Lagrangians associated with the above 
constraints.
Let A± - exp(- 1 - a ± ) , Bj = exp(- Bj), then 
“ ij “ AiBjmij
and
Mi
Al " p A 7 a )
N .
B, -j T Ai“i7
If Bj is set equal to 1 in constraints (I) to prime this 
iterative process then this will produce the same sequence 
of matrices M(k) - ( m ^ <k>)m x n as Procedure A -
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Now if j is set equal to 1 for all i, j above then 
Procedure A becomes an iterative calculation of an
independence assignment of values for and the
non-linear programming formulation becomes the general 
case of the entropy maximising problem where no a priori 
information exists:
Min Z l m^jlog m£j
s . t . Z
* mij ‘ NJ
Entropy maximising procedures have been used for urban 
and regional modelling (Wilson, 1970) and are due to 
ideas from social physics (Jaynes, 1957).
The problem addressed by Jaynes was the following. Given
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that x can take values with the unknown probabilities
function g(x) such that the probability assignment is 
unbiased whilst agreeing with the available information. 
Jaynes (1957) shows with Shannon (Shannon and Weaver, 
1949) that there is a function, unique up to a 
multiplicative constant, which is positive and increases 
with uncertainty and is additive for independent sources
of uncertainty, given by H(pj , --- , pR) =-k z Pjlog p±,
k>0, constant (see Appendix 7.2).
Jaynes calls this function the entropy of the probability 
distribution and it indicates the degree of uncertainty 
about the occurrence of events in information systems - a 
high entropy value indicates that an event is likely to 
occur. In maximum likelihood estimators entropy
maximisation is equivalent to maximising the likelihood 
of a macrostate. As Jaynes saysi
It is now evident how to solve our problem; in 
making inferences on the basis of partial information we must use that probability 
distribution which has maximum entropy subject to whatever is known. This is the only unbiased assignment we can make; to use any other would amount to arbitrary assumption of information 
which by hypothesis we do not have. (Jaynes,
1957« 623).
The solution to the problem of determining the most
P± (i=l.--- ,nn) and given the expected value of 
, ) , what is the expected value of the
n
f(x)= I p f(x ) i=l 1 1
probable matrix x n and
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for all i, j where Mi, Nj are given can be
derived as follows.
Each consistent matrix M which satisfies the conditions 
is called a macrostate of the system. Each macrostate can 
be obtained by a variety of configurations of individual 
entries in the matrix, each such configuration is called 
a microstate. By simple combinatorics there are
ways of choosing a particular macrostate M— W
called the entropy of the macrostate M . n o w assuming 
that each microstate is equally probable then the
macrostate with the maximum entropy will be the most 
probable macrostate and hence the best estimate for M* . 
However W can be replaced by any monotonic function of W 
and the maxima of those functions will occur at the same 
value of M* . In particular we may substitute log W for W 
in the objective function. Now,
- log (m .. !) - I S  log m±j !
But m.. ! is * constant, so the objective function
Using Stirling’s approximation log 1-m^log ,
»
becomes max(- E E log mjj.1 ) -
i  J
min(E E log mjj!) .
i  J
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we obtain the objective function
Min log W = E E m  log m, . - m, .i j ■LJ J-J
= (E E m  .log m, ,) - m.. 
i j 1J 1J
But m..is a constant so the objective function is
min(E Em. .log m. ,)or equivalently max(- E Em, . log m .) . i j J J i j 1J
Shannon's rigorous proof that this represents the
function unique up to a multiplicative constant which is 
positive and increases with uncertainty and is additive 
for independent sources of uncertainty is given in
Appendix 7.2.
The above thus provides three procedures applicable
according to the amount of information available and
between them these cover all cases which may arise. In 
particular Procedure A applies where there exist 
unidimensional distributions from more reliable sources 
such as specialised data sources, together with
information concerning their interdependence from less 
reliable sources such as the previous year's FES;
Procedure B is applicable when, in addition to the 
information available before, there is also some limited 
information on the precise nature of the interdependence 
relationships; and finally when the only information 
available is the unidimensional distributions with no 
indication of their interrelationship then m±j i« »«* 
equal to 1 for all i, j and the procedure becomes an
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independence assignment. The procedures are both 
intuitively and theoretically the most preferable since 
they use all the information available and make the 
minimum of additional assumptions.
7•4 Adjustment Procedures as Part of the Analytic Process
The above procedures provide the means to update the data 
of a survey such as the FES so that they are in accord 
with more recent and reliable aggregate data from 
specialised sources. The same process can then be applied 
to the survey data in order to project them in a manner 
which is consistent with forecast values for variables. 
This section provides one approach to this analytic 
process.
Suppose the analysis is being performed at time . 
Available data are the FES for time To , aggregate data 
for To.Ti and forecasts or scenarios of aggregate
variables for some future time or times Tx , x>l.
Step 1
Compare FES data with aggregate data for T 0 . The OPCS 
exercise matching 1981 FES households with the data on 
those same households in the Census would be particularly 
valuable for this part of the analysis. As will analysis 
of the type performed by Atkinson and reported in Chapter
6.
Giving each individual in the FES a weighting of 1, 
reweight individuals multiplicatively according to the 
results of this comparison in order to render the FES as 
representative a sample of individuals in the general 
population as possible. This could be done using the 
above procedures.
The result of Step 1 will be to provide a best possible 
sample for time To , call this Fo
Step 2
Adjust monetary variables in Fo for times TlfTx according 
to the best information on prices and wages inflation, 
interest rate changes, rent and rates changes etc., as 
specifically as appropriate for the application.
Step 3 ,
Obtain aggregate figures for Tj from appropriate sources. 
Obtain demographic projections according to OPCS for Tx to 
establish aggregate data for Fx (that is the estimated FES 
sample at Tx )• Take Treasury economic forecasts, 
alternative forecasts and hypothesised scenarios for Tx 
as possible future environments. Use theoretical 
understanding and hypotheses of behavioural response to
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further enrich the forecasts for Tx - these may be 
dependent upon the policy alternative in question in 
which case a separate population sample would be 
generated for each alternative.
Step 4
Use the above techniques to derive F! ,F such that it 
uses the maximum amount of available information with the 
minimum of arbitrary assumption.
Step 5
Refer the Fj ,Fx so derived to experts for comment and 
cycle through the process accordingly.
Step 6
Once the estimated Fi,Fx are decided then the alternative 
benefit policies as specified by sets of rules can be 
applied to their corresponding populations. The purpose 
of this exercise will be to enumerate sub-populations as 
defined by one or more characteristics in order to 
analyse them for size, to investigate the commonality of 
other characteristics within the sub-populations and to 
determine the financial impact of the policies on them. 
The above process is summarised in Figure 7.1.
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Figure 7.1 Proposed use of Iterative Proportional Fitting
in Analytic Process
Input.i FES for time To,
aggregate data for To,T,, 
forecasts of data for Tx, x>l
Compare FES at To with aggregate data for To,
Reweight FES using IPF to 
population at To as
make it as representative oft 
possible - call this Fo /
<
[Adjust monetary variables in Fo for times Tt, Tx)
__________ 3
f Create samples F(, Fx by combining Fo and aggregates! 
^(actual, forecast or hypothesised) for T| , Tx by IPFy
r -
1Submit F« , Fx to experts for comment)
^^atis k .
Output« Estimated FES-type samples for years
T|, Tx to be assessed for eligibility 
to benefits under various policy 
regimes ____________
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This stage of the process should incorporate an 
implementation model to assess how the policies will 
behave in practice rather than theory. That is, the 
policy should be evaluated by considering the composition 
of the expected recipient population as opposed to the 
target population or the eligible population. The way in 
which these three populations vary with the number and 
nature of the eligibility rules needs to be the subject 
of further research. This has been discussed in Section 
5.2 and will be taken up again in Chapter 9.
It must be emphasised, however, that a prerequisite 
without which this modelling effort would be wasted is to 
obtain maximum co-operation between the analytic 
divisions within the Department, interested researchers 
outside and direct sponsorship from the highest policy 
level possible. If the results of such analysis are to 
have any impact on the policy-making process then 
administrators and analysts must co-ordinate their 
knowledge and abilities. This does not involve submerging 
differences of opinion in a quest for consensus, rather 
that those differences should be made explicit in the 
modelling process and emphasised in the presentation of 
results. There should be, however, an acceptance of the 
modelling process itself, this is fundamental to any 
useful policy analysis. It is only necessary that the 
modelling process utilises existing data and knowledge to 
the full and recognises alternative interpretations and
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theories, it is not sufficient — in addition the process 
must be seen to be doing this by those for whose 
attention the results are intended.
It is suggested that a major strength of the approach 
proposed above is that it is simple to understand and 
encourages participation and constructive criticism from 
non-technicians from an early stage. This improves the 
quality of the analysis by utilising such people's 
knowledge and experience and builds a commitment to the 
results amongst the users of the analysis.
7.5 Summary
This chapter has highlighted the complementary nature of 
data from specialised sources such as administrative 
statistics, specialised surveys and research projects and 
general purpose surveys such as the FES. In particular 
administrative statistics are generally as accurate and 
as up to date as possible; specialised surveys and 
research projects provide valuable background knowledge 
and understanding; and the FES provides a very sound 
framework to build the information system around.
The aim, then, is to combine these data in a coherent and 
simple manner so that these strengths are fully 
exploited. Three procedures using iterative proportional 
fitting are described - the appropriate procedure being
169
chosen for each application according to the amount of 
information available.
One possible approach to the analytic process which 
incorporates these procedures is then described. The 
approach seeks to achieve maximum involvement in the 
analytic process on the part of other interested analysts 
and potential users of the results. The purposes of this 
are to ensure that the opportunity of incorporating their 
expertise in the analysis is not lost and also to build 
their confidence in and commitment towards the results.
The following chapter compares the results of an exercise 
which uses the above techniques to combine data from 
different sources with the unprocessed data.
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Chapter 8
h Comparison of Alternative Approaches to Combining Data
Sources
8.1 Introduction
The previous chapter has outlined the desirability of 
being able to exploit the complementary strengths of 
general survey data and more specialised statistics to 
derive a database which is more reliable than raw survey 
data and yet richer than administrative statistics alone. 
The technique of iterative proportional fitting was 
described and its use for this purpose explained. This 
chapter shows how this approach compares with alternative 
methods and emphasises the ability of the approach to 
both exploit the maximum amount of knowledge and to 
obviate the need for assumptions which may or may not be 
justifiable. Furthermore the approach is both simple to 
use and to understand and the results can therefore be 
expected to be more readily acceptable to potential users 
than those derived from less direct models which, however 
sophisticated, can often be perceived as obscure and 
somewhat mysterious.
In this chapter, then, the ability of the iterative 
proportional fitting approach to enhance the quality of 
unadjusted survey data is validated. The alternative
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aPProach basing evaluations on aggregated data 
combined with assumptions of independence is also 
represented by a simple independence-based model. Finally 
the quality of the best fitting model is discussed 
together with some suggestions for possible improvements, 
and the value of the approach for analysing the expected 
composition of future populations emphasised.
8.2 The Alternatives
The data used for the purposes of this comparative 
analysis were a table published in Social Security 
Statistics 1982 (DHSS, 1982) and data taken from a subset 
of the 1981 Family Expenditure Survey tape. The former 
was derived from the Annual Statistical Enquiry (ASE) - a 
survey of 1 in 50 Supplementary Allowance cases and 1 in 
200 Supplementary Pension cases on a day in December 
1981. The data were extracted from the FES tape in such a 
way that the corresponding tables could be drawn up. The 
FES and ASE data are given in Tables 8.1 and 8.2 
respectively. The tables categorise Supplementary Benefit 
recipients according to sex, age (13 categories), 
employment status, and whether or not they are in receipt 
of Unemployment Benefit. The form of the validation is to 
derive estimated versions of Table 8.2 using the data 
contained in Table 8.1 plus varying amounts of aggregate 
data taken from Table 8.2.
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Table 8.1 Supplementary Benefit Recipients in 1981 FamilyExpenditure Survey
■Males
Age 16-
17
18-
19 20-29 30-39 40-49 50-59 60-64 65-69 70-74 75-79 80-84 85-89 90+ T o t a l
Unem­
p l o y e d
30 20 68 50 34 24 8 - - - - - - 234
With
UB
- 2 12 13 6 5 1 - - - - - - 39
W ‘ out UB 30 18 56 37 28 19 7 - - - - - - 195
Sick - - 4 6 8 i o 7 1 - - - - - 36
Ret­ired - - - - - 1 - 46 48 47 14 2 1 159
U n o c c ­upied - - 7 7 4 9 3 - 1 - - - - 31
Other - - - 3 - 1 - 1 - 1 - - - 6
Total 30 20 79 66 46 45 18 48 49 48 14 2 1 466
Females
Unem­ployed 18 18 28 8 5 1 - - - - - - - 78
WithUB 1
- 4 5
W ‘ out 
UB
17 18 24 8 5 1 - - - - - - - 73
Sick - 1 1 2 4 5 1 - - 1 - - - 15
Ret­ired -
- - - - - 22 47 57 37 25 io 1 199
Unocc­upied 3
5 37 35 21 23 27 35 55 53 36 8 3 341
Other 1 3 6 20 9 1 3 4 1 - - - - 48
Total 22 27 72 65 39 30 53 86 113 91 61 18 4 681
Male arid Femal3.
| Total l” L 1i l ill. [l31 \SL . I75 71 134Ji l l 139 IZ5_ \ K . * “ 4?-lSource: Family Expenditure Survey 1 9P1172a
Table 8.2 Supplementary Benefit Recipients on 9 December 1981 
j_n great Britain (Thousands)
Males
Age 16-
17
18-
19 20-29 30-39 40-49 50-59 60-64 65-69 70-74
75-
79 80-84 85-89 90+ Total
Unem­
ployed 87 93 348 222 143 121 37 - - - - - - 1053
WithUB
- 6 77 65 34 22 7 - - - - - - 212
W' out UB 87 87 271 157 109 99 30 - - - - - - 841
Sick 5 4 24 21 20 29 20 2 - - - - - 125
Ret­ired - - - - - - - 137 143 125 53 19 4 482
Other 2 1 3 7 8 11 25 1 - - - - - 58
Total 94 98 375 250 171 161 82 140 143 125 53 19 4 1715
Females
Unem­
ployed
WithUB
w 1 out 
UB
63
63
59
2
57
71
10
61
18
3
15
24
3
21
30
3
27
- - - - - - -
265
22
243
Sick 3 3 18 16 18 35 1 - - - - - - 96
Ret- 116 212 291 281 211 106 39 1256ired
Other 6 22 156 124 42 65 - 1 - 1 - - - 391
Total 72 84 245 158 92 99 117 213 291 282 211 106 39 2008
Males and Females
| Total 166 £20 |408 |263 B60 |l99 353 434 407_ 264 125 lllu|3724|
Sourcei Social Security Statistics 1982, Tables 34.73, 34.74. Based on sample of 1 in 50 Supplementary Assistance cases and 
1 in 200 Supplementary Pension cases.
172b
The FES includes a code for 'unoccupied' which is not 
included in the ASE tables and so all FES cases with 
employment status so classified have been reallocated to 
the residual 'others' group. This is by no means an ideal 
first approximation, particularly for females beyond 
retirement age. However it will serve to illustrate the 
power of the iterative proportional fitting method in 
being able to surmount such a problem without needing to 
resort to additional assumptions or hypotheses. It may 
well be that in this case an explanation could have been 
readily obtained for the discrepancy and the data 
adjusted accordingly. If this were the case then clearly 
such information would be incorporated in the analysis, 
however in other cases the explanations will not be 
forthcoming and the only alternative to the approach 
adopted here would be to make some informed guesses as to 
the cause of the discrepancy - indeed in yet other cases 
the need to seek an explanation will not even be 
recognised.
The other main point to note is that whereas the ASE is 
taken on a single day the FES is a continuous survey and 
the sample was taken throughout the year and this may 
bias the results in so much as the characteristics of 
Supplementary Benefit recipients have changed during the 
year. Other points concerning the reliability of the FES 
in relation to beneficiaries have already been covered in 
Chapter 6. Finally the 1981 FES included 1147 recipients
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of Supplementary Benefit of which 559 were below 
retirement age and 588 were above, this compares with 
approximately 10,000 and 35,000 cases respectively which 
formed the basis for the ASE.
These basic data were then treated in various ways to 
derive six further sets of data which were alternative 
estimates of the ASE tables. That is the FES data and 
increasing amounts of the ASE data were used to attempt 
to reproduce the ASE tables. The purpose of this exercise 
is to replicate the kind of analyses which would be 
performed in studies under an analytic process of the 
type described in the previous chapter. In practice, of 
course, all the data available would be used but clearly 
for the purposes of validation it is necessary to select 
parts of the available data and to test the quality of 
the techniques by producing estimates of other known 
data.
The bases for these six derivations were as follows (all 
numbers rounded to the nearest thousand):
i. The FES cell counts multiplied by the estimated 
population of Great Britain in June 1981 
(54,397,600), and divided by the total number of 
persons in the FES - see Table 8.3.
ii. The cells of Table 8.3 multiplied by the total
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number of Supplementary Benefit cases at the time 
the ASE divided by the number of Supplementary 
Benefit recipients in the 1981 FES - see Table 8.4.
iii. The cells of Table 8.3 adjusted using iterative
proportional fitting such that the total numbers of 
men and women and the totals (of either sex) in 
each age category were the same as those in the
ASE-based tables - see Table 8.5.
iv. The cells of Table 8.3 adjusted using iterative
proportional fitting such that the total numbers in 
each age category subdivided by sex and the total 
numbers in each employment status classification 
subdivided by sex were the same as those in the
ASE-based tables - see Table 8.6.
v. The same as in Table 8.5 but in addition iterative 
proportional fitting was used to ensure that the 
totals of those in the unemployed category for each 
sex as divided into recipients and non-recipients 
of Unemployment Benefit also agreed with the ASE 
tables - see Table 8.7.
vi. Estimates derived from the ASE totals used for Table 
8.7, assuming the existence of 65 structural zeroes 
out of a total of 130 estimated cells and, apart 
from the information contained in these marginal
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totals, that the cell values were independent - see 
Table 8.8.
To relate this validation exercise to the previous 
chapter, the data taken from Table 8.1 in each case 
corresponds to the FES data at time T 0 say, whilst the 
data which is extracted from Table 8.2 corresponds to the 
data from specialised sources for T^ say. In each case 
the table estimated corresponds to a subset of Fj, namely 
an estimated population at time T j.
Tables 8.3 8.8 follow
Table 8.3 FES sample grossed up so that adjusted sample size 
equals estimated GB population (Thousands)
Males
Age L6-
17 18-19 20-29 30-39 40-49 50-59 60-64 65-69 70-74 75-79 80-84 85-89 90+ T o t a l
Unem­
p l o y e d
79 53 180 132 90 63 20 - - - - - - 620
With
UB
- 5 32 34 16 13 1 - - - - - - 103
W'out
UB
79 48 148 98 74 50 19 - - - - - - 517
Sick - - 11 16 21 26 18 3 - - - - - 95
Ret­ired - -
- - - 3 - 122 127 125 37 5 3 421
U n o c c ­
upied
- - 19 19 11 24 8 - 3 - - - - 82
Other - - - 8 - 3 - 3 - 3 - - - 16
Total 79 53 209 175 122 119 48 127 130 127 37 5 3 1234
Females
Unem­
ployed
48 48 74 21 13 3 — — — — — — 207
With
UB
3 - 11 14
W'out
UB
45 48 63 21 13 3 - — — 193
Sick - 3 3 5 11 13 3 - - i - - - 44
Ret­ired
- - - - - - 58 125 151 98 66 26 3 527
Unocc­
upied
8 13 98 93 56 61 72 93 146 140 95 21 8 903
Other 3 8 16 53 24 3 8 11 3 - “ - “ 127
Total 58 72 191 172 103 79 140 228 299 241 162 48 11 1804
Males and Femiales
(Total |137 125 400 347 225J 1 ,8 188 I S | « T E S I 199 53 3038|
1981 Family Expenditure Survey counts multiplied by estimated OB population f o r 30 June 1981 and divided by FES sample size, 
that is 54397600/20535 - 2649.0.176a
Table 8.4 FES sample grossed up so that, number of Supplementary
Benefit recipients in sample equals actual number of recipients^
in ASE (Thousands)
Males
Age L6-17 18-19 20-29 30-39 40-49 50-59 60-64 65-69 70-74 75-79 80-84
85-
89 90+ Total
Unem­ployed 97 65 221 162 H O 78 26 - - - - - - 760
WithUB
- 6 39 42 19 16 3 - - - - - - 127
W' out 
UB
97 58 182 120 91 62 23 - - - - - - 633
Sick - - 13 19 26 32 23 3 - - - - - 117
Ret­
ired - - - - - 3 - 149 156 153 45 6 3 516
Unocc­upied - - 23 23 13 29 IO - 3 - - - - lOl
Other - - - IO - 3 - 3 - 3 - - - 19
Total 97 65 256 214 149 146 58 156 159 156 45 6 3 1513
Females
Unem­
ployed
58 58 91 26 16 3 « « - — — — 253
WithUB 3 - 13
16
W' out UB 55 58 78 26
16 3 237
Sick - 3 3 6 13 16 3 - - 3 - - - 49
Ret­
ired
- - - - - - 71 153 185 120 81 32 3 646
Unocc­
upied IO
16 120 114 68 75 88 114 179 172 117 26 IO 1107
Other 3 IO 19 65 29 3 10 13 3 - - - - 156
Total 71 88 234 211 127 97 172 279 367 295 198 58 13 2211
Males and Fern«lies
frotal 169 ¡153 « 0 425 276 244 231 [526 451 244 65 3724*|
1981 FES counts multiplied by total number o f actua* - Supplementary Benefit recipients and divided by number or Supplementary Benefit recipients in FES, that is 3724/
* denotes value input from ASE.
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Table 8.5 FES sample adjusted so that Supplementary Benefit
recipients disaggregated by age and by sex equal actual numbers
of recipients (thousands)
Males
Age 16-
17 18-19
20-
29 30-39 40-49 50-59 60-64 65-69 70-74
75-
79 80-84 85-89 90+ Total
Unem­ployed LO 5 88 301 167 111 70 24 - - - - - - 862
WithUB
- 9 55 44 20 15 1 - - - - - - 144
W' out UB LO 5 79 246 123 91 55 23 - - - - - - 720
Sick - - 21 23 30 33 25 - - - - - - 132
Ret­
ired
- - - - - 34 - 145 154 162 59 15 11 585
Other - - 36 39 16 34 11 - - - - - - 136
Total LO 5 88 359 229 157 170 60 146 154 162 59 15 11 1715*
Females
Unem­ployed
WithUB
48
3
59 91
13
19 11 3 230
16
W' out UB 45 59 78 19 11 3
- - - - - - - 214
Sick - 5 5 6 13 16 3 - - 1 - - - 49
Ret­ired
- - - - - - 59 116 146 104 87 63 9 587
Other 13 30 165 154 82 71 76 91 134 139 118 47 23 1146
Total 61 94 261 179 106 90 139 207 280 245 205 H O 32 2008*
Males and Females
|Total|l66* L82-6 20 *|408 *|2 6 3«|260* 199*^53*EH3 t07*j264* L25*j 43* 3724*|
* denotes value input from ASE.
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Table 8.6 FES sample adjusted so that Supplementary Benefit
recipients disaggregated by age by sex equal actual numbers of
recipients (thousands)
Males
Age 16-17 18-19 20-29 30-39 40-49 50-59 60-64 65-69 70-74 75-79 80-84 85-89 90+ Total
Unem­ployed 94 98
347 216 142 109 46 - - - - - - 10 53*
With
UB
- 9 61 55 25 22 2 - - - - - - 175
w 1 out UB 94 89 286 161
117 87 44 - - - - - - 878
Sick - - 15 19 24 33 30 4 - - - - - 125*
Ret­ired - -
- - - 4 - 135 141 124 53 19 4 482*
Other - - 12 14 6 15 6 2 2 1 - - - 58*
Total 94* 98* 375* 250* L71 *161* 82* L40* 143* L25* 53* 19* 4* 1715*
Females
Unem­
ployed
61 57 H O 24 12 4 — “ “ m1 “ 265*
With
UB
3 - 15 “ 18
W  out 
UB
58 57 95 24 12 4 - - - - - — — 247
Sick - 9 11 14 25 39 - - - - - - - 96*
Ret­ired
- - - - 116 212 289 279 209 105 38 1256*
Other 10 18 124 120 55 57 1 1 2 3 2 1 1 391*
Total 72* 84* 245* 158* 92* 99* L17* 213* 291* 282* 211* 106* 39* 2008*
-Males and Females
66* Ì 8  2 *J6 2 O *|4 O 8 *J2 6 3 *(2 60 *(l 9 9 *|3 5 3 *|4 34 *|4 O 7 *|264 *|l 2 5 *L43* 3724*|
* denotes value input from ASE.
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Table 8.7 FES sample adjusted so that. Supplementary Benefit
recipients disaggregated by age by sex by receipt of
Unemployment Benerit equal actual numbers in ASE (thousands)
M a l e s
Age 16-17 18-19 20-29 30-39 40-49 50-59 60-64
65-
69 70-74 75-79 80-84 85-89 90+ Total
Unem­
ployed
94 98 347 217 141 H O 45 - - - - - - 1053*
With
UB
- 11 74 66 30 27 3 - - - - - - 212*
W 1 out UB 94
87 273 151 111 83 42 - - - - - - 841*
Sick - - 15 19 24 33 31 4 - - - - - 125*
Ret­ired
- - - - - 3 - 135 141 124 53 19 4 482*
Other - - 12 14 6 15 6 2 2 1 - - - 58*
Total 94* 98* 375* 250* L71* L61 * 82* L40* L43* 125* 53* 19* 4* 1715*
Females
Unem­
ployed
With
UB
W* out 
UB
61
4
57
57
57
111
18
93
24
24
12
12
4
4
265*
22*
243*
Sick - 9 11 14 25 39 - - - - - - - 96*
Ret­ired
- - - 116 212 289 279 209 105 38 1256*
Other IO 18 123 121 55 57 1 1 2 3 2 1 1 391*
Total 72* 84* 245* 158* 92* 99* 117* 213* 291* 282* 211* 106* 39* 2008*
Males and Females
frotal|l66* 182-EIE!408-283< 260* !99-353- 434-f07‘26^ L25* 43* 3724*]
* denotes value input from ASE.
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Table 8.8 Cells estimated so that Supplementary Benefit recipients disaggregated Dy age by sex by receipt oT ~ Unemployment Benefit equal actual totals and assumingIndependence.
Males
Age 16-17
18-19
20-
29 30-39
40-
49
50-
59
60-
64
65-
69 70-74
75-
79 80-84
85-
89 90+ Total
Unem­ployed 80
84 321 214 146 138 70 1053*
With
UB
16 17 65 43 29 28 14 212*
W 1 out 
UB
64 67 256 171 117 H O 56 841*
Sick IO IO 38 25 17 16 8 125*
Ret­ired
139 142 124 53 19 4 482*
Other 4 5 18 12 8 8 4 58*
Total 94* 98* 375* 250* 171* 161* 82* L40* L43* 125* 53* 19* 4* 1715*
Females
Unem­
ployed
With
UB
W 1 out 
UB
25
2
23
30
2
28
87
7
80
56
5
51
33
3
30
35
3
32
265*
22*
243*
Sick 9 11 31 20 12 13 96*
Ret­ired
** *« ** *« ** ** 117 212 290 281 210 106 39 1256*
Other 38 44 128 82 48 52 391*
Total 72* 84* 245 *158« 92« 99« 117« 213* 291« 282* 211* L06* 39* 2008*
Males and Females
| Total]166«|182«|620*j408*|263*|260*jl99*j353*j434*j407*j264*}l25*| 43*]| 3724*]
* denotes value input from ASE.** denotes value assumed to be structural zero.
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Table 8.8 Cells estimated so that Supplementary Benefit recipients disaggregated py age by sex by receipt oF~ Unemployment Benefit equal actual totals and asBurningindependence.
Males
Age 16-17 18-19
20-
29
30-
39
40-
49 50-59
60-
64
65-
69
70-
74
75-
79 80-84 85-89 90+ Total
Unem­ployed 80
84 321 214 146 138 70 1053*
With
UB
16 17 65 43 29 28 14 212*
W ‘ out 
UB
64 67 256 171 117 110 56 841*
Sick io io 38 25 17 16 8 125*
Ret­ired
** 139 142 124 53 19 4 482*
Other 4 5 18 12 8 8 4 58*
Total 94* 98* 375* 250*171* 161* 82* L40* L43* 125* 53* 19* 4* 1715*
Females
Unem­ployed
WithUB
W' out 
UB
25
2
23
30
2
28
87
7
80
56
5
51
33
3
30
35
3
32 **
265*
22*
243*
Sick 9 11 31 20 12 13 96*
Ret­ired
** 117 212 290 281 210 106 39 1256*
Other 38 44 128 82 48 52 391*
Total 72* 84* 245 *158* 92« 99« 117« 213* 291* 282* 211* 106* 39* 2008*
Males and Females
T otal|l6 6 *|l8 2 *j6 2 0 *|4 0 8 *|2 6 3 *|2 6 0 *|l9 9 * 353*j434*j407*{264*{l25*j 4 3* 3724*
* denotes value input from ASE.** denotes value assumed to be structural zero.
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8.3 Comparison
The first problem encountered when attempting to compare 
the quality of the members of a set of models such as 
this is the choice of an appropriate error statistic. The 
problem is compounded somewhat by the existence of 
structural zeroes, random zeroes and some cells which may 
or may not contain structural zeroes and this makes the 
use of traditional tests for goodness of fit such as 
chi-squared inappropriate. It was felt that the absolute 
error between the estimated cell and the ASE-based cell 
counts, summed over all the internal cells was as good a 
statistic to start from as any. Table 8.9 shows the 
absolute errors summed over the age groups for each 
employment status category for each sex for each of the 
models.
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Table 8.9 Absolute errors summed over age groups by _______ employment status for Tables 6.3 - 87?
Model 8.3 8.4 8.5 8.6 8.7 GOGO
Employment Status >»—.
Unemployed with UB 110 86 73 43 22 79Unemployed without UB 324 227 154 62 45 116Sick 34 35 35 40 41 59Retired 65 84 107 9 8 4Others 83 98 108 48 48 55
Total Males 616 530 477 202 164 313
Unemployed with UB 15 17 17 19 23 7Unemployed without UB 67 65 75 80 79 138Sick 61 57 55 30 30 60Retired 729 610 672 8 8 2Others 704 881 726 74 74 145
Total Females 1576 1630 1545 211 214 352
Total Absolute Errors 2192 2160 2022 413 378 665
The goodness of fit of models 8.6 and 8.7 Is most 
encouraging, particularly so in the light of the large 
discrepancies between the ASE and the unadjusted 
FES-based models. This would seem to vindicate the aim of 
exploiting as much of the data as possible - even the 
minor addition to model 8.6 which is included in 8.7 of 
specifying the breakdowns of the unemployed by sex into 
recipients and non-recipients of Unemployment Benefit, 
rather than assuming that the FES proportions were true 
can be seen to result in considerable improvement, 
reducing the cumulated absolute error by more than 8%. 
The most important adjustment which the iterative 
proportional fitting procedure makes is in correcting for 
what is presumably a difference in definitions in the
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classification of cases into retired/unoccupied/others 
particularly for females. Whilst it was noted above that 
it may have been possible to explain some of this 
discrepancy, and hence make allowance for it, this will 
not always be the case - indeed differences in 
definitions between alternative data sources was one of 
the major problems encountered when the Population Model 
was built. It is therefore a valuable asset of the 
technique that it can surmount this problem without 
recourse to additional assumptions. It must be 
re-emphasised that if the reason for the divergence is 
known and the figures can be adjusted accordingly then 
this should be done.
Much of the dependence between the factors is accounted 
for in the derivation of Table 8.8 from the marginal 
totals and consequently the estimates are quite good 
overall - although the cumulated absolute error is still 
665 against 378 for model 8.7. Much of this error can be 
attributed to the correspondence between age and 
eligibility for Unemployment Benefit - there are 
proportionately far fewer unemployed persons eligible for 
Unemployment Benefit in the younger age groups because 
they are less likely to satisfy the National Insurance 
contribution conditions. This discrepancy is to be 
expected since the correspondence is well understood. 
However this again emphasises the value of the iterative 
proportional fitting method in enabling the use of both
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survey data and administrative statistics. There are
several important points to note.
i. In many cases the existence of a dependency may not 
be common knowledge.
ii. Even if the existence of the relationship is known 
there may not be sufficient data to estimate an 
equation to describe it.
iii. Even if such a model could be estimated there would 
be so many such models required to build the 
overall picture of the population for benefit 
policy evaluations that they could not possibly be 
brought together in a single model.
(Factors (i)-(iii) combined to influence the choice 
of the simulation approach when building the 
Population Model.)
iv. All such interactions are embodied in the 
person-specific data of a survey such as the FES - 
albeit with the associated weaknesses already 
discussed. Failing to exploit this information when 
the wherewithal exists in such a readily available 
form has been shown here to be unnecessary.
v. Comparison of the results from the iterative
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P r o P o r t i o n a l  f i t t i n g  a p p r o a c h  a n d  t h e  in d e p e n d e n c e  
b a s e d  m o d e l  m a y  l e a d  t o  a d d e d  i n s i g h t s  i n t o  t h e  
t r u e  n a t u r e  o f  t h e  r e l a t i o n s h i p s  b e tw e e n  
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  a n d  t o  t h e  f l a w s  i n  t h e  s u r v e y  
d a t a .
Table 8.10 shows how the percentage absolute error for 
each cell of Table 8.7 against the corresponding cell of 
Table 8.2 is distributed over the numbers observed in the 
cells of Table 8.2.
Table 8.10 Percentage absolute error for cells of Table 
8.7 against the observations in Table 8.8
->»^ctual count (OOOs) 
Percentaqe absolute e r r w ^
O >0and
< i o
>10and<25
>25and
<40
>40and
<80
>80 Total
< 5 53 2 1 1 4 14 75> 5 and <20 - 0 4 3 2 2 11
>20 and <40 - 1 5 1 1 1 9>40 and <70 - 2 3 O 1 O 6>70 and <100 15 1 1 O O 17
> i o o - 3 O O O 0 3Positive estimate for emotv observed cell
9* — “ “ “ 9
Total 62 23 14 6 8 — 123 .♦The estimated values for these cells were 1 (four 
times), 2 (three times), 3 (once), 4 (once).
The first point to note is that this is not a uniform 
distribution - the large percentage errors are 
concentrated in the low count cells and the accuracy of 
the prediction of the cells with high observed values is 
very good. In particular 90% of cells with an error in 
excess of 70% contained less than 10,000 in the observed 
cells and over 80% of observed cells containing more than
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80,000 were estimated to within 5%. This can be partially 
explained by the smaller size of the denominator in 
calculating the percentage errors, and also the greater 
significance of rounding for the smaller values.
Table 8.11 shows the correspondence between percentage 
absolute errors for each cell of Table 8.7 against those 
of Table 8.2 and the number of individuals in the 
respective FES cells.
Table 8.11 Percentage absolute errors of cells in Table 8.7 against number of individuals in FES
Actual FES 
'Vv>*^ount8
% absolute error''
O i 2-5 6-10 11-30 31-50 >50 Total
< 5 53 2 1 1 8 7 3 75
> 5 and <20 - O 2 5 4 O O 11
>20 and <40 - 1 4 2 1 1 O 9>40 and <70 1 2 2 1 0 0 6
>70 and <100 9 4 3 1 O o 0 17
>ioo - 1 O 1 O 0 1 3
Positive count for empty obs'd cell
4 1 1 1 1 1 9
—  ---Total----- 6 i * 1 13 13 15 9 5 130
The encouraging aspect of this table is the way in which 
the level of accuracy improves rapidly as the size of the 
FES sample increases. The rate at which the accuracy 
improves would suggest that pooling data for two or three 
consecutive FES years for these groups would be worthy of 
consideration in applications where an accurate estimate 
of these groups is required. The higher level of error in 
the smaller cells also suggests that any additional 
information relating to these population groups would be
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of particular value.
The estimates will surely be open to improvement by using 
additional information, knowledge and hypotheses and 
these can easily be incorporated into the iterative 
proportional fitting approach. The important point, 
however, is that where those additional data do not exist 
good estimates can still be obtained which are 
considerably better than the unadjusted survey data or 
estimates based on theoretically unsound independence 
assumptions, whilst remaining conceptually simple.
For the purposes of constructing 'future' populations the 
approach would be exactly the same, the only difference 
being that the input marginal totals would themselves be 
estimates and hypotheses rather than the known values in 
the above example. Clearly the quality of the population 
profiles derived in this manner is constrained by the 
quality of these estimates. However the same arguments 
apply in this case as in the 'correcting' and 'updating* 
cases, indeed more so. Any forecast will be tentative and 
more open to error than the derivation of a description 
of the existing population so surely it is all the more 
important that the use of those data which are available 
is maximised, and that this is achieved in a clear, 
comprehensible and, perhaps most important, criticisable
form
8 -4 Conclusion
In Chapter 7 the potential advantages of combining data 
from general purpose surveys and more specialised sources 
were discussed. An analytic approach based on the use of 
iterative proportional fitting procedures was introduced 
to seek to fulfil this objective. Three such procedures 
were described, to be used according to the amount of 
data available for the particular application.
This chapter has validated this approach by reproducing 
known data of the kind which might typically be required 
in a benefit policy evaluation study. Data from the FES 
and the Annual Statistical Enquiry of Supplementary 
Benefit claims were used in varying combinations to 
derive estimates for data taken wholly from the ASE. The 
appropriate procedure as defined in Chapter 7 was used 
for the purpose.
The results of the exercise are encouraging. Each 
additional piece of information taken from the ASE served 
to improve the quality of the estimates obtained. This 
improvement was achievable irrespective of whether an 
explanation for the discrepancy was available. The level 
of accuracy achieved in the example which used most 
information from the ASE, that is Table 8.7, was 
particularly encouraging with over 80% of the ASE cells 
containing in excess of 80,000 people being estimated to
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within 5%. The larger percentage errors were associated 
with those categories for which there were fewer cases. 
This is partially explained by smaller denominators and 
the greater significance of rounding. Accuracy was also 
shown to improve very quickly as the size of the FES 
sample upon which the estimate was based increases. This 
emphasises the need to exploit any additional information 
pertaining to such groups when the results concerning 
these are, or may be, of importance.
In conclusion, then, the value of the approach advocated 
in Chapter 7 has been clearly validated in this exercise. 
The approach is direct and simple to understand and yet 
embodies all available knowledge and understanding to 
derive the best possible estimates. Where explicit 
understanding does not exist estimates are made on the
basis of the minimum assumption and have clearly been
shown to be superior to those based on the arbitrary
assumption of independence.
Chapter 9
The Operational Consequences of Policy Decisions
9.1 Introduction
The widespread level of concern with the operational 
aspects of the social security system has been alluded to 
several times in previous chapters. The need to tackle 
the operational problems at the policy making level has 
also been recognised - indeed it should be regarded as 
essential that the operational consequences of policy 
decisions are fully investigated at the policy analysis 
stage. Accordingly the following two chapters describe 
work carried out on these aspects of the policy analysis 
problem. This chapter describes an analysis of the 
operational complexity of the benefit system with a view 
to identifying those aspects of policies which give rise 
to the greatest problems in practice. The following 
chapter describes some work on the regional variation in 
benefit take-up which might lead to new insights into the 
causes of misimplementation of benefit policies. The 
motivation for this work is discussed further in the 
following section.
Section 9.3 then describes several approaches to 
analysing operational complexity which were considered 
and rejected. Section 9.4 describes the analytic approach
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which was adopted. The strategy was to consider the 
procedure for assessing eligibility to benefits in terms 
of the procedure's component dimensions such as 
contribution records, the existence of dependents, 
availability for work and so on. The surrogate measure of 
complexity used was the number of appeals against benefit 
officers' decisions which were made concerning these 
various dimensions and the rates per claim for benefit at 
which they were generated. The substance of the analysis 
is set out in Section 9.5.
Section 9.6 uses further data to quantify the 
difficulties associated with means-testing.
Conclusions and recommendations are presented in Section 
9.7.
9.2 Motivation
The complexity of the benefit system and the expressions 
of concern with this problem from all major political 
parties has been noted above - see Chapter 4 in 
particular. It would appear from the analysis of the 
historical development of the social security system that 
much of the complexity embodied in the system today is a 
function of the nature of its development and not a 
necessary attribute of any income maintenance scheme - 
although Heidenheimer et al (1975) have shown that
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Britain is by no means alone in its burden. It is 
imperative, therefore, that any areas of complexity which 
are purely a function of the development of the system 
and serve no useful policy function be identified and 
removed.
Furthermore, one only has to consider the introduction of 
Housing Benefit to appreciate the need to take account of 
the operational consequences of policy decisions when 
analysing policy alternatives and their financial and 
distributional consequences. The Housing Benefit scheme 
was fully introduced in April 1983, it is administered by 
Local Authorities and was seen as being a move towards a 
simpler form of assistance with housing costs. The 
difficulties encountered by the Local Authorities in 
implementing the scheme are almost legendary already - 
suffice to say that by December 1983 some eligible 
claimants had still not received any benefit 
(Raynsford,1983). In March 1983 Raynsford commented 
(Carvel,1983), ’It is the natural consequence of an 
unacceptably complicated scheme being implemented to an 
absurdly tight timetable. The Government has botched this 
badly' . Moreover it cannot be argued that the problems 
were unforeseen. In April 1982 Mr Peter McGurk, then 
senior housing officer of the Association of Metropolitan 
Authorities (AMA) detailed a list of difficulties of 
implementation of the scheme which he envisaged.
Suppose I were a local authority housing
188
director now, I would be getting anxious about 
time. We have the local elections in May and the council is on a six week committee cycle. There is very little time before the summer recess. I would want decisions by the beginning of July.
My problem is that I don't know what is going on. I have been told by my association - either 
the AMA or the Association of District Councils ■ that UHB is coming in in two stages in 
November 1982 and April 1983. I have some idea of the total case load I will be expected to 
take on, because I have been talking with the local office of the DHSS to establish numbers.
But I'm still a bit confused because these numbers don't seem to tally with the figures 
which have been handed down nationally. So I can't yet be sure about how many extra staff I would need.
I would be worried about training them and I would be worried about getting my computer 
systems ready in time. Suppose I am managing a reasonably large authority and I have put 
housing management on a decentralised basis. I 
need a system to handle benefit cases in area offices. I need a computer system to be able to identify individuals' entitlements...
I also need to review my rent collection 
system. If I am still on door-to-door 
collection do I need to re-organise my rounds? Should I have neighbourhood collection points 
in my area offices? Or should I go over to Giro 
payments through the Post Office.
I am not so worried about the November (1982) deadline. (When the housing element of Supplementary Benefit came under the Housing Benefit scheme). But I am worried about the 
following April.
My council will not let me set up a new system or take on staff until they get this assurance. 
As it happens, my hypothetical authority is just on the edge of Mr Heseltine's penalty zone 
for “overspending" and anything extra could tip 
it over the edge. I
I am also worried about hostels. I am not sure at the minute whether people in hostels are 
going to be in the new scheme or whether they 
will continue to get supplementary benefit.
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Another headache is the private rented sector.
I have to decide what is the "reasonable rent" against which benefit can be calculated. Is 
that a fair rent or market rent? I don't know the yardstick, I need to ask what other people are doing and get some uniform advice.
I am not clear about furnished tenancies. Benefit will not cover the part of the rent 
which is attributed to furniture. But how much? Students are another problem.
The upshot is that I can't do much until I have 
got more information.(Carvel, 1982).
The basic lesson to be learned from all this is that much 
of the chaos which has accompanied the introduction of 
Housing Benefit could and should have been avoided. It is 
essential that the operational consequences of policy 
decisions are fully explored at the policy analysis 
stage. Complexities in eligibility rules and claiming 
procedures must be avoided where possible and otherwise 
minimised and taken into account when assessing the 
distributional consequences of the policy options and the 
timing of the implementation of new schemes. Furthermore 
the more accessible is the presentation of the results of 
policy analyses the more feasible it would become to 
broaden the involvement in the policy debate to include 
those who will be responsible for implementing the 
policy.
The need to allow for non-take-up and other factors 
causing distortions between target and recipient 
populations of benefits in assessing the distributional
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consequences has already been noted - see 5.2.4. The 
perceived complexity of the claiming process has recently 
been identified as an important cause of non-take-up of 
benefits - see for example Cohen and Tarpey (1982) and 
*^err (1983). The analysis described in this chapter, 
therefore, focusses on the problem of identifying those 
aspects of the assessment process which lead to 
difficulties of implementation. The following chapter 
describes an approach which could lead to further 
insights into the causes of non-take-up.
9.3 Measures of Operational Complexity
A number of approaches to measuring the operational 
difficulties consequent of benefit rules were considered. 
The first approach considered was to attempt to devise 
some objective measure based on the number of rules for 
various benefits. This is by no means straightforward as 
one somehow has to encapsulate the effect of compound and 
conditional questions and a meaningful method of 
achieving this could not be identified.
Another attempt to determine an objective index which was 
considered was to classify rules according to the extent 
to which they can be verified or disproved by reference 
to documentary evidence. So that contribution conditions 
are wholly verifiable by reference to records, some 
factors may be substantiable by reference to a previous
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employer for example, other factors will never be 
completely substantiable by documentary evidence and will 
rely upon subjective interpretation. Whilst early 
attempts to derive an index by this means suggested such 
a course would be feasible it was felt that it would 
still require a considerable degree of subjective 
judgment and would be somewhat arbitrary as a 
consequence.
The other main approach considered was to interview staff 
in Welfare Rights Offices and DHSS Local Offices to 
ascertain which aspects of the assessment process gave 
rise to the most difficulties. This approach could have 
led to a good, subjective index of operational 
difficulties being developed and should have had the 
additional advantage of involving operational staff in 
policy analysis. For these reasons such an analysis would 
still be a valuable exercise, the results of which would 
serve to augment the analysis presented here. Such an 
analysis would, however, require the collection of 
primary data from a large number of offices around the
country.
At this stage a further approach was considered which 
seemed to fill the needs of the analysis more fully than 
any other. This approach was to study data relating to 
the appeals procedure. If the numbers of appeals relating 
to various benefits could in turn be related to the
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specific aspect of the claim which had given rise to it 
then this would produce an objective index of operational 
complexity. The data necessary to carry out such an 
analysis turned out to be readily available. 
Encouragingly the results of the analysis turned out to 
be well in accord with intuitive expectation.
The following section describes the data which were used 
for the analysis.
9.4 Data - Appeals and Commissioners' Decisions.
In the first instance a dissatified claimant can ask for 
a review of a benefit officer's decision. However reviews 
only concern cases where the claimant believes that 
decision to have been made in ignorance of a fact« or to 
have been based on a mistaken fact or where there has 
been a change in the claimant's circumstances subsequent 
to the decision having been taken. The first level of 
appeal against the original or reviewed decision is a 
Local Tribunal. Local Tribunals hear appeals against any 
decision taken by a benefit officer except those 
concerning medical questions relating to claims for 
mobility allowance which are heard by medical boards.
If the claimant is not satisfied with the decision of the 
Local Tribunal then the next stage is to seek leave to 
appeal to the Social Security Commissioners - until
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November 1980 these were the National Insurance 
Commissioners. The Commissioners are professional judges 
of equal standing to circuit judges. Their decisions set 
precedents and are binding on lower bodies deciding 
cases. The more important of these decisions are 
’reported *.
The Commissioners will hear appeals from National 
Insurance Local Tribunals on any grounds, and have been 
doing so since the inception of the National Insurance 
scheme after the war. Appeals from other tribunals, 
however, may only concern points of law - this includes 
appeals relating to Supplementary Benefit, Family Income 
Supplement, Attendance Allowance and Mobility Allowance.
The main source of data for this analysis was Neligan's 
Digest of Commissioners' Decisions. This digest includes 
decisions reported from the inception of the 
Commissioners in 1948 through to 1983, although:
An appreciable number of reported decisions have been omitted, particularly some of the 
earlier decisions which dealt with facts that are now wholly unrealistic, eg the amount of a person's earnings. Similarly, decisions which 
have been overruled by later decisions given by 
a Tribunal of Commissioners (these latter are included) or rendered nugatory by subsequent legislation have not been included... In some 
other cases it has not always been easy to decide whether or not to omit a decision but in 
general the benefit of any doubt there may have been was given in favour of inclusion rather 
than exclusion. (Neligan, 1979« x).
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The year in which the decision was reported is also 
recorded.
Unfortunately, as explained above, the criteria for 
appealing against decisions of Local Tribunals other than 
National Insurance are rather different to those for the 
National Insurance Tribunals and also Commissioners have 
only been hearing such appeals since November 1980. It is 
not possible, therefore, to consider means-tested 
benefits by studying the data on Commissioners' 
Decisions. Some indication of the position of 
means-testing in relation to other eligibility criteria 
can be gained from data on appeals to Local Tribunals, 
however. The data used for this purpose were the total 
number of appeals and references to Local Tribunals from 
1976-1981 - although here again there was a difficulty 
because the figures for Supplementary Benefit report the 
numbers of appeals heard whereas the figures for the 
other benefits considered relate to the numbers of 
appeals made.
This section has described the appeals procedure and the 
data used for the present analysis. The next section 
describes the analysis.
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9,5 Analysis of Commissioners' Reported Decisions
For the purposes of the analysis of Commissioners' 
Decisions all decisions recorded in Neligan for
Unemployment Benefit, Sickness Benefit, Non-Contributory 
Invalidity Pension, Maternity Benefits and Allowances, 
Widows' Benefits and Allowances, Family Allowances/ Child 
Benefit, Guardian's Allowances, Child's Special 
Allowances and Death Grant were considered. Each was 
grouped according to the year the decision was reported 
and allocated to one of the following categories
depending upon the particular aspect of the eligibility 
assessment procedure being decided upon so that those 
aspects of the assessment procedure which have caused the 
greatest problems could be identified.
a) Contribution record,
b) Unemployment - including Period of Interruption of 
Employment and linking problems,
c) Availability for work,
d) Incapacity for work,
e) Child dependents,
f) Marriage, cohabitation, and adult dependents,
g) Absence from GB and residence conditions,
h) Claiming process,
i) Trade disputes,
j) Reason for leaving previous employment - misconduct,
k) Reason for leaving previous employment - voluntary
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leaving,
l) Appeal against, period of disqualification under j or
k,
m) Imprisonment and detention in legal custody,
n) Free in-patient treatment in hospital,
o) Household duties test,
p) Pregnancy and confinement,
q) Death,
r) Education,
s) Overlapping benefits.
Table 9.1 shows which benefits of those analysed have 
eligibility criteria in the above categories.
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Table 9.1 Categories of Eligibility Criteria Covered by 
Benefits Under Analysis.
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Notes (1) Allowances only
(2) Supplements only(3) Since April 1982 Maternity Grant has been non­contributory .Some of these decisions relate to 
claims on husbands' contribution records which 
are, therefore, no longer applicable but have been included here as they remain indicative 
of the problems the condition causes.
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The numbers of Decisions reported for ail the benefits 
under consideration by each of the categories was, in 
descending order:
b) Unemployment 3 0 1
h) Claiming 1 2 0
f) M'ge/cohab*n/ad depts 95
d) Incapacity 66
g) Absent abroad/residence 62
i) Trade disputes 54
c) Availability 49
e) ChiId dependents 43
k) Vol'y leaving 37
j) Misconduct 35
l) Disqual'n appeal 15
n) Hospital 14
m) Prison/detention 13
o) Household duties 8
q) Death 6
p) Pregnancy 5
s)Overlap bens 4
a)Cont'n record 3
r) Education 2
The above list ranks the categories by the extent to 
which they have given rise to problems in the past. Such 
a scale fails to make allowance for the fact that some of 
the above categories of rules were relevant to more
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*4.
claims -than other categories which in turn increases the 
likelihood of appeals being generated. For the purposes 
of evaluating the likely operational consequences of 
future policies, however, a scale of absolute complexity 
is more useful - this would be incorporated with a 
population model which would estimate the expected 
numbers of claimants of each type.
For this reason the next stage of the analysis was to set 
the rate at which these decisions are generated against 
the numbers of claims for the relevant benefits.
Determining the number of claims during a year for a 
given benefit is generally more difficult than 
ascertaining the number of recipients of a benefit on a 
particular day in the year which is a more commonly 
reported statistic but less indicative for present 
purposes. The number of claims were obtained for most 
years between 1948 (or the year of introduction of the 
benefit) and 1982 for the above benefits. Where the 
actual data were not attainable rough estimates were made 
on the basis of the figures for other years or 
alternative data - see Appendix 9.1 for details. See 
Appendix 9.2 for sources of claims data.
Having grouped the decisions as above and identified the 
rate at which claims were being generated the next stage 
of the analysis was to construct a series of graphs of
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cumulated numbers of decisions against cumulated numbers 
o f claims for the various categories both for individual 
benefits and collections of benefits. The following 
graphs are plotted.
Figure 9.1 Commissloners' Decisions - All Benefits.
This shows the cumulated number of Commissioners' 
Decisions for all the benefits covered in the analysis 
plotted against the cumulative number of claims for the
benefits which have eligibility criteria in the
categories of analysis (see Table 9.1). Note the
'Unemployment' curve has been truncated in order to
facilitate the scaling of the graph.
Figure 9.2 Commissioners' Decisions - Unemployment 
Benefit.
This is the same as for Figure 9.1 except that this 
applies only to decisions relating to Unemployment 
Benefit. Again the 'Unemployment' curve has been 
truncated, but is shown in full in Figure 9.3 with the 
'Availability* curve for comparison.
Figure 9.4 Commissioners' Decisions - Sickness Benefit.
As for 9.2, in this case those decisions relating to 
claims for Sickness Benefit.
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mFigure 9.5 Commissioners' Decisions - Claiming Process.
These are the curves showing decisions relating to the 
claiming process for Unemployment Benefit and Sickness 
Benefit depicted in Figures 9.2 and 9.4 respectively 
shown together here for purposes of comparison.
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A crude ranking of the categories of decision in this 
analysis, based on an approximate extrapolation of the 
curves in Figure 9.1, would be as follows (see Figure 
9.1) - listed in order of decreasing difficulty.
0) Household duties test — see footnote.
b) Unemployment - including Period of Interruption of 
Employment and linking,
h) Claiming process,
f) Marriage, cohabitation and adult dependents,
1) Trade disputes,
c) Availability for work,
d) Incapacity for work,
k) Reason for leaving previous employment - voluntary 
leaving,
j) Reason for leaving previous employment - misconduct,
g) Absence from GB, residence conditions,
e) Child dependents,
l) Appeal against period of disqualification under j or
k,
n) Free in-patient treatment in hospital,
m) Imprisonment and detention in legal custody,
q) Death,
p) Pregnancy,
r) Education,
a) Contribution record,
s) Overlapping benefits.
Note the 'Household duties test' applies only to
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Housewives' Non-Contributory Invalidity Pension for which 
the total number of claims was around 110,000 between its 
introduction in 1977 and 1982 which generated 8 
Commissioners' Decisions. Due to scale this is not shown 
on Figure 9.1 but, regardless of the measure one adopts, 
there is no doubt that the household duties test has 
generated Commissioners' Decisions at a rate per claim 
far in excess of any other aspect of the determination of 
claimants' eligibility to non-means tested benefits.
Note this ranking attempts to allow for the declining 
rate of generation of Decisions with increasing numbers 
of claims and as such is more indicative of absolute 
complexity than simply dividing the total number of 
Decisions by the total number of claims to obtain average 
rates of generation - these are computed in Table 9.2 for 
comparative purposes, however.
This ranking corresponds closely to what one would 
intuitively expect. Categories 1, m, n, p, g, and r 
generally concern matters which only arise in a 
comparatively minor proportion of cases and the rankings 
reflect this. Category a, however, concerns some 1/2 
billion claims which have given rise to just 4 
Commissioners' Decisions which strongly emphasises the 
value in terms of non-controversiality of rules for which 
answers to questions can be substantiated or otherwise by 
documentary evidence. Indeed, more generally, the extent
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to which non-disputable, documentary evidence can be used 
to resolve difficulties generally increases through the 
categories going down the rankings. This is not an 
altogether surprising phenomenon but it is no less 
important for that. It should also be borne in mind that 
with advances in information technology the cost of 
storing and retrieving the information required for 
documentarily substantiable eligibility conditions is 
declining in relation to procedures based on discretion 
and judgment.
The shape of the curves is also significant. The rate at 
which Decisions are made generally declines as the total 
number of claims for a benefit increases. Again this is 
not surprising since the Decisions set precedents and as 
such each eliminates a further element of uncertainty in 
the rules - and simultaneously further complicates the 
rule book. Indeed Neligan observes in the introduction to 
the digest (Neligan, 1979: viii) that over half of the 
2488 Decisions reported between 1948 and 1977 were made 
in the first ten years, and in the last twenty years the 
problems have become increasingly complex. There are two 
main characteristics one might expect to observe when 
considering the shape of the curves in Figures 9.1 - 9.5.
A curve which climbs steeply and then flattens out may be 
indicative of a certain lack of foresight when framing 
the legislation. It may be that aspects of the conditions
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were not made sufficiently clear in the rules. Any future 
legislation embodying similar eligibility criteria should 
take heed to avoid repetition of similar errors of 
omission.
A steadily climbing curve on the other hand is perhaps 
indicative of an aspect of eligibility determination 
which is inherently problematic to implement. This type 
of problem can be expected to be much more difficult to 
overcome and these criteria should be avoided where 
possible and, where not, the likely consequences must be 
taken into account when analysing policy options.
The following analysis attempts to quantify this aspect 
of the curves in Figure 9.1. Rates of generation of 
Decisions against claims were calculated for the first 
and last quartiles of claims for each of the categories. 
The ratio of the latter to the former is indicative of 
the extent to which the rate of generation has declined 
as the total number of claims has accumulated. Categories 
o, p, q and r are omitted due to the comparatively small 
number of claims relating to these. The results are given 
in Table 9.2.
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Table 9.2 Analysis of decline in rate of generation ofdecisions
(i)Cate­gory
(ii)Total no. 
Decisions
(iii)Total no. 
Claims 
(OOOs)
(iv)
Av. rate 
of gen­
eration
(v)
Rate of 
gen. - 
1stquartile
(vi) 
Rate of 
gen. - 
4thquartile
(vii) 
3ol (vi) 
fCol (v)
a 4 479050 0.01 0.00 0.03 -
b 296 122455 2.42 5.19 0.95 0.183
c 49 114849 0.43 1.15 0.03 0.026
d 65 310788 O. 21 0.44 0.17 O. 386
e 42 463080 O. io 0.09 O. IO 1.111
f 93 439265 0.21 O. 51 0.05 0.098
g 58 503047 0.12 0.23 0.03 0.130
h 117 503047 0. 23 O. 55 0.09 0.164
i 54 114849 0.47 0.70 0.28 0.400
j 35 114849 0. 30 0.63 0.07 0.111
k 36 109748 0.33 0.69 0.07 O. lOl
1 15 114849 0.13 0.28 0.00 0.000
m 13 374754 0.03 0.10 0.02 0.200
n 14 340625 0.04 0.16 0.00 0.000
s 4 503047 0.01 0.03 0.00 0.000
Notes
i. Av. rate of generation (Column iv) -Total no. Decisions * lOOO / Total no. Claims.
ii. Rate of gen. - 1st quartile (Column v) -No. Decisions gen'd by first 25% of Claims * 4000 / Totalno. Claims.
iii. Rate of gen. - 4th quartile (Column vi) -
No. Decisions gen'd by fourth 25% of Claims * 4000 / Totalno. Claims.
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This index gives the following ranking for 'persistence' 
of complexity.
e) Child dependents,
i) Trade disputes,
d) Incapacity for work,
m) Imprisonment and detention in legal custody,
b) Unemployment - including Period of Interuption of 
Employment and linking problems,
h) Claiming process,
g) Absence from GB and residence conditions,
j) Reason for leaving previous employment - misconduct,
k) Reason for leaving previous employment - voluntary 
leaving,
f) Marriage, cohabitation and adult dependents,
c) Availability for work,
l) Appeal against period of disqualification under j or
k.
n) Free in-patient treatment in hospital, 
s) Overlapping benefits.
Table 9.3 brings together the two sets of rankings for 
absolute complexity and persistence.
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Table 9.3 Rankings of Absolute Complexity and Persistence
Complexity Persistence
a)Cont'n record 19 _
b)Unemployment 2 5
c)Availability 6 11
d )Incapac i ty 7 3
e)ChiId dependents 11 1
f)M 'ge/cohab'n/ad depts 4 io
g)Absent abroad/residence io 7
h)Claiming 3 6
i)Trade disputes 5 2
j)Misconduct 9 8
k)Vol'y leaving 8 9
l)Disqual'n appeal 12 12
m )Prison/detention 14 4
n)Hospital 13 12
o)Household duties 1 -
p)Pregnancy 16 -
q)Death 15 -
r)Education 17 -
s)Overlap bens 18 12
Those categories which appear in the first half of both 
rankings - ie those which are persistently« highly
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problematic - are:
b) Unemployment — including Period of Interruption of 
Employment and linking problems,
h) Claiming process,
i) Trade disputes,
d) Incapacity for work.
These aspects of eligibility determination for 
non-means-tested benefits are those which should cause 
the greatest concern. If there is a genuine desire to 
improve the operation of the social security system then 
either radically different ways of testing for these 
criteria have to be devised or they must be dropped from 
the assessment process.
The claiming process could surely be simplified in many 
ways and this could go a considerable way towards easing 
the pressure on the operation of the system. Figure 9.5 
plots the curves for the 'Claiming process' for
Unemployment Benefit and Sickness Benefit. The degree to 
which the claiming process for Sickness Benefit is more 
problematic than that for Unemployment Benefit is almost 
entirely due to the existence of a time limit for 
claiming Sickness Benefit where no such limit applies to 
Unemployment Benefit.
As for the other three 'persistently* difficult 
categories, however, there is no clear way of radically
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altering the testing of these criteria and if a less 
contentious system is the primary aim of subsequent 
reform a move towards a tax credit scheme in which such 
aspects would not necessarily have to be tested would 
appear to be the solution.
failing either of these measures to improve the operation 
of the system then when eligibility criteria which are 
known to be problematic are included in assessment
procedures this fact should be taken into account at the 
policy evaluation stage.
Those categories which caused considerably more problems 
in the short term than the longer term - a difficulty 
which may be attributable to the framing of the
legislation and a fault which need not and should not be 
repeated if such criteria were used in future systems - 
are :
f) Marriage, cohabitation and adult dependents, 
c) Availability for work,
j) Reason for leaving previous employment - misconduct,
k) Reason for leaving previous employment - voluntary 
leaving,
l) Appeal against period of disqualification under j or
X.
n) Free in-patient treatment in hospital.
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The position of the category concerning marriage, 
cohabitation and adult dependents may appear somewhat 
surprising given the perennial nature of the cohabitation 
issue for Supplementary Benefit. It should be remembered, 
however, that in the case of the National Insurance 
benefits its significance is essentially in relation 
either to the payment of supplements or in determining 
widowhood status. The nature of the problem for 
Supplementary Benefit is far more fundamental in that it 
relates to the definition of the unit of assessment.
It is perhaps important to recognise that just because 
the rate of generation of decisions has declined through 
time for many of the categories this is no reason to 
argue that the existing, complicated system of benefits 
is acceptable. Such an argument could be given further 
weight by reference to the chaotic implementation of 
Housing Benefit where an attempt was made to introduce an 
alternative system. Rather the experience accrued in the 
development of the system to date and the mistakes made 
along the way must be exploited to the full when 
reforming the system, something which clearly was not 
done prior to the introduction of Housing Benefit. By 
doing this the replacement system can embody the quality 
of durability which is so essential if simplicity is to 
be retained for any length of time.
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9-6 Means-testing and Local Appeals Tribunals Data
«(pi
As explained in Section 9.4 the Commissioners have only 
been hearing cases relating to Supplementary Benefit and 
Family Income Supplement since November 1980 and the 
basis for appeal is restricted to points of law. For 
these reasons the data relating to Decisions on 
Supplementary Benefit are not directly comparable to 
those on National Insurance and non-means-* tested 
benefits.
The problems caused by means-testing in general and the 
public dissatisfaction with the Supplementary Benefit 
scheme in particular, however, mean that some effort must 
be made to relate this to the problems discussed above.
Two approaches can give some indication of the position 
of the Supplementary Benefit means-test in relation to 
the National Insurance criteria - data relating to Local 
Appeals Tribunals and the breakdown of Commissioners' 
Decisions relating to Supplementary Benefit.
Table 9.4 shows the rates of Decisions (multiplied by 
1000) and appeals to Local Tribunals against claims made 
for several of the benefits considered. Again the 
Supplementary Benefit appeals data are not directly 
comparable because the number of appeals for 
Supplementary Benefit refers to the nuniber heard whereas
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for the other benefits the numbers refer to the numbers 
of appeals made, which will be something in excess of 
those heard.
It can be seen from the table that there is a remarkably 
close correspondence between the rate of generation of 
Local Appeals and Commissioners' Decisions. This is 
encouraging in itself and lends greater weight to the 
analysis of Commissioners' Decisions since the Local 
Appeals data relate to the first line of recourse for 
dissatisfied claimants. More importantly, however, for 
present purposes this enables some degree of 
quantification of the position of Supplementary Benefits 
in relation to non-means-tested benefits. In particular 
the rate of generation of appeals per claim for 
Supplementary Benefit is some 2.4 times that for 
Unemployment Benefit - probably the most appropriate 
benefit for comparison.
The second source of further information relating to 
Supplementary Benefit is the breakdown of those Decisions 
which have been made. Of the 77 Decisions made up to 1983 
there had been no decisions regarding registration and 
availability for employment, one concerning the condition 
'engaged in remunerative full-time work', two concerning 
'aggregation* (essentially the cohabitation/ household 
composition issue), two concerning claims and payments, 
and 25 concerning requirements and resources (15 and 10
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respectively). There were also 34 decisions on the 
controversial 'Single Payments' Regulations which have 
been the subject of a recent enquiry by the Social 
Security Policy Inspectorate (Social Security Policy 
Inspectorate, 1983) and which, in a survey carried out by 
the Family Services Unit recently, was identified along 
with late payments as the dominating subject of enquiries 
concerning Supplementary Benefits to their advice centres 
(Family Services Unit, 1983).
When considering this breakdown it must be borne in mind 
that some criteria for Supplementary Benefit have been 
subjected to Commissioners' scrutiny for a number of 
years as eligibility criteria for other benefits. There 
therefore exists a substantial body of accumulated 
knowledge relating to some of these aspects. For these 
reasons, to quantify the differences between 
Supplementary Benefit and Unemployment Benefit would be 
exceeding the limits of the data.
The breakdown of Decisions relating to Supplementary 
Benefit would seem to suggest that whilst means testing 
is inherently more controversial and problematic than 
other eligibility criteria, the absence of Decisions 
relating to availability for work for instance suggests 
that there is a learning process developing. This latter 
point is encouraging for those who would like to see a 
radical review and reform of the benefit system - an
214
indication that given due consideration and preparation 
the implementation of a new system could be made without 
the difficulties encountered with the introduction of 
Housing Benefit.
9.7 Conclusions.
The purpose of the analysis described in this chapter was 
to identify those aspects of the eligibility assessment 
process which cause the most problems. This was done by 
examining the rates at which the Decisions of the Social 
Security Commissioners categorised by various dimensions 
of the assessment process have been reported.
There are two immediate results of this analysis. The 
first is a broad ranking of these categories according to 
the degree of difficulty which they have caused, the 
second is a classification of the categories into those 
which are persistently problematic and those which caused 
problems in the short term but became less problematic as 
the laws were more closely defined. Both of these sets of 
results have turned out to be well in accord with 
intuitive expectation.
The lesson of this analysis is this. If a government sees 
the improvement of the operation of the social security 
system as a high priority then either radically different 
ways of testing for those categories which fall into the
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classification of being both persistently and highly 
problematic must be devised or else benefit assessment 
procedures should be framed so as to avoid them wherever 
possible in the reformed system. Those categories which 
fall into the classification of causing problems in the 
short term but not in the long term should, if included 
in future schemes, exploit the experience accrued from 
the problems they have caused in the past. Those 
categories which have proved to be non-problematic in 
both the short and long terms should, of course, be used 
in preference to other criteria wherever this is 
feasible. In particular rules should aim for preference 
to be based on facts supportable by documentary evidence.
To exploit this kind of information in the framing of a 
reformed, unified, coherent, harmonised, simplified 
system is essential if that system is also to be robust 
and durable. Without robustness and durability the other 
qualities will be short-lived.
Where eligibility criteria which are known to be 
problematic are included in systems being evaluated then 
this must be taken into account at the policy analysis 
stage. In the long term one would ideally like to be able 
to relate the quality of a criterion as being problematic 
to specific difficulties of implementation such as 
non-take-up, error rates and clearance times. This would
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mean that the distributional consequences of problematic 
criteria could be embodied in the analysis of the 
distributional consequences of policy options as a whole.
The following chapter describes an analytic approach 
which, it is argued, may lead to added insights into the 
causes and possible remedies of those aspects of policy 
which manifest themselves in the form of difficulties for 
the operational system and, further, increase the 
involvement of policy makers and Local Office staff in 
the policy analysis debate.
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Chapter IQ
An Analysis of Regional Variations in Benefit Take-Up
lO.1 Introduction
The previous chapter has discussed further the need 
mentioned in earlier chapters to link analysis of the 
operational system with policy issues. An analysis of the 
operational complexity of the various aspects of the 
benefit entitlement procedure was described. This chapter 
investigates the potential value and feasibility of 
another approach to studying the operational system. The 
approach studied in this chapter is to consider 
inter-regional differences in population characteristics 
and aspects of the implementation of the benefit system 
such as levels of take-up.
The chapter consists of three further sections. The 
following section motivates the work described. The 
analysis is presented in Section 3 and conclusions in 
Section 4.
lO.2 Motivation
The social security system in Britain today is intended 
to be nationally equitable, treating all persons defined
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as being of like circumstance in a uniform manner 
regardless of place of residence within the country. This 
in itself is sufficient justification for researching the 
existence of any regional differences and attempting to 
identify their causes and possible remedies. However, if 
such differences do exist and can be identified, then 
there is the potential for being able to derive 
explanations which might lead not only to a reduction in 
the regional variations in the quality of the service 
implementation but also to insights which might improve 
the performance of the operational system generally.
It is suggested, therefore, that an investigation of a 
wide range of factors at locational level such as 
differences in population characteristics, benefit 
take-up rates, administrative errors, staffing levels, 
etc, could be of potential value to policy analysis.
To this end, this chapter describes some work carried out 
on regional variations in the take-up of Child Benefit 
and One Parent Benefit - non-take-up of benefits being 
the single most important factor in causing distortions 
between eligible and recipient populations. An important 
aspect of the analysis is the presentation of the data on 
shaded maps, both to assist in data analysis and for 
presenting the results of the research.
The use of pictorial representations of data has become
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commonplace today, especially with the onset of the wide 
availability of computer graphics packages. Their value 
in being able to present a large amount of dry statistics 
in a more interesting and comprehensible form are 
obvious, the impact of pictorially presented data can be 
immediate and striking - indeed the analyst must ensure 
that the presentation of the data is not allowed to 
overemphasise the significance of those data.
It is an underlying theme of this thesis that the purpose 
of policy analysis in any field should be to raise the 
level of debate amongst policy makers. The analyst should 
first endeavour to understand the problem area using the 
best available information, but this should be regarded 
as the starting point in the analytic process. The second 
phase is to present the data and the analysts' 
interpretations of them to the policy makers - and indeed 
any other interested parties who have legitimate cause 
for access to them - in such a way that they can be fully 
appreciated by the recipients and such that they serve as 
a starting point and continuing focus for debate and 
dialogue between analysts and policy makers. This aspect 
of the policy analyst's work is crucially important for 
without it the earlier analytic efforts are seriously 
devalued.
It is suggested that the potential value of this 
pictorial approach for studying operational issues in
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policy analysis is particularly great. The potential 
contribution of Local Office staff to this aspect of 
policy making is considerable and it is suggested that 
this analytic approach significantly improves the 
prospects for their involvement.
The following section, then, describes a study of levels 
of take-up of Child Benefit and One Parent Benefit in the 
Local Authority Districts and Counties in England and 
Wales - the results of which were presented on a series 
of shaded maps.
lO. 3 A Study of Regional Variations in Take-up of Child 
Benefit and One Parent Benefit
This work was carried out by way of a pilot study to 
investigate the feasibility of analysing regional data in 
this manner. Encouraged by the results of this work 
further studies along similar lines are now in progress.
10.3.1 The Principal Eligibility Conditions for Child 
Benefit and One Parent Benefit
The principal conditions for eligibility to Child Benefit 
are very simple. Essentially a person must be responsible 
for a child, satisfy certain residence conditions and 
claim in the correct manner. A child is defined as a 
person who is either under 16 or who is 16 and under 19
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and receiving primary or secondary education at a 
recognised educational establishment. 'Responsible for' 
essentially requires either that the child is living with 
the claimant or that the claimant is contributing more 
than the current rate of Child Benefit per week for the 
maintenance of the child. Child Benefit is not payable in 
respect of a child who is married, or entitled to 
Non-Contributory Invalidity Pension, or in prison, 
custody or care of a Local Authority, or boarded out by a 
Local Authority who are paying a boarding out allowance 
in respect of the child. The child must generally be 
resident in Great Britain and the claimant must be in 
Great Britain. There are exceptions to these conditions 
but they are not important for present purposes.
To be eligible for One Parent Benefit a person must be 
entitled to Child Benefit for a child who is living with 
him or her, the person must not be living with a spouse 
or living with anyone else as husband and wife, nor 
residing with a parent of the child. One Parent Benefit 
is not payable in respect of a child for whom child 
special allowance, guardian's allowance or an increase in 
retirement pension, widow's benefit or invalid care 
allowance is in payment. If a person receives an increase 
of any other benefit in respect of the child then the 
increase will be reduced by the amount of One Parent 
Benefit.
222
The data on recipients of Child Benefit and One Parent 
Benefit are based on an analysis of a 30% sample of Child 
Benefit records on 5 April 1981 carried out by one of the 
Statistics divisions of the Department of Health and 
Social Security. The records were assigned to districts 
on the basis of the Local Authority in which the Post 
Office of payment of Child Benefit is situated. The 
statisticians responsible for the survey believe this 
resulted in 95% of persons being assigned to the area of 
their residence with the majority of the remaining 5% 
being allocated to an adjoining or nearby area when 
recipients choose to have their benefit paid at a Post 
Office away from their home address - such as a Post 
Office convenient to their workplace for instance. This 
factor will not have any significant effect on the 
results at the county level but does mean that district 
level analyses need to be treated with more caution. The 
data excludes 98,000 families (1.4% of the total) 
covering 116,000 children (0.9% of the total) where the 
Local Authority is not known.
The present analysis was based on the total number of 
dependent children for whom benefit was being received in 
the case of Child Benefit and the number of families in 
the case of One Parent Benefit. This is because Child 
Benefit is payable for each eligible child, whereas One
10.3.2 Recipiervts of Child Benefit and One Parent Benefit
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Parent Benefit is paid in respect of the eldest child 
which qualifies.
lO.3.3 Estimation of Eligible Populations for Child 
Benefit and One Parent Benefit
The estimates of the eligible populations are taken from 
the Census carried out on 5/6 April 1981. The data used 
in this analysis were extracted from the Small Area 
Statistics derived from a 10% sample of Census returns 
and held at the University of Manchester Regional 
Computer Centre. The relevant definitions used in this 
sample follow.
a. 'Dependent children* are children in families who are:
i. under 16 years of age, or
ii. under 19 years of age, never married and classified 
from the question on economic activity in the week 
prior to the Census as 'student'.
b. A 'student' is a person at school or a full-time 
student at an educational establishment not provided by 
an employer - this includes 'Government Training 
Courses'.
c. A 'family' consists of:
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i* a never married couple with or without their never 
married children, or
ii* a father or mother together with his or her never 
married children, or
iii. grandparent(s) with grandchildren if there are no 
apparent parents of the grandchildren usually 
resident in the household.
Note there is no age limit to 'child* in this definition. 
Step and adopted relationships, when specified as such, 
were not distinguished from blood relationships. Thus 
'adopted son' or 'stepson' were coded in the same way as 
'son', but 'foster son' was treated as unrelated.
d. 'Private households' include:
i. children at boarding school, university, college, 
etc. if not married
ii. adopted or foster children (however temporary)
iii. spouses who work away from home, abroad, in forces, 
etc.
iv. persons in an institution for less than 6 months
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(rough guide only); 
but exclude:
i. children in the forces or working abroad
ii. a spouse who is separated but occasionally visits or 
never visits
iii. persons in an institution for more than 6 months 
( rough guide only).
Given these definitions the estimates of eligible 
populations required for this analysis were made as 
follows.
a. Child Benefit - total number of 'dependent children* 
in 'private households' in the given area.
b. One Parent Benefit - two estimates were used for One 
Parent Benefit:
i. total number of lone parent 'families' in 'private 
households' in the given area,
ii. total number of 'private households' consisting of 
one lone parent 'family' with at least one 
dependent child.
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Note that neither of these definitions corresponds 
exactly to that required to establish eligibility to One 
Parent Benefit. Definition (i) does not specify that the 
child should be 'dependent' and definition (ii) requires 
that the household contains only one family. This means, 
therefore, that (i) overestimates the eligible population 
and (ii) underestimates it. However, whilst (i) gives an 
average take-up rate for England and Wales of 25.9% and 
(ii) gives an average rate of 49.1%, the two sets of 
take-up rates are so highly correlated (see Table 10.1) 
that for the purposes of the area-based analysis they may 
be regarded as being equally valid.
Table 10.1 Regression of high estimate of take-up against
low estimate
County data District data
Coefficient 1.92960 1.90872
Multiple correlation 0.997455 0.990768
F for regression 10371.4 21364.6
(54 data points) (401 data points)
The significance of the exclusion for eligibility to One 
Parent Benefit in respect of recipients of other benefits 
can be gauged from the following figures.
Number of families receiving One Parent Benefit in April
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1981 in England and Wales - 408,000.
Total number of one parent families enumerated in April 
1981 Census in England and Wales - 1,574,000.
Total number of households containing one family 
consisting of a lone parent with dependent child(ren) in 
April 1981 Census in England and Wales - 831,000.
Guardian's Allowances in payment in December 1981 in 
Great Britain - 4,023.
Child's Special Allowances in payment in December 1981 in 
Great Britain - 893.
Widowed Mother's Allowances in payment in November 1981 
in Great Britain - 79,000.
Non-Contributory Invalidity Pensions in payment for
claimants under 20 years of age in May 1980 in Great 
Britain - 12,000.
Invalid Care Allowances for claimants under 20 years of 
age in payment in December 1981 in Great Britain - 116.
This gives a maximum number of exclusions on these 
grounds of some 96,000 children - this assumes that no 
child falls into more than one category and they all live
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in England and Wales. Even if all these cases were to be 
excluded from the eligible population the estimated 
take-up rates would only rise from 25.9% to 27.6% and 
from 49.1% to 55.5%. This compares somewhat unfavourably 
with the official estimate for December 1981 in Great 
Britain when 'about 70% of those standing to gain by 
claiming One Parent Benefit were receiving it' (DHSS, 
1982: 261).
lO.3.4 The Results
For the purposes of this pilot study the most important 
aspect of this project was perhaps the method of 
analysis. The results concerning take-up of Child Benefit 
were not anticipated to be of great inherent interest 
since take-up is more or less complete. The results 
relating to One Parent Benefit are of greater interest 
since take-up is certainly nowhere near complete and, it 
would seem, are considerably below the DHSS's own 
estimate of 70% and probably under 50%. This in itself is 
an important finding and should perhaps be viewed as an 
alarmingly low figure for a non-means-tested benefit.
A further interesting, general observation to emerge from 
the analysis, though not altogether unexpected, is the 
strong connection between areas of larger eligible 
populations with areas of high levels of take-up. The 
regressions for the district data are shown in Table
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Table 10.2 Regressions of Estimates of Take-up against, 
the Corresponding Eligible Population Estimates
(i) (ii)
Coefficient 0.345356 E-04 0.119758 E-03
Multiple correlation 0.743051 0.718237
F for regression 493.106 426.214
Column (i) low estimate of take-up against high population estimate.
Column (ii) high estimate of take-up against low population estimate.
This relationship is largely encapsulated by the 
individual maps for districts and counties of take-up of 
One Parent Benefit - see Figures 10.1 and 10.2. This is 
because the geographically smaller districts and counties 
are generally more densely populated both in general 
terms and more particularly in terms of the eligible 
populations for One Parent Benefit - see Figures 10.3 and 
10.4. Figure 10.5 shows take-up of One Parent Benefit in 
the Greater London Council area where it can clearly be 
seen that those inner city boroughs commonly associated 
with high deprivation and which contain larger numbers of 
one parent families also achieve the higher levels of 
take-up of One Parent Benefit.
This is to be expected since informal information systems
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can be expected to be better in areas of higher density 
of eligible populations. Furthermore there is a greater 
presence of Welfare Rights Offices, Citizens' Advice 
Bureaux and other non-official sources of information to 
be found in urban areas. These factors should perhaps 
serve to emphasise the importance of this relationship 
when considering plans for any future campaigns by DHSS 
to increase take-up of benefits.
10.4 Conclusion
The purpose of the work described in this chapter was to 
investigate the feasibility of studying and presenting 
regional data on shaded maps. The results are encouraging 
and DHSS is sponsoring further work now being carried out 
along similar lines. It is envisaged that other benefits 
will be analysed similarly in the near future.
It is also envisaged that such an approach might lead to 
new insights into the causes of mis implementation of 
benefit policies and other operational difficulties. It 
is hoped that the approach would, in addition, enable an 
increased involvement on the part of Local office staff 
in commenting on the operational implications of policy 
decisions.
231
Chapter 11
A Role for Operational Research in the Analysis and 
Evaluation of Social Security Benefit Policies
This chapter brings together the main conclusions of the 
work presented in this thesis.
A review of the historical development of the social 
security system has shown that comprehensive reform is 
far more difficult to achieve than piecemeal change. The 
consequence of this has been the present system which is 
confusing for claimants, excessively cumbersome to manage 
on a day to day basis and of which analysis and criticism 
at the policy level are made extremely difficult. The 
system is in need of radical revision. There is 
widespread support for reforming the system, but 
considerable diversity of opinion concerning the form 
such a reworking should take.
The review of the development of the system and the 
present environment both indicate the need for more 
strategic planning. Any reform should ideally be preceded 
by objective analysis based on the best possible 
information concerning existing and expected future 
circumstances. This should pave the way for a system 
which seeks to be more coherent; easier for claimants to
understand; more easily administered; designed to cope 
with the problems of today and the future; and properly 
co-ordinated both internally, and also with the taxation 
system and the Government's other social and employment 
measures.
Although the definition of system objectives is usually 
considered a desirable step towards improving strategic 
planning, because of the controversial nature of many 
questions in this field, it would appear to be an 
infeasible goal. It is suggested that a prerequisite for 
achieving an improved social security system is, 
therefore, the design of an analytic system which allows 
the evaluation of policy alternatives against a broad and 
changing spectrum of objectives.
It is suggested that a database of the basic data 
required to assess the distributional implications for 
existing and potential claimants of present and possible 
alternative benefit policies should be developed. This 
would be constructed in such a way as to enable benefit 
evaluation analyses to be carried out without extended 
periods of primary analysis. Rather, such studies would 
involve the extraction and analysis of data from the 
database in such a manner as to comply as well as 
possible with the needs of policy makers - though not, of 
course, such as to support only their views.
It was also felt to be important that potential users of 
the analyses should be involved in the analytic process 
from as early a stage as possible with a view to building 
their commitment to the analyses, incorporating their 
expertise in the work and ensuring early analytic 
involvement in policy evaluation studies.
By considering the requirements of the output of the 
information system it was possible to identify certain 
qualities which were considered to be essential and 
desirable for the database to possess.
On the strength of this analysis there would appear to be 
a strong case for basing the information system on a 
survey of a representative sample of households from the 
general population covering the widest possible range of 
variables including income, housing, family structure, 
expenditure, employment histories, education and so on. 
The case for using such a general household survey is 
further strengthened by the experience of the Population 
Model which adopted the main alternative approach of 
bringing together data from a wide range of sources and 
which was dropped largely because of the great 
difficulties inherent in performing this task in a 
correct and consistent manner.
The most suitable general purpose survey available is the 
Family Expenditure Survey (FES). Although the FES is not
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an ideal sole source of data on which to base an 
information system to analyse social security policies 
such a facility does not exist. It is concluded that the 
FES supplemented by other data does provide an acceptable 
source.
The weaknesses of the FES all suggest the need to 
supplement its data with more reliable, aggregate data. 
Indeed the qualities of data attainable from 
administrative statistics, specialised surveys and 
research projects, and general purpose surveys are found 
to be very much of a complementary nature. In particular 
administrative statistics are generally as accurate and 
as up to date as possible; specialised surveys and 
research projects provide valuable background knowledge 
and understanding; and the FES provides a sound framework 
to build the information system around.
It is concluded that these data sources should be 
combined in such a way as to exploit these strengths 
whilst reducing the significance of the weaknesses if 
possible.
Techniques known variously as iterative proportional 
fitting, multi-proportional matrix adjustment, the RAS 
method, the Furness method and entropy maximisation have 
been brought together at IIASA to infer migration 
patterns of population categories from aggregate data.
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These procedures provide the means to combine the data in 
the manner described and in a simple and coherent way. 
Furthermore the procedures fit well into an approach to 
policy analysis which requires the involvement and 
participation of experts from all relevant disciplines 
and potential users of the results of the analyses.
The same procedures can also be used to consider the 
distributional implications of expected and hypothesised 
values for aggregate variables and behavioural changes in 
future years. This facilitates a full testing of the 
sensitivity of alternative policies to possible changes 
in the environment. This is seen as another important 
aspect of the analysis.
An exercise to test the iterative proportional fitting 
algorithms demonstrated the potential value of exploiting 
all available information. Furthermore it displayed the 
ability of the approach to take account of dependency 
relationships even when there is not sufficient data to 
estimate equations to describe them or indeed where the 
existence of the relationship is not common knowledge. 
Further it would not be possible to include all such 
relationships in a single model even if they could be 
estimated.
To summarise, the use of iterative proportional fitting 
to enhance FES data with information from administrative
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statistics and specialised sources, and to breakdown the 
distributional implications of forecasts and hypothesised 
scenarios is advocated. This approach provides the 
opportunity to establish a readily available information 
system upon which to base the initial evaluation of 
social security policy alternatives on the best possible 
information and understanding. For many purposes this 
analysis will be sufficient but if, after such analysis, 
more detailed studies are considered necessary then that 
decision will be well-founded and the areas in need of 
further investigation better identified.
The need to better understand the operational 
implications of policy level decisions is seen as an 
important element if the difficulties of the operational 
system are to be alleviated. Accordingly work was done on 
identifying those aspects of the procedures for assessing 
benefit entitlement which have given rise to the most 
problems and also on regional variation in benefit 
take-up.
The problem of benefit complexity was addressed by 
analysing the rate of generation of Decisions of the 
Social Security Commissioners categorised according to 
the aspect of the assessment procedure to which they 
related.
The analysis provided two immediate results. The first is
237
a broad ranking of the categories according to the degree 
of difficulty which they have caused, the second is a 
classification of the categories into those which are 
persistently problematic and those which caused problems 
in the short term but became less problematic as the laws 
were more closely defined. Both sets of results proved to 
be well in accord with intuitive expectation.
If a future government considers the improvement of the 
operation of the social security system to be a high 
priority then either radically different ways of testing 
for those categories which fall into the classification 
of being both persistently and highly problematic - 
namely the tests for unemployment, the claiming process, 
trade disputes and incapacity for work - must be devised 
or else benefit assessment procedures should be framed so 
as to avoid them wherever possible in the reformed 
system. Those categories which have caused problems in 
the short term but not the long term - namely marriage, 
cohabitation and adult dependents, availability for work, 
reason for leaving previous employment and free 
in-patient treatment in hospital - should, if included in 
future schemes, exploit the experience accrued from the 
problems they have caused in the past. Those categories 
which have proved to be non-problematic in both the short 
and long terms should, of course, be used in preference 
to other criteria wherever this is feasible. In 
particular rules should aim for preference to be based on
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facts supportable by documentary evidence.
The above analysis applied to non-means-tested benefits. 
Whilst means-testing was shown to be inherently more 
problematic and controversial there was evidence to 
suggest that a learning process was developing and that 
the kinds of problems experienced with non-means-tested 
benefits had not immediately caused problems when 
Supplementary Benefits became subject to the jurisdiction 
of the Social Security Commissioners in 1980. This is 
encouraging for those who advocate the introduction of a 
radically different system who might be discouraged by 
the experiences of the introduction of Housing Benefit in 
1983.
To exploit the results of this kind of analysis in the 
framing of a reformed, unified, coherent, simplified 
system is essential if these qualities are not to be 
short-lived.
Where eligibility criteria which are known to be 
problematic are included in policies being evaluated then 
this should be taken into account at the policy analysis 
stage. Ideally in the long term it would be possible to 
relate the quality of an eligibility rule being 
problematic to specific difficulties of implementation 
such as non-take-up and error rates. This would mean that 
the distributional consequences of problematic criteria
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could be embodied in the analysis of distributional 
consequences of policy options as a whole. This is an 
area where further research effort could be of great 
potential value.
The feasibility of studying and presenting regional data 
on shaded maps was investigated. The results are 
encouraging and further work is being sponsored by DHSS. 
It is envisaged that the analysis of regional differences 
in indicators of operational performance such as take-up 
rates may, in addition to removing some of the 
differences in implementation between areas, lead to 
added insights into the causes of misimplementation of 
policies and hence possible improvements in the system at 
a national level. It is also hoped that the analytic 
approach will enable an increased involvement on the part 
of LO staff in commenting on the operational implications 
of policy decisions.
The philosophy underlying the approach to policy analysis 
expounded in this thesis is very similar to that 
advocated by Quads:
Considering what can be done to increase 
understanding, the claims of what one can expect from public policy analysis should be 
rather modest. It can frequently reduce the complexity of problems to manageable proportions (manageable by judgment, that is) by identifying and clarifying those elements 
about which information exists or can be found. 
It can eliminate from consideration the
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demonstrably inferior alternatives and 
sometimes find one that all interested parties can accept even though they are not fully 
satisfied. By making information available and 
laying bare hidden assumptions and value preferences, public analysis can widen the area of informed judgment. It can counter the purely 
subjective approach on the part of advocates of 
a program by forcing them to defend their line of argument and talk about the specifics of the 
situation rather than merely express their 
personal opinions with statements of noble purpose, thereby raising the quality of public discussion.
Policy analysis is valuable because it can help 
a decision-maker by providing information through research and analysis, isolating and 
clarifying issues, revealing inconsistencies in aims and efforts, generating new alternatives, 
and suggesting ways of translating ideas into feasible and realizable policies. Its major 
contribution may be to yield insights, particularly with regard to the dominance and sensitivity of the parameters. It is no more than an adjunct, although a powerful one, to the judgment, intuition, and experience of decision-makers... (Quade, 1982: 11-12).
If the policy choices can be brought within the understanding of analysts, they can be brought 
within the understanding of those who must make 
the legal decision. The task of analysis is to 
bring together knowledge from all the various 
diciplines that can help and to present at 
least some of the risks and implications of the possible choices. (Quade, 1982: 20).
Given the nature of the development of the social 
security system to date and the state of the system at 
present it would seem that any properly directed analytic 
assistance could be of considerable value. It is hoped 
that this work might make some contribution to this 
cause. In particular it is hoped that the notion of using 
iterative proportional fitting to enhance FES data to 
establish an information system for benefit policy
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analysis might be adopted. Also further research should 
be carried out to develop the work presented here to 
enable the inclusion of an analysis of expected 
implementation problems of the various alternatives at 
the policy evaluation stage.
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Appendix 2.1 Glossary
Class I Contributions - currently 9% for employees and 
entitle the contributor to all relevant benefits. There 
are three other classes of contribution but payment of 
these does not entitle the contributor to all National 
Insurance benefits.
Lower earnings limit - when earnings reach the lower 
earnings limit the employee has to start paying Class I 
National Insurance Contributions. The lower earnings 
limit is usually adjusted every April.
Period of Interruption of Employment (PIE) - a PIE is 
made up of 2 or more days of unemployment in any 6 
consecutive days (excluding Sundays), or 4 or more 
consecutive days (excluding Sundays) of incapacity for 
work. PIEs separated by less than 8 weeks 'link' to form 
a single PIE.
Poverty trap - the consequence of the high implied 
marginal tax rates which result from the compounding of 
income tax. National Insurance contributions, and 
withdrawal of benefits around the official poverty line 
and which means increases in gross income lead to only 
minimal increases or even decreases in net income.
Relevant Tax Year (RTY) - the last complete tax year
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prior to the start of the benefit year in which the 
initial claim is made. Tax years run from 6 April to 5 
April, benefit years start on the first Sunday in January 
and usually end on the first Saturday in the following 
year.
Replacement ratio - the ratio of income received when out 
of work to that received when in employment, either 
previous or prospective.
Take-up is the percentage of those entitled to a benefit 
who actually claim and thence receive it.
Total Income Support (TIS) is defined in Social 
Assistance as:
for those in work -
gross earnings less income tax, NI contributions, rent, 
rates and work expenses, plus Child Benefit, Family 
Income Supplement, rent rebates, rate rebates, free 
school meals, and free welfare milk;
and for those out of work -
NI Benefit less rent and rates, plus Earnings Related 
Supplement, Supplementary Benefit (including rent and 
rates), Child Benefit, any Family Income Supplement still
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payable, rent rebates, rate rebates, free school meals 
and free welfare milk (tax rebates were ignored).
Unemployment trap - the narrowing of the difference 
between incomes in and out of work which makes a return 
to work financially unrewarding.
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Appendix 5.1 Measures of Inequality of Income
1. The Gini Coefficient
The Lorenz curve plots the cumulative percentage of the 
population against the percentage of total personal 
income. The Gini coefficient measures the proportion of 
the area below the line of complete equality, that is the 
45 degree line, which is above the Lorenz curve. Thus the 
higher the Gini coefficient the greater the degree of 
inequality.
Percentage of Population
The obvious weakness with such a measure is that it does 
not express where the percentage shares are most 
deficient, that is curves A and B whilst describing very 
different distributions can have identical Gini 
coefficients.
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2. The Atkinson Measure of Equality
The Atkinson measure is defined as
1
a,_a .E = (y )
Y
where “ represents the weight attached by society to 
inequality in the distribution.
Piachaud (1982) uses values fora of -0.5, -1.0 and -2.0. 
The higher the value of E the greater the equality of 
distribution. A value of -0.5 for a attaches a greater 
weight to transfers at high incomes whereas -2.0 for <* 
indicates the emphasis is being placed on inequality in 
the lower income ranges.
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Appendix 6.1 Sample Design of -the Family Expenditure 
Survey as at 1979 and described in Kemslev et al (1980)
The FES uses a four stage, stratified, rotating design in 
which the primary sampling units (PSUs) are 455 of the 
459 administrative areas of Great Britain, made up of the 
boroughs of London, Edinburgh, Glasgow, Dundee, Aberdeen 
and the district councils. The secondary units are 
electoral wards, and tertiary units addresses and finally 
households.
The PSUs are stratified by region, population density and 
an economic indicator based on rateable value. The 
regional factor divides the region into 16 major strata. 
The second factor then divides them into Metropolitan 
areas and the district councils into three bands 
according to population density - the bounds between 
bands chosen such that there are approximately equal 
numbers of PSUs in each band. This yields 44 strata in
which PSUs are arranged in descending order of the third
*stratification factor - for England and Wales this is the 
proportion of domestic properties with rateable value 
over 400 pounds, in Scotland the proportion of industrial 
rateable value to total rateable value. The intermediate 
strata are then divided into 168 minor strata 
approximately equal in size in such a way that selection 
of one PSU from each of these minor strata should ensure 
a sample which is regionally representative and with
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distribution by area type as faithful as possible - the 
divergence between the 'expected' and 'actual* 
distributions being caused by the need for integral 
numbers of PSUs in each stratum.
In each quarterly period the sample consists of one PSU 
from each of the 168 strata. The PSUs are selected 
randomly and independently and with probability 
proportional to size of the population. Each PSU then 
contributes 16 addresses to the final sample so that the 
distribution of addresses is close to the correct 
regional distribution.
Once selected a PSU is used for four consecutive quarters 
and then replaced by another PSU from the same stratum. 
The 168 are divided into four sets of 42, each 
representative of the whole, so that in each quarter 42 
PSUs are selected from one of these four sets. Thus if Xi 
represents the ith selection from set X, the following is 
the rotation patternt
Quarter Sets
j Ai Bi Ci Di ) In any 12 month
j+1 Ai+1 Bi Ci Di \ period 7 setsj+2 Ai+1 Bi+1 Ci Di ( (294 PSUs)j+3 Ai+1 Bl+1 Ci+1 Di / are in use.
j+4 Ai+1 Bi+1 Ci+1 Di+1
j+5 Ai+2 Bi+1 Ci+1 Di+1
Occasionally it is necessary to change the frame which 
means that for three quarters the sample is selected from 
a combination of old and new frames and hence areas can
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be omitted or double—counted. However, by regarding the 
sample of a minor stratum as being a random selection 
from an infinite population of areas then the old and new 
frames become equally random choices from the same 
infinite population and the sample during the 
transitionary stage can still be regarded as 
representative.
The four sets of 42 are also used in a process designed 
to ensure that there is no systematic allocation of the 
quarterly samples into monthly samples.
Having selected the quarterly sample of PSUs the 
secondary stage is to select four wards from each PSU 
with probability proportional to size of the electorate 
at the time of selection. The four wards selected are 
allocated at random to the quarters for which the PSU 
remains in the sample. Finally 16 addresses are selected 
at random from the electoral registers of the chosen 
wards. If an address is reselected within 13 months then 
it is rejected and another selection made. The final 
sample is restricted to domestic households so residents 
of hotels, hostels, hospitals and other institutions are 
excluded.
Some 5% of addresses selected contain more than one 
household. At the address selection stage, if the elector 
chosen is the first on the register at that address and
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there are less than four surnames registered at that 
address, then the address is selected. If there are four 
or more surnames at the address and the elector selected
is the first on the register with that surname then the
address is selected — thus increasing the probability 
that the address is selected on the assumption that four 
or more surnames on the electoral register at one address 
is an indicator of the presence of more than one
household. At the interview stage at these 'pre-sampled 
multi-household* addresses the interviewer then 
identifies the number of households at the address and 
consults a table which determines the household or 
households to be chosen - each has a probability of 
selection inversely proportional to the number of
surnames. This usually identifies a single household to 
be interviewed, although sometimes none or more than one 
is selected. Further addresses will reveal themselves to 
be multi-household at the interview stage, if there are 
more than three the interviewer takes a random sample - 
each interviewer is limited to a total of twenty
households so the increase in households to be
interviewed as a result of 'concealed multi—households' 
may lead to a slight under-representation of 
multi—household addresses in the final sample for
inner-city areas.
Some selected addresses are excluded from the final 
sample because they are empty, demolished, or not within
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the coverage of the survey. This latter cause is usually 
a result of the address not being a domestic household or 
sometimes because domestic expenditure is closely tied 
with commercial expenditure.
As a result of these various factors the original 
'intended* sample of 10,752 households a year yielded 
effective samples of 10,080 in 1976, 10,145 in 1977 and 
10,135 in 1978.
Each annual report gives estimates of sampling errors. 
'Formula 1* gives standard errors derived from the single 
stage random formula, 'formula 2' is an approximation of 
the true value taking into account the multi-stage design 
and rotation - the ratio of * formula 2' to 'formula 1' is 
an estimate of the design factor. The higher design 
factors are associated with those variables susceptible 
to regional clustering - in particular housing 
expenditure had a mean design factor of 1.98 for the 
years 1969-1976.
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Appendix 7.1 Uniqueness, Existence and Convergence of 
Solution to Procedure A
This proof is adapted from Macgill (1977) which applies to 
a more general form of procedure A.
The form taken in this proof will be the derivation of
M* * <raij>mxn from
mij " AiBjmij ( 1 )
where A^, Bj are row and column multipliers to be determined 
iteratively from
MiE B .mr ' u
R = ____ JLj T A,mi'"ij
( 2 )
(3)
It will be shown that this procedure derives a unique 
solution to the problem of obtaining a non-negative m x n 
matrix M* with predefined row and column totals , Nj 
( I Hj ■ E Nj) so that the entries mjj of M* are 
biproportional to those of a matrix M ■ ^ij^mx n'
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This procedure can be primed by assigning any positive
values to the Bj's in (2) or to the A1's in (3), but
setting Bj = 1, Vj in (2) will result in the above procedure
being the same as procedure A and will produce the same
sequence of matrices = (mi^)Ij m x n
Note also that since ttk j = 0 =*• mjj = 0 the same proofs 
would apply to procedure B.
Uniqueness
Suppose 3 H* = ( ^ V i J ^ x n *  " (AiBjmij>mx n ’ solutions 
to this procedure, and suppose aibimii > AiBimii, mi i ^ 0.
Note we may assume mii f  0 for if not then w can be rearranged 
accordingly. We may also assume bi = Bi =1, since any of 
the row and column multipliers can be multiplied by a 
positive constant providing the remainder are altered
accordingly. Finally we assume n >_ m, if not M can be
*
transposed.
Kt - Mf ( a l ~ A i ) mi i  C a i b 2- A i B 2 ) mi2  ( a i b n- A i B n )m1 n
(a2-A2)m21 (a2b2-A2B2)m22
(am-Am )mmi (amb2-AmB2)ram2
(a2bn"A2Bn V 2n
(a b - A B  ) m n m n
with all row-sums and column-sums equal to zero.
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0
n
ai > Aj , m u  ? 0, (aj - A ^ m n  + r ( a ^  - A^B^m^ =
^a i bj  -  < some J  o r  e l s e  we have a
c o n t r a d i c t  i o n .
We may assume j  = 2 , th u s  1 < (m1 2  * ° ) *
n
Now ( a j b 2 -  A iB 2 )m1 2  < 0 ,  T (a^bg -  A^B2 )mi 2  = 0.
.*. ( a i b 2 -  A^B2 )m^  > 0 , some i  or e ls e  we have a 
c o n t r a d i c t i o n .
We may assume 1 = 2, th en  m22  > 0 , 1 < ^
( a 2 -  A2 )m2 1  + ( a 2b 2 -  A2 B2 )m22  > 0 (m2 1  > 0 ) ,  and
n
( a 2 — A2 )m2i + £ ^a 2b i — A2 B.)m . =
J - 2  J  J  J
(a b 4 -  A B . )m. 4 < 0 ,  some j  or  e ls e  we have a 
2 j  2 j  Z J
c o n t r a d i c t i o n .
We may assume j  = 3, then  m2 3 > 0 , < 5 -^*
T h is  argument can be persued u n t i l  i  = i ,  where e i t h e r  
a) i i  = m, in  which c a s e  a^ > A j m4l i  0  Vi  * mi l > °*
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>  0 ,  c o n t r a d i c t i n g  M j  -  M j  =  0 ;
o r
b )
m
E  ( a ,  
i —  1  1
A .  ) m .
i 1 < m ,  j = i ,  +  1  a n d  ( a .  - A .  ) m .  +1l 1l 1l1
t h u s  c o n t r a d i c t i n g  ~  N i j  =
n
E(a. b . - A .  B  ) m .  > 0 ,
j = 2  M  3  M  J  1 i J
o r
c )
m
i l < m ,  J - i j  a n d  E i a ^  i “ A i B 1  ^  ) m i i
M .  -  M ,  = 0 .  11l 1l
< 0 ,  c o n t r a d i c t i n g
T h e r e f o r e  i f  a  s o l u t i o n  t o  t h e  p r o c e d u r e  e x i s t s  t h e n  i t  
w i l l  b e  u n i q u e .
E x i s t e n c e
( r i f j )  t o  e x i s t  i t  i s  n e c e s s a r y  t h a t  a  m a t r i xi  J  m  x  nF o r  M *
w i t h  r o w  a n d  c o l u m n  t o t a l s  M  
m . . =  0  e x i s t s .  T h i s  r e q u i r e s  Z  M .  . . .
i J  i = l  1  j = * i  3
N .  a n d  w i t h  m j j
m  n
E N .  a n d  i f
0  w h e r e v e r
m iiJ 0  t h e n  Ml i < E N . , N . < E M. .11 “ Jl*J< 3 Jl ~
T h e s e  l a t t e r  c o n d i t i o n s  p r e v e n t  a t t e m p t s  t o  g e n e r a t e  a
m a t r i x  s u c h  a s 1m  f  i  m f  2!m*2 l 0 J w i t h  E  M t  -  S N j  -  3 ,  M i  -  1 ,  M 2  -  2Ni - 1, N2 = 2
T h a t is, fmfj mf2*| 1 
[mfi 0 J 2
w i t h  m f 2  > _  0  w h i c h  i s  c l e a r l y  n o t  
p o s s i b l e .
1  2
P r o v i d e d  t h e s e  c o n d i t i o n s  a r e  s a t i s f i e d  t h e  a d j u s t m e n t  i s  
s a i d  t o  b e  ' c o n s i s t e n t ' .  I f  t h e  a d j u s t m e n t  i s  c o n s i s t e n t
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(7), 2k.(m ) ij m x n <il V raij>mx„
tend to a common limit, M* = (m?.) say, as k -*■ °» ifi, j m x n
and only if the following conditions hold,
E M = Z N. (8)
i 1 j J
and for any m. . = 0, m. . e M,iiJl ilJl
L < E N 
11
(9)
±  e m . 
I*!,1
(10)
(Note, given (8) then (9) and (10) are complementary) 
Strategy for Proof
k*™ lLemma 1 will show that the sequences (max(A. /A. )} andi 1 1
(min(A.k/A .k_1)} are monotonically decreasing and increasing 
i 1 1respectively and that the equivalent Bj sequences behave 
correspondingly.
Lemma 2 will show that these sequences are bounded and hence 
attain finite limits.
Lemma 3 will show that if any of (8), (9), or (10) is 
violated then these limits cannot equal unity.
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Lemma 4 will show that if (8), (9) and (10) hold then 
these limits will necessarily be unity.
Proof
k kLemma 1 Given and B as defined in the theorem,J
then
Max
Max
A .k+1 A k A .k+1 A ki < Max 
i
i , Min 
i
i > Min 
i
i
A k Ai A k_1l A k Ai A k_1
o k+1
BJ , < Max
j
R k B,1 , Min 
j
R k + 1Bj , > Min
j
R k
B kBj B k_1 Bj B kBj B k_*Bj
Proof of Lemma 1
M ., k+i _
1 Z B . m. .j J
(from (4))
k+i M .
' . k _ . k k _
Ai  j  Ai  Bj  mi J
M.
— XT'i---- 57*I A . KB K (— 
j 1 J BjK_1 1J
V i (Bj k _ 1  ?  0 V j , k )
M .
- . , v , , k„ ¥i
m} n < 7 T b r>  s. Ai  BJ mi J  J  Bj J
1
min (— - )  
i  B * -»
V 4 (from ( 4) )
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m a x
k + i
h r  i
S i m i l a r l y
B .
m i n  —  
j  B
----- rr«-
min — fcrj  b
k-i -
i  A
k + i
►  = >  m a x - - - t —  <  m a x  — i t — r -
i  A ± k  ~  i  A ± k
O t h e r  p a r t s  o f  l e m m a  p r o v e n  s i m i l a r l y ,  
T h u s  t h e s e  s e q u e n c e s  a r e  m o n o t o n i c .
k + i
L e m m a  2  T h e  d e c r e a s i n g  s e q u e n c e s  ( m a x (  ■ ■  .  ) }  a n d
-------------\r 1 * J A K
L
k + i  n  k + iL
i  A
B ^ - 1 i A±
{ m a x ( — “ — z~ —  ) }  a r e  b o u n d e d  b e l o w  a n d  t h e  i n c r e a s i n g
j B . K 1 , ,B1J sequences {min( *  ^)> and {min(— -^-)> are
 t  j  j
b o u n d e d  a b o v e .
P r o o f  o f  L e m m a  2
L e t  m i n ( — = — )  =  K  ( *  f i n i t e )  
i  A , 1
a / +1
B u t  Y  ±  m a x ( - - - - g —  )
1  A ,
k + i
K  i s  a  l o w e r  b o u n d  f o r  ( m a x (  1  ^  ) >1 A .
O t h e r  c a s e s  p r o v e n  s i m i l a r l y .
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Thus the sequences are monotonic increasing (decreasing) 
and bounded above (below).
the sequences attain finite limits. 
AikSuppose lim max (— -) = w. 
k-*-“ i At
A k
1 ) — w
A k_1> Ai
« k+l 
1 , ) IVA k Ai
But, from proof of lemma 1, 
. k k+i
max(— j— - 
i A .K_1 ) > -----S~k— 1 max(--- t— )min, Bj N i A,
J (BJk-1
k-n
max(— i— r) " W > -------r- - W > max( 1 . ) - W.j * K—1 — _j_ R  ^ A Ri A
J
mln( BJ ■■■)
- W| < e Vk > k.
B1 1.*. lim min(— “ — i.. 4 n K“l wk-*-<» j B
A . k  B  *  !
Thus if lim max(— c— - ) - W then lim min(— ¿ _ )  = ^ and k+- i A ^ " 1 k-*-~ J BjK
and
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A 3
Similarly if lim min(— i— ) = a then lim max(— 4 ) = I .k-*=> i A -1 T3 ^ 1 Gk-*-" j B.
Ai a .kLemma 3 Let lim max(— £-,-) = w and lim min(— i— ) = a.
k-v« i A * k_1k-*-» k A,
If the conditions of the theorem are violated then w > 1 or 
a < 1 and hence there is no convergence.
Proof of Lemma 3
Suppose that condition (8) does not hold, s.t. E N. < E M 
j J i
From (4) and (5),
E N
j j ^ l l  4ik"lB/''"ij. vt'
and E M. = E E A.kB.k-1m., Vk i i i j i j ij
ï  j  r f c r  Ai k ' l B j k ‘ , , " i j  , k < A i k ‘ 1 ’ ‘  ° v k >
max
i
- i A k _ 1  B Ai  J‘ 3
Ÿ  r » > E M. 
i  1i A i k " 1 J  3
max
i
A k ^
Ai  .  i
Mi
. k - l  -  E
A i  J MJ 1
l im
k-M»
A k Aimax — c—r 
i  At K
- W > 1
"ij -
( I D
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Similarly if £ N. > £ M. then it can be shown that a < 1 
j J i 1
and again there is no convergence.
Now suppose condition (9) does not hold. s.t. . = 0  andil Jl
i f i  :
> E Nh, say.
From (4), M. = E A . 1B ."mk+l_ kil Z. "i “j “‘iij-
„ ï. A k+1B,km. . E A.k+1 Bjkm.
Mi, _ j  * 1  j  1 l J  Ë Nj  I N .  I N .
JfJi .1 j^J1 J
i a . a. .  .
ii J iiJ
j7tJ1 1
k+l„ k
k+i
(m. , =0)il Jl
k_ kE E A , B . m.j E E  ( ■ r )A. B . m. .
< - i w ' l v  3 *  °>
1 1
< rnaxt-- ^ ) 1 --r-
i A L J
k+i E E A1kBjkm1j
i
» k+l 
Aimax(---c— )
i A.k
i f  3:
(from (5))
Ai Mim*x<— TT> ” T ' NT 51 1 ‘ 
1 Ai J?*Ji J
.’. W > 1 and again there is no convergence. Conditions 
(10) are complementary and there is no need to repeat the 
proof for these.
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Lemma 4 If the conditions of the theorem are satisfied
then W - a = 1 and convergence to M* = (m*) will beij m x n
achieved.
Proof of Lemma 4
A k r Mi
From (11), max —— > -—^— — li A 1 - Ë T C
1 Ai j J
W > 1.
Similarly it can be shown that a < 1.
" iMoreover W > 1 => a < 1, for suppose l i m  — t -— — * W. >_ 1 V . ,
k—  a 1k_1 1 1
> 1 for some i.
Now EM. = E E A.kB.k’1m 
i 1 i j  1 J ij
- 1
(from (4))
(Aik'1 f 0 V1,k)
> E E A.k_1Bjk“1m
i J ij
E N, (from (5),
contradicting E M. = E N.
i  J  J
k a KA K Ailim — < 1 some i and in particular lim min frj,
‘ k ~  A ^ " 1 1 Ai
m a <
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1
l i m  m a x i ' V T ,  1  i m  m a x
k - * - “ >  i AA i k + ~  j
A k -+■  00 a n d  B j k - * •  “ - a s  k  - * ■
B .
s o m e  j  ( j  e  J  s a y ) .
I f  f  0  s o m e  i  e  I ,  j  e  J  t h e n  m ^ ! ^  - * •
m ( k )
«  a s  k  - * ■  ~  c o n t r a d i c t i n g
^ j  b o u n d e d  b y  ,
I f  m
i j “ O V ^ e l . j e J  t h e n  ^  0  s o m e  i j  e  I ,  j j  ^  J
k  k  ( k )M o r e o v e r  A .  - * ■  « •  a s  k  - » •  »  s o  B .  0  a s  k  »  s . t .  m )  4 'M  J i  i J
r e m a i n  w i t h i n  b o u n d s  ,  N j
L e t  J 1 =  { j | B j  - * ■  0  a s  k  }
L e t  J 1 1  =  { j  |  j  i  J 1 ) .
T h u s  ( i ,  j )  e  I  x  J 1 1  = >  m t j  -  0  a n d  I  x  J  <  I  x  J 1 1 .
A p p l y i n g  c o n d i t i o n  ( 9 )  t o  I  x  J 1 1 ,
E  V .  <  E  N .  ( 1 2 ) .
l e i  1 “  J e J 1 J
From (4),  Z  M ±  -  E ^Al kBj k lmi j  “  . r T . S Ti Ai BJ mi J  i e l  i e l  j  J  J l e i  J e J 1
( s i n c e  m ^  ■  0  V ( i , J )  e  I  x  J 1 1 )
r r o .  ( 5 ) ,  *
+  E  E  A . k B . k m j
J c J 1 U l *  1 1J
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where I1 = {i
If W > 1, ct «
Z Z A.kB 
jeJ1 iel1 1
Thus Z N. = 
JeJ1 J
then Z N = 
JeJ1 J
contradicting 
W = a = 1
I i  i  I } .
1 then for j e J1 , B^k -*■ 0 as k -»■ « and 
k,nij "■ 0 as k "*■ 00 (i 6 I1 => A±k finite as
k -*•<*>) .
Z Z A. B.km . a n d  since B.k < B.k-1for jeJ1 jeJ1 iel 1 J 1J J J
r A .kB.km.. < Z Z Aj kBJk-1m.1 4.T i j ij ' ,:T1 “J “idJeJ iel JeJ1 iel = Z M iel i’
( 1 2 ) .
and convergence is achieved.
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Appendix 7.2 The Entropy of a Probability Distribution
( S e e  S h a n n o n  a n d  W e a v e r ,  1 9 4 9 : 4 9 )
E v e n t s  X j  ,  - - - - ,  x n  o c c u r  w i t h  p r o b a b i l i t i e s  p :  ,  - - - - ,  p Q .
S h a n n o n  a s k s  i f  3  H i P j  ,  - - - - ,  P n ) ,  a  m e a s u r e  o f  u n c e r t a i n t y
c o n t a i n e d  i n  t h e  d i s t r i b u t i o n  P j ,  - - - - ,  p R .
S h a l l  r e q u i r e  t h r e e  p r o p e r t i e s  o f  H :
i )  H  b e  c o n t i n u o u s  i n  t h e  p ^ .
i i )  I f  p .  =  —  f o r  a l l  i  t h e n  H  s h o u l d  b e  a  m o n o t o n i c  
1  n
i n c r e a s i n g  f u n c t i o n  o f  n ,  t h a t  i s  i f  t h e  e v e n t s  
a r e  e q u a l l y  l i k e l y  t h e n  t h e  m o r e  e v e n t s  t h e r e  
a r e  t h e  m o r e  u n c e r t a i n t y  w i l l  e x i s t .
i i i )  I f  a n  e v e n t  i s  d i v i d e d  i n t o  s u b - e v e n t s ,  t h e n  t h e  
H  s h o u l d  b e  t h e  w e i g h t e d  s u m  o f  t h e  i n d i v i d u a l  
v a l u e s  o f  H  -  t h a t  i s  i f  x ^  c a n  o c c u r  a s
, ---, x. w i t h  p r o b a b i l i t i e s  p, ,Jl Jn>4 Ji
t h e n  H ( p i i , - - - - ,  p  )  -  H ( p j p n )  +
+ PiH(pji’ -- ’ PJm. ) + p__ )nirin
I f  t h e s e  c o n d i t i o n s  h o l d  t h e n  H  *  — k  I  P ^ l o g  
( k  >  0 ,  c o n s t a n t ) .
275
Proof
L e t  A ( n )  =  H ( — ,  — ,  I ) .
n  n
F r o m  ( i l l ) ,  A ( s m )  =  A ( s )  +  A i s 1 " “ 1 )  =  2 A ( s )  +  A ( s m ' 2 )  =  m A ( s )
S i m i l a r l y ,  A ( t n )  =  n A ( t )
C a n  c h o o s e  n  a r b i t r a r i l y  l a r g e  a n d  f i n d  m  s . t .
( s , t  i n t e g e r s  >  1 ) .
m  l o g  s  < _  n  l o g  t  <  ( m  +  1 )  l o g  s
m  <  l o g  t  <  m  +  1 _ 
n  —  l o g  s  n  n
g i v e n  a n y  e > 0 , 3 m , n s . t . log 1 1 l o g  s  1
F r o m  t h e  m o n o t o n i c i t y  o f  A ( n ) ,  A ( s m )  £  A ( t n )  <  A ( s m + 1 ) .
H e n c e  g i v e n  a n y  c  >  0  3 m ,  n  s . t .  -  j r ^ y l  <  5  •
. * .  g i v e n  a n y  e  >  0 ,  -  1 § | - § I  «  e
A ( t )  =  k  l o g  t ,  k  >  0  t o  s a t i s f y  ( i i ) .
n iN o w  s u p p o s e  x  ,  - - - - ,  x n  o c c u r  w i t h  p r o b a b i l i t i e s  p ^  =  — - - - - - -
I  n .
n A  i n t e g e r s .  i « i  1
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From (iii), k log = H(Pl » ---, Pn) + k I p± log
H = k(E p^ log m i •- Ep± log n±) (ZPj = 1)
= -k rpi nlog 1 *1
= -k sp± log p ^
Note if are incommensurable they may be approximated by 
rationals and continuity condition means that same expression 
holds for H.
H is therefore a unique measure of the uncertainty or 
"entropy" contained in a probability distribution.
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Appendix 9.1 Claimants for Benefit« 1948-1982
Y EA R 1.UB 2 .SB 3 .N C IP 4 .MB 5 .MA 6 .CB 7 .OA 8 .rsA 9 .TV3 1 0 .WR 1 1 .1 9 4 81 94 91 9 5 01951195219531 9 5 419551 95 619571 9 5 819591 9 6 019611 96 21 96 31 9 6 419651 96 619671 96 819691 9 7 01971197219731 9 7 419751 9 7 619771 9 7 81 97 91 9 8 019811982
^ 1 3 4 6 )  2 7 3 6  2 7 9 6  2 4 7 9  3 5 8 4  2 8 4 9  2 6 0 6  2 32 2  2611 2 5 7 5  3 5 1 8  3 0 0 2  2 4 4 7  2 4 8 9  3 45 1  3 3 9 6  2 4 3 6  2 3 6 4  2 6 3 3  3 2 7 5  3 1 1 7  3 0 9 8  3 1 5 9  3 5 7 0  3 3 6 0  2 7 9 3  3 2 1 8  4 4 2 7  4 7 7 5  4 6 0 0  4 3 8 4  4 2 7 1  5 13 1  4 9 1 2  5 10 1
2 98 46 9 4 87 3 0 075456 58 773767173791977629 6 0 978878 7 6 88 3 1 9915290029 33 68 9 9 89 56 51 09251 0 0 4 81 0 6 0 81 1411106 3 28 8 0 19 7 6 41 00 2 29 86 39 6 0 1107 4 510151111 6 71 0 7 8 89 37 67 56 96 9 0 5
1336 .5  6 .36 .5  8 .11 0 .4N /AV
(369)* 738 748 752 747 (74 7 )* (737 f  737 761 773 807 819 8 34 857 8 989 0 9  9 2 0  941 9 249 10 8 79 8 69 8 22 825 822 726 671 637 6 34 582 587 622 6 59 654 6 06
" (5 6 )  112 124 143 153 (1 5 3  f  (1 9 6 /  196 164 174187188 188 198 211 216 217 234 245 2 50 245243 233 241 247 222 216 217 253244 277 317 351 365 330
3285** (3 7 5 ;« ( 3 7 5 ;499502495484 482485 484 502 550 584 603 632 644 656 658 637 621 624 610 593 575 528 477 437 424 3973 27 0466493484413448
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Notes
A11 . ff^ures in thousands. Bracketed figures estimated -
1• Unemployment Benefit (UB).
New^ claims (100% count) including second and subsequent claxms in same year. Commences July 1948.
a. Estimated by divding number of claims from July 1948 to July 1949 (2727) by 2.
2. Sickness Benefit (SB).
New ^ claims (100% count) including second and subsequent claims in same year. Commenced July 1948.
3. Non-Contributory Invalidity Pension (NCIP).
New claims (100%) count. Commenced November 1975. 1976 
figure includes 1975 claims.
4. Maternity Benefit (MB).
Number of awards for maternity grants — counting multiple births as one award.
b. Estimated by dividing figures for 1949 by 2.
c. Estimate based on 1952 and 1955 data - basis of award changed at this time.
5. Maternity Allowance (MA) .
Number of awards of maternity allowances.
6. Family Allowance / Child Benefit (CB).
1946-1977 - number of new claims received from familiesplus additional claims received from families already 
receiving allowances plus claims for revival of allowances following a break in entitlement.
1978-1982 - additions to number of families receiving
Child Benefit during year.
d. Commenced August 1946 - claims for 1946 and 1947
included in 1948 figure.
e. Claims for July 1949 to December 1950 averaged over 
1949 and 1950.
7. Guardian's Allowance (QA).
Number of awards made in year. Commenced July 1948.
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Estimated for 1966 to 1982.
f. Figure for 1948 represents awards made from July 1948 to June 1949. Figure for 1949 represents awards from July 1949 to December 1950.
8. Child Special Allowance (CSA).
Allowances in payment at 31 December - number of children. Commenced November 1957.
9. Death Grant (DG).
Number of grants paid in year. Commenced July 1949.
g. July - December.
h. Estimates based on reported costs of payments.
10. Widow'8 Benefit (WB).
Number of awards made excluding widow's allowance in year to 31 March. Commenced July 1948.
11. Widow's Allowance (WA).
Number of awards made in year to 31 March. Commenced July 
1948.
i. 452,000 in payment on 30 June 1949 mostly converted from previous widow's pension scheme. Figure used refers 
to new claims in first year of scheme.
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Appendix 9.2 Sources of Stati8tic8 on Numbers of Claims
1. Social Security Statistics 1972/.../1983,HMSO.
2. Report of the Ministry of National Insurance for the 
period 17th November 1944 to 4th July 1949, HMSO, 
Cmd. 7955.
3. Second Report of the Ministry of National Insurance 
for the period 5th July 1949 to 31st December 1950, 
HMSO, Cmd. 8412.
4. Third Report of the Ministry of National Insurance for 
the year 1951, HMSO, Cmd. 8635.
5. Fourth Report of the Ministry of National Insurance 
for the year 1952, HMSO, Cmd. 8882.
6. Report of the Ministry of Pensions and National
Insurance for the year 1953, HMSO, Cmd. 9159.
7. Report of the Ministry of Pensions and National
Insurance for the year 1954, HMSO, Cmd. 9495.
8. Report of the Ministry of Pensions and National
Insurance for the year 1955, HMSO, Cmd. 9826.
9. Report of the Ministry of Pensions and National
Insurance for the year 1956, HMSO, Cmnd. 229.
10. Report of the Ministry of Pensions and National
Insurance for the year 1957, HMSO, Cmnd. 493.
11. Report of the Ministry of Pensions and National
Insurance for the year 1958, HMSO, Cmnd. 826.
12. Report of the Ministry of Pensions and National
Insurance for the year 1959, HMSO, Cmnd• 1133.
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13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
2 0 . 
21 . 
22 .
23.
24.
25.
26.
Report of the Ministry of Pensions and National
Insurance for the year 1960, HMSO, Cmnd. 1458.
Report of the Ministry of Pensions and National
Insurance for the year 1961, HMSO, Cmnd. 1764.
Report of the Ministry of Pensions and National
Insurance for the year 1962, HMSO, Cmnd. 2069.
Report of the Ministry of Pensions and National
Insurance for the year 1963, HMSO, Cmnd. 2392.
Report of the Ministry of Pensions and National
Insurance for the year 1964, HMSO, Cmnd.2686.
Report of the Ministry of Pensions and National
Insurance for the year 1965 HMSO, Cmnd. 3046.
Report of the Ministry of Social Security for the 
year 1966, HMSO, Cmnd. 3338.
Report of the Ministry of Social Security for the 
year 1967, HMSO, Cmnd. 3693.
Annual Report of the Department of Health and Social 
Security for the year 1968, HMSO, Cmnd. 4100.
Annual Report of the Department of Health and Social 
Security for the year 1969, HMSO, Cmnd. 4462.
Department of Health and Social Security Annual 
Report 1970, HMSO, Cmnd. 4714.
Annual Report of the Department of Health and Social 
Security for the year 1971, HMSO, Cmnd. 5019.
Department of Health and Social Security Annual
Report 1972, HMSO, Cmnd. 5352.
Department of Health and Social Security Annual
Report 1973, HMSO, Cmnd. 5700.
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27 of Health and Social 
HMSO, Cmnd. 6150.
Security AnnualDepartment 
Report 1974,
28. Department of Health 
Report 1975, HMSO, Cmnd.
29. Department of Health 
Report 1976, HMSO, Cmnd.
30. Department of Health 
Report 1977, HMSO, Cmnd.
and Social Security Annual
6565 •
and Social Security Annual
6931 •
and Social Security Annual
7394
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Appendix 10.1 Notes to Child Benefit, and One Parent 
Benefit District Level Maps
1. City of London was left blank in all maps due to the 
exceptional nature of its population.
2. Peterborough recipients were divided between 
Peterborough and Huntingdon districts in proportion to 
the estimates of the eligible populations due to an 
irregulatity in recipient data for these districts.
3. Sedgefield and Teesdale recipients were combined and 
distributed between the two districts in proportion to 
the estimates of the eligible populations due to an 
irregularity in data for these districts.
4. Data for the districts in the county of Hereford and 
Worcestershire appear to be exceptionally confused and 
the results of the analysis for this county should be 
treated with due caution.
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